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SuFFixation and wHat ELSE? 
a cognitivE LinguiStic anaLySiS   
oF tHE Hungarian dEvErbaL SuFFix -Ó.
ErzsébEt tóth-Czifra
Abstract
Unlike other areas of grammar, the category of affixes is a yet unexplored area of the cog-
nitive linguistic description of Hungarian grammar. The present study intends to start to fill 
this gap and provides a cognitively plausible account of the Hungarian deverbal suffix -Ó. 
By adopting a combined approach of corpus and cognitive linguistics, the paper attempts to 
answer the following questions. 1. In exactly which ways do -Ó constructions reflect cogni-
tive construals? 2. How is the semantic structure of the suffix -Ó structured by meaning 
extensions? 3. What is and what is not metonymical in this semantic structure? And finally, 
4. On which levels of constructional organization can metonymic patterns of meaning con-
strual be identified? After a thorough corpus and cognitive linguistic analysis of data ex-
tracted from the Hungarian Gigaword Corpus (Oravecz–Váradi–Sass 2014), the paper 
comes to the general conclusion that the semantic map of -Ó is structured by metonymic 
meaning extensions of different sorts. While the functions of -Ó resulting from these meaning 
extensions proved to be straightforward cases of word-formation metonymies (action for 
agent, action for location, action for object involved in the action, and action for charac-
teristics), the core meaning of the present participial -Ó constructions was interpreted as 1. 
as a secondary action in a multiple action scenario as well as 2. a reference-point helping 
in the identification of the agent. Furthermore, the metonymic extensions are represented in 
all three levels of meaning construal: 1. on the level of individual constructions 2. on the 
level of constructional schemas, and 3. also in the semantic structure of the affix itself. 
Bearing all this in mind, the author argues for the flexibility of coding and construal contra-
ry to the perceived arbitrariness of grammar.
Keywords: affixational word-formation, conceptual metonymy, cognitive grammar, token 
frequency, type frequency, constructional schemas
1. Introduction 
Research on word-formation metonymies attracts a rapidly growing attention within the 
cognitive linguistics enterprise. Iconic manifestations of this interest include articles such as 
Dirven (1999), Panther and Thronburg (2001, 2003), Schönefeld (2005), Ungerer (2007), 
Janda (2011) and Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2014a). Its central position within the cognitive 
linguistics paradigm is reflected by the fact that current debates on the topic were hosted by 
Cognitive Linguistics (22/2, 25/2). A possible reason for this heavy interest towards word-for-
mation metonymies is that this phenomenon can be postulated as an organic synthesis of two 
main research areas of cognitive linguistics, namely: 1. the description of grammar in terms 
of cognitive construals and 2. metonymy studies.  
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On the one hand, the recognition of language as a main representation of how humans 
interpret the world and make sense of experiences (Kövecses 2006) opened up a radically 
new perspective on the description of grammar (as opposed to the generativist tradition). 
Instead of postulating an autonomous language module,  a foundational goal of cognitive 
linguistics, or more specifically cognitive grammar, is “to explain linguistic phenomena  in 
terms of general cognitive strategies” (Langacker 1987: 12–13) such as categorization, pro-
totype effects, mental spaces, image schemas, figure-ground alignment, generalization, sche-
matization, analogy and by means of figurative meaning extensions via metaphor, metonymy 
and conceptual integration. An especially relevant increment of this cognitively plausible 
view of grammar in the context of the present paper is the recognition that just like morpho-
logically simple and complex words, their lower constituents (e.g. suffixes) as well as higher 
levels of linguistic organization (e.g. syntactic and discourse patterns) are also representa-
tions of cognitive construals, and as such, they are considered as meaningful symbolic units, 
however schematic this meaning might be. Moreover, just like lexical units, they also have 
the capability to exhibit polysemy. Along this path, the initially lexeme-centered cognitive 
linguistic descriptions started to push their boundaries above and below the lexeme level by 
explaining discourse strategies and syntactic patterns as well as inflectional morphology as 
representations of general cognitive meaning-making mechanisms. 
On the other hand, from the late 1990’s, accelerating interest in metonymy resulted in a 
“metonymy turn of a kind” (Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2014a) within the field of cognitive 
linguistics. Not only has metonymy been recognized as a fundamental conceptual operation 
(Kövecses–Radden 1998, Radden–Kövecses 1999), but it has also proved to be just as ubiq-
uitous as metaphor (Radden 2005). This growing attention towards metonymy (represented 
in monographs like Panther–Radden (1999), Barcelona (2000), Dirven and Pörings (2002), 
Benczes et al. (2011), Brdar (2007) Thornburg–Barcelona (2009) shed light on many inherent 
problems and hidden complexities in metonymic meaning-making, most of which are cen-
tered around the difficulties in setting limits on the notion of conceptual metonymy. 
Interestingly, in research on word-formation metonymies, these hidden complexities in 
metonymic meaning-making seem to be present in high density and as such, it can be con-
sidered as a “veterinarian’s horse” of metonymy studies. Here the need for a proper definition 
of metonymy – i.e. where does it begin and stop1, or what is the focal point in the emergence 
of metonymy from weaker forms of reference-point phenomena (cf. Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 
(2014a, 2014b) and Langacker (1993) for a contrasting view) – seems to be especially decisive 
in uncovering both similarities and differences between word-formation metonymies and 
lexical metonymies. Considering this, in the following I will briefly touch upon two such 
definition-oriented problems that have serious implications in the study of metonymy in 
affixational word-formation. 
1.1. The broad vs. the strict definitions of metonymy and their implications  
in affix polysemy
Those who rely on the broader definition of metonymy, which is the quasi adoption of the 
Langackerian idea (Langacker 1993: 29–35; Langacker 1999: 199) of the equality of metonymy 
1 This phrasing is intended to evoke the titles of two influential definition-related studies on metonymy 
(namely Paradis 2004, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2014a). 
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and reference-point phenomena, argue for the pervasiveness of metonymic patterns in affix-
ational word-formation. In these accounts (Colman–Anderson 2004, Basilio 2006, Janda 
2010, 2011, Nesset 2010) practically the base of the suffixation is interpreted as the metonym-
ic source domain and the morphologically complex derivation (i.e. the suffixation itself) is 
interpreted as the metonymic target. As an example, Janda (2011) identifies the Russian 
suffixation saxarnica (lit. ‘sugar’-nica) ‘sugar-bowl’ and the Czech suffixation květináč 
(lit.‘flower’-áč) ‘flower-pot’ respectively as instances (and products) of the ConTainEd for 
ConTainEr conceptual metonymy, where the bases saxar and květin serve as source domains, 
the suffixations saxarnica and květináč as the targets and the suffixes -nica and -áč serve 
the contexts for the metonymic relationship (Janda 2011: 360). 
By contrast, those who intend to limit the notion of metonymy to an overtly unmarked 
meaning shift from one reading of the symbolic unit (i.e. the suffixation in our case) to an-
other (see Panther–Thrornburg 2001, 2003, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2014a, 2014b) evaluate 
the idea of word-formation metonymy in the previous sense (i.e. in the sense of Nesset (2010), 
Janda (2011), etc.) as a broad overgeneralization of the notion of conceptual metonymy which 
seriously threatens the explanatory power of metonymy itself.2 This, however, does not mean 
that the narrow view of metonymy would deny the existence of metonymic patterns in affix-
ational word-formation. Instead, the consensus over the existence of affix polysemy directs 
our attention to another source of ambiguity, namely on which levels of constructional or-
ganization metonymical meaning construal takes place.  
1.2. Different views on the operation of metonymy along the levels  
of constructional organization
As a case of affix polysemy in a strict sense, Janda (2011) and Nesset (2010) argue that in the 
case of affixational word-formation, metonymy operates on the suffix. As such, they identi-
fy suffixes with the strong capability to exhibit metonymic patterns, some of which are 
claimed to accommodate fifteen or sixteen metonymies.3 In Janda’s (2011: 375) taxonomy, 
such strongly polysemous word-formation devices are called versatile suffixes. Similarly, 
Panther and Thornburg (2001, 2003) also argue for the suffix-level representation of meton-
ymy, in spite of the fact that they argue against the overt markedness of metonymy. In addi-
tion to and clearly separated from metonymies operating within the suffix, they also identi-
fy metonymic and metaphoric processes operating on the base. By contrast and following 
from the strict definition of metonymy (that is, the morpholexical invariance involved in 
metonymic meaning construal), Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2014a,b) (in line with Bybee (2006, 
2010)) argue that metonymy in word-formation takes place primarily on the level of individ-
ual constructions as a result of 1. idiomatization due to entrenchment and consequently 2. the 
2 This latter view of metonymy in word-formation shows a higher degree of congruency with other, theo-
retically groundbreaking studies on metonymy such as Barcelona (2000) and Benczes at al. (2006).
3  “However, most suffixes are much less specific and some can signal a wide variety of metonymy patterns.
(…) Multiple metonymy patterns are common among suffixes: Norwegian has up to eleven metonymies for 
a given suffix, and the figures for Russian and Czech are fifteen and sixteen respectively (for more detail, 
see Section 3.4). The point is that a word-formational affix can be highly non-specific in terms of identifying 
the relevant metonymy. Affixes are sublexical and abstract, and in terms of metonymy they often under-
specify the relationship involved.” (ibid. 361)
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post-hoc emergence4 of metonymy in suffixations, which in turn 3. can trigger analogical 
changes and schema-level abstractions. Consequently, they reject the idea of the suffix-level 
representation of metonymy patterns; instead, it is argued that similarly to lexical metony-
mies, an extension is carried out from one meaning of the suffixation to another. finally, and 
as a third approach, Basilio (2006) does not even takes the challenge of the precise identifi-
cation of source and target or the position of metonymy patterns along the levels of construc-
tional organization.
In sum, the great deal of ambiguity regarding these issues, the sharply contrasting views 
and conceptions as well as the intensity of such debates show that the above questions and 
problems are far from being settled. Additionally, previous research on the topic (i.e. affix 
polysemy in particular and word-formation metonymy in general) has suffered from a num-
ber of shortcomings. 1. first of all, no study has yet strived to look at the correlations between 
idiomatization (i.e. metonymical meaning construal in our case) and the dynamics of lan-
guage use in contemporary corpus data, despite massive evidence for the high degree of 
intertwining of the emergence of meaning shifts with the dynamicity of language use in the 
usage-based literature (e.g. Barlow–Kemmer 2000, Langacker 2000, Bybee 2006, Taylor 
2012). In terms of data collection, studies on word-formation metonymy mainly rely on either 
the grammar book approach or the mere inventory of suffixation patterns instead of using 
naturally-occurring corpus data.5 2. Second, although cross-linguistic diversity is a relevant 
issue within this field (e.g. preference for conversion vs. preference for affixation), all the 
above cited studies investigate Indo-European languages. As such, in terms of the canonic 
(basic-level) categories of language typology, all of the studied languages belong to the same 
type of fusional languages. Considering this, it is suggested that research on languages oth-
er than fusional ones would be especially beneficial as it would give a more accurate picture 
of diversity in word-formation metonymies. Moreover, agglutinating languages seem to be 
especially suitable for the study of affix polysemy since the high frequency of affixational 
word-formation patterns (as opposed to other means of word-formation such as conversion) 
is one of their typological features (Comrie 1987). 
2. Aims
Bearing all this in mind, I wish to contribute to the research on affix polysemy in particular 
and word-formation metonymies in general. In order to uncover some metonymic patterns 
in Hungarian word-formation, the deverbal suffix -Ó will be the case in point. Such investi-
gation is especially needed if we consider that unlike other areas of grammar, the grammat-
ical category of affixes is a yet unexplored area6 of the cognitive linguistic description of 
4 “However, we believe that appearances are deceiving and that what is referred to as polysemy or polyfunc-
tionality of affixes is the result of a generalization over a number of individual cases of polysemy of specif-
ic morphologically complex words. In other words, it is a post-factum type of phenomenon. On more theo-
retical grounds, there are reasons no to assume that metonymies (or metaphors) invariably extend the 
meaning of an affix detached from its bases and the affix is then added to certain bases to produce new 
lexemes with the given meaning. ” (ibid. 317–318.)
5 for an axception, see Hartmann (2015) who provides a proper corpus analysis on the Geman deverbal 
suffix -ung from a diachronical perspective. 
6 for the only axception, see fekete (2013) who investigates the -stul/stül suffix which can be posited onto 
the borderline between inflcetional and derivational morphology. 
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Hungarian grammar.7 This lack of attention is even more striking in the light of the above 
claims on the richness of agglutinative languages in affixes. Having a rich system of deriva-
tional affixes (see e.g. Kiefer and Laasko 2014: 486–489) makes Hungarian especially suit-
able for the study of affix-polysemy. 
Based on all this, the aim of the present study is to study some important features of affix 
polysemy in general and to provide a cognitive linguistic description of the Hungarian de-
verbal suffix -Ó in particular by answering the following questions:
 
1. In exactly which ways do -Ó constructions reflect cognitive construals? 
2. How is the semantic structure of the suffix -Ó structured by meaning extensions?
3. what is and what is not metonymical in this semantic structure? And finally: 
4. On which levels of constructional organization can metonymic patterns of meaning 
construal be identified? That is, can we talk about affix polysemy in a strict sense in 
the case of -Ó?  
3. Methodology
The present paper adopts a combined approach of corpus and cognitive linguistics. Data 
were collected from three sources: 1. As a starting point, the most widely-used Hungarian 
comprehensive grammar books were consulted, with Velcsov (1968) and Lengyel (2000) 
representing a descriptive framework and Laczkó (2000) and Kiefer (1998) representing a 
generativist approach. 2. Natural usage-based data was culled from the personal (személy-
es) subcorpus of the Hungarian Gigaword Corpus (henceforth HGC, Oravecz–Váradi–Sass 
2014). The choice of this subcorpus was justified by two considerations. firstly, its size (it 
contains 338,600,000 tokens in contrast to the total amount of 1,532,933,778 tokens in 
HGC) makes it possible to conduct quantitative and qualitative analyses at the same time. 
Secondly and most importantly, the lack (or very low percentage) of patterns of everyday 
language use in HGC, i.e. the dominance of literary texts and newspapers, was kept in 
mind. It is assumed that the subcorpus compiled from forum texts exhibits patterns of 
language use that are closer to the everyday registers and as such, shows a more balanced 
picture of language use (in contrast to the other, literary works and newspaper arti-
cles-dominated modules of HGC). Thirdly, in order to account for patterns of -Ó neolo-
gisms in language use, the “fabulous linguists’ playground” (Taylor 2012: 17), Google was 
also consulted. 
As to the issue of metonymy-identification in the course of the analysis: complexities in 
the task of identifying metonymies in discourse are reflected by the fact that (up to my 
knowledge, at least) for this purpose there are no such conventionally used methods or cri-
teria established as they exist for the identification of metaphor (MIP or MIPVU). Thus in 
the course of the analysis I will simply rely on the following, widely accepted8 definition of 
conceptual metonymy: “Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, 
7 This, however, does not amount to a complete lack of usage-based accounts regarding affixational word-for-
mation in Hungarian.  In the framework of functional linguistics and natural morphology, Ladányi (2007) 
serves as a valuable input for the cognitive linguistic study of the field. 
8 The conventional acceptedness of this definition is also reflected by the fact that both Panther and Thornburg 
(2001), (2003), Janda (2011) and Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2014a) reckon it as a starting point for metonymy 
analysis. 
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the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same 
domain, or ICM” (Kövecses–Radden 1998: 39). 
4. Cognitive construals behind the semantic matrix of -Ó 
Hungarian comprehensive grammars agree that the deverbal suffix -Ó is a highly polyfunc-
tional one and they are also quasi-consistent9 in the identification of its functions. In terms 
of thematic roles, it is used in:
 
a) present participles e.g. álló (áll (‘to stand’)+ -ó → ‘standing’), létező10 (‘existing’) 
b) adjectives denoting characteristics e.g. forró (‘hot’), különböző (‘different’)
c) agent nouns, either occasional or professional, e.g. olvasó (‘reader (of a book)’, 
hozzászóló (‘commenter’) and író ( ‘writer’), szerző11 (‘author’) respectively
d) instrument nouns, e.g. rugó (‘spring’), riasztó (‘alarm’)
e) purpose location nouns e.g. háló(szoba) (‘bedroom’), parkoló (‘parking area’)
f) complex event nouns e.g. esküvő (‘wedding’), lakásavató (‘flat warming party’)
The hierarchy of these functions in terms of their evolvement12  can be seen in figure 1. Here 
the spatial distance among the given functions represents their grammatical (and – as will 
be seen later – also their conceptual) distance from the base. 
9 There are only two considerable differences in the assignment of the functions in the different accounts. 
1. Laczkó (2000) distinguishes an occasional instrument category or function as well. 2. The older, descrip-
tive grammar books, such as Velcsov (1968) make reference to an archaic, nowadays already unproductive 
patient noun (nomen patientis) function as well. They mention examples like szántóföld (‘plough land’) and 
költőpénz (‘spending-money’). Based on corpus data, however, a much more straightforward example of 
this schema suggests itself: in the personal corpus of HGC adó ‘tax’ (derived from the verb ad ‘give’) is by 
far the most frequent type of all the -Ó nouns with a token frequency of 1287. furthermore, a higher degree 
of diversity is manifested in how these different accounts relate the many functions of -Ó to each other (i.e. 
whether the focus is on the overlaps and contiguity  between them (like in Velcsov 1968) or rather on the 
criteria for their clear delineation (as in Kiefer 2000, Laczkó 2000).
10 Examples are taken from the 10 most frequent types of -Ó nouns in each category (e.g. agent noun, in-
strument noun etc.) in the personal subcorpus of the HGC.
11 The suffix -Ó comes in two variants: the back-voweled -ó and the front-voweled -ő. 
12 This model of evolvement is also supported by the etymology of the examples respectively in Benkő 
(1967-1984) and also supported by diachronic descriptions of -Ó (such as A. Jászó 1991, Károly 1956). As 
to this latter: the fact that the suffix arose during the Uralic period and as such, even its polyfunctionality 
had been emerged far before the first written documents of Hungarian, raise serious difficulties in providing 
a proper, unambiguous description of the historical development of the functions of -Ó.  for a more detailed 
summary of such complexities (see Tóth-Czifra 2016). 
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Figure 1: function of suffixations in -Ó. (source: own construction.)
As the term deverbal suggests, -Ó constructions have verbs as bases. At the same time, in 
many cases the present participle -Ó constructions give rise to both adjectives and nouns via 
conversion, exhibiting the word-formation patterns [V+ -ó]
part 
 → [V+-ó]
adj
  e.g. forró 
part
 
(‘boiling’) → forró 
adj
, (‘hot’) or [V+-ó]
part 
 → [V+-ó]
adj 
 e.g. író 
part
 (‘a writing person’) → 
író 
noun
 (‘writer’). furthermore, another portion of -Ó nouns are the result of ellipsis from a 
compound/phrase in which the -Ó component first acquires an adjectival meaning, as in folyo 
vyz (transcr. folyó víz, ‘flowing water’, Jók.K 140,) → folyó (‘river’) or hálószoba (‘bedroom’) 
→ háló (‘bedroom’).13 
As to the development of these functions of -Ó, Laczkó (2000: 402) argues against the 
deductibility of functions e) and f) (that is, the instrumental and complex event -Ó nouns) 
from the other functions of -Ó. with this incompatibility in mind, he postulates another -Ó 
suffix which shows a ‘fake homonymy’ (álhomonim) relationship to the original present 
participial -Ó. Contrary to this approach, in the following a more coherent, network model 
of the suffix -Ó will be outlined. Instead of fake homonymy, it is argued that these seeming-
ly diverse functions are conceptually related as they result from systematic metonymic mean-
ing extensions.  
Based on its above summarized polyfunctionality, it can be put forward that the deverbal 
suffix -Ó is a polysemous symbolic unit. In order to account for the semantic map of -Ó, the 
first step is the identification of the central sense of the suffix which serves as a basis of its 
meaning extensions. Notice that the map of functions in figure 1 already suggests how these 
seemingly diverse functions are conceptually related.
13 for a third possibility, that is, the direct derivation of -Ó nouns from verbs, see section 5.
  PART PART/ADJ ADJ
  forró (‘boiling’), aggódó (‘worrying’) aggódó (‘worrying/worrier’) forró (‘hot’)
 + -Ó író (‘writing’)  hálószoba (‘bedroom’)
 V
 ír (‘to write’)
 aggódik (‘to worry’)
 forr (‘to boil’)
  N occasional
  író (‘author of a text’)
  N professional, typical
  író (‘writer’) szűrő (‘filter’), esküvő (‘wedding’), háló (‘bedroom’)
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4.1. The core meaning of suffixations in -Ó as a reference-point phenomenon
In line with the diachronic development of the suffix, the present participle meaning or 
function seems to be the primary one. Here the suffixation is considered as a composite 
structure (Langacker 1987) resulting from mutual elaboration (with emergent properties) 
between the base verb and the suffix. This composite structure as a symbolic unit serves 1. 
to designate a secondary action in a multiple action scenario (again, in the sense of Langacker 
1987) and also 2. as a reference point helping in the identification of an agent.
(1)  A cikket író diákok jól le lettek dorongolva.
 (‘The students who wrote the article were harshly scolded.’)
Sentence (1) shows a random present participle example from the HGC.14 what can be seen 
here is a complex scenario, consisting of two actions: the scolding of the students as the 
primary one and the writing of the article by the students as the secondary one. As such, (1) 
is an instantiation of figure ground alignment where the action expressed by the finite verb 
form serves as a figure, since it is more salient than the secondary action expressed by the 
-Ó construction, which serves as a ground. On the other hand, the -Ó construction becomes 
the salient element if we restrict the scope of analysis to the NP, i.e. to the cikket író diákok 
(‘the students who wrote the article’) part. within the scope of the NP, the -Ó construction 
has a referential function (in the sense of Ruiz de Mendoza and Velasco 2002). That is, the 
secondary action is salient enough to clearly identify or designate the agent(s) in a particular 
context. In another words, it serves as a reference-point (Langacker 1999: 199) to the agents, 
i.e. to the particular students in question. This feature of present participle -Ó constructions 
shows similarity to referential metonymies, such as ham sandwich in the sentence The ham 
sandwich wants the bill (just to refer to a classic, extensively studied example). There is 
however a decisive difference between present participle -Ó constructions and ham sandwich 
in terms of metonymic meaning-making. In the case of ham sandwich, apart from providing 
reference to the agent (i.e. to clearly identify it in a particular context), it also stands for the 
agent. Such a stand for relationship is not present in the case of present participle -Ó con-
structions, such as író in (1). In conclusion: such -Ó constructions are not exhibiting meto-
nymic patterns. Instead, they 1. designate a secondary action/event in a complex scenario. 
2. serve as a reference point for the identification of the agent(s). Although I am aware that 
-Ó constructions do not necessarily profile actions in a strict sense, I will henceforth refer to 
this core meaning (or source meaning) as aCTion in cognitive terms.15
14 All the further examples are also taken from the personal subcorpus of HGC. 
15 This decision stays in contrast with Langacker (2008), who claims that only finite verbs can exhibit tem-
poral relations, and as such can serve as aCTion source domains, while other verb forms, e.g. the gerund -ing, 
are processed by summary scanning, consequently they lose their temporality. Contrary to this explanation 
in this paper the non-finite present participle -Ó constructions are considered as temporal (although not 
prototypically temporal) relations for three reasons. first, these constructions show a relative temporality 
as they are isochronic with the primary temporal relation expressed by the finite verb form. Second, they 
also show an inner temporality or inner temporal structure i.e. aspect as they express ongoing, continuous 
actions and finally, because of the controversial nature of the sequential vs. summary scanning dichotomy. 
for a detailed discussion on this latter, see Broccias and Hollmann (2007). Also, for a detailed argument for 
the temporality of present participial -Ó constructions in terms of profiling see Tóth-Czifra (2016). 
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This present participle sense then, i.e. the actual, physical ongoing action can serve as a 
source domain and can provide mental access to other thematic roles. These thematic roles are 
accommodated within an aCTion iCm, and as such, meaning extensions from the action core 
sense carried out within the aCTion iCm – are clearly metonymic in nature. figure 2 illustrates 
these metonymic mappings that motivate the figurative meanings of -Ó constructions.16 
Figure 2: The semantic map of the Hungarian deverbal suffix -Ó.
4.2. From ongoing aCtions to profEssional agEnts
One line of meaning extension leads towards ThinGs and human aGEnTs. In cases where there 
is an action that is typical or habitual (or permanent) for an agent, this particular agent can be 
accessed or conceptually construed via this actual, ongoing, typically physical action, exhib-
iting therefore the aCTion for ThE aGEnT generic level metonymy. Exactly this happens in (2).
(2) a. A level írója még 2 hónap múlva se kapott választ. (‘The writer of the letter hasn’t 
received any answer for 2 months’)
 b. A legjobb reklámot egy író találta ki. (‘The best commercial was invented by a 
writer.’)
(2a) and (2b) are however on different degrees/levels of idiomaticity. In (2a) a non-profes-
sional (i.e. occasional) agent is present and as such, here the aCTion for ThE non-profEssional 
aGEnT sub-metonymy is instantiated. This level of meaning extension exhibits a lower degree 
of conceptual and grammatical autonomy than (2b) where the metonymic target is a profes-
sional agent. In terms of conceptual construal, in (2a) the target író (‘writer’) is more close-
ly tied to a given instantiation of the aCTion iCm (in this case the írás/wriTinG iCm.), as it is 
elaborated in relation to another entity of this specific action scenario, namely the objECT/
paTiEnT ElEmEnT of it in terms of a possessive relationship. As such, here the (untypical) 
16 function f), that is, the complex event meaning of -Ó constructions is missing from here. The lack of this 
extended meaning from figure 2 is explained at the end of the section. 
 ACTION ICM
  ONGOING ACTION HABITUAL ACTION CHARACTERISTICS
  AGENT (OCCASIONAL)  
INSTRUMENT
  AGENT (TYPICAL)  
PURPOSE LOCATION
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possessor, the letter serves as a reference-point for the identification of its possessed entity, 
its writer within the aCTion iCm. In other words, just as in the case of (1), here the refer-
ence-point phenomenon is present as well.17 This conceptual construal is illustrated in figure 
3, where the bold line represents the metonymic mapping between the aCTion as a source and 
the non-profEssional aGEnT as the target, while the simple arrow represents the refer-
ence-point relation. The third arrow indicates the perspective itself, i.e. the relationship be-
tween the conceptualizer/viewer and the reference-point.
Figure 3: paTiEnT serving as a reference-point for non-profEssional aGEnT  
within the aCTion iCm.
By contrast, the target for író (‘writer’) in (2b) is a profEssional aGEnT who is a conceptually 
autonomous being (as entities denoted by nouns generally are).18 first, its autonomy is re-
flected by the fact that based on our culturally conditioned knowledge (or cultural model) on 
the target, i.e. people who make their living from writing, író in this sense is capable of 
evoking a rich cognitive content. Consequently, many elements of this cultural model (in the 
sense of Kövecses (2006) and the encyclopedic view of meaning (see Langacker 1987)) are 
independent already from the action of wriTinG. for instance, apart from writing they also 
participate in literary events, such as dedication events), give interviews, or eventually are 
requested to create commercials, as in our case in (2b). All this conceptual richness and in-
dependence from the particular action of writing is missing from (2a), where the profiled 
entity in the target is much less elaborated, as it is restricted to a random person who writes 
a letter. Accordingly, the target of (2a) is closely tied to the given situation.  
17 for a detailed analysis of possessive constructions as reference points see Langacker (1993, 1995) and 
Taylor (1996). with regard to the Hungarian possessive constructions see Tolcsvai Nagy (2013: 255–267). 
18 for a discussion on conceptual autonomy with regard to word-class categories see Radden – Dirven 
(2007), Langacker (2000).
 ACTION ICM
 S T
 ACTION AGENT
 R
 OBJECT/PATIENT
 C
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In sum, what can be seen between (2a) and (2b) is a gradual meaning shift (involving the 
spECifiC for GEnEriC and aCTualiTy for poTEnTialiTy generic level metonymies) from an ac-
tual, situation-tied relationship to a conceptually and grammatically independent entity 
which does not necessarily involve a specific instantiation of the aCTion iCm (in this case, that 
of wriTinG) anymore. Corpus data shows that this metonymic meaning shift is well-en-
trenched in language use: as Table 1 shows, in the personal subcorpus of HGC, the proportion 
of író as a noun vs. író as a present participle is 807 to 65. As such, író is the fifth most fre-
quent -Ó agent noun, following újságíró (újság ‘newspaper’ + író → ‘journalist’) which is a 
compound with író in its head.
 Table 1: Token distribution of the suffixation író in the personal subcorpus of HGC.
Naturally, the fact that író in (2a) and (2b) are on different levels of conceptual autonomy and 
idiomatization is also reflected in their grammatical behavior: while the idiomatized, insti-
tutionalized profEssional aGEnT -Ó construction loses the argument structure of its base verb 
completely, in 2a. the Patient argument of the verb ír (ír – levelet ‘to write – a letter’) is 
present in the form of a possessive relation (a levél írója ‘the writer of the letter’).19 
In addition to the aCTion for aGEnT metonymy, the core meaning of -Ó constructions is 
also capable to account for insTrumEnTs20 (e.g. riasztó ‘alarm’), purposE loCaTions (e.g. 
háló(szoba) ‘bedroom’) and ComplEx EvEnTs (e.g. esküvő ‘wedding’), exhibiting therefore the 
aCTion for insTrumEnT, aCTion for purposE loCaTion and aCTion for ComplEx EvEnT metony-
mies, respectively. This latter however is missing from figure 2. The reason for that is very 
19 for a detailed discussion on the grammatical representation (or linguistic coding) of the stages of this 
word-class/conceptual category change see Kiefer (1998) and Laczkó (2000). The changes in the syntactic 
behavior of these suffixations as a result of word-class category change (e.g. losing argument structure) 
however calls into question the per definitionem unmarkedness of metonymic meaning making. Although 
morpholexical invariance is beyond question, the syntactic changes still can be interpreted as a sign of 
markedness. This is especially considerable with the lexicogrammar continuum in mind. 
20 As the dashed line inditcates in figure 2, insTrumEnTs can be also interpreted as metaphoric meaning 
extensions from profEssional aGEnTs. 
SLH_30.indd   15 2016.01.22.   16:38:02
16 ERzSéBET TóTH-CzIfRA
simple: unlike aCTion for aGEnT, aCTion for insTrumEnT and aCTion for purposE loCaTion, the 
aCTion for ComplEx EvEnT metonymy is a parT for wholE type of metonymy, in which a sa-
lient subevent/action of the complex event provides mental access to the whole complex event 
(consisting of a series of subevents). This conceptual operation is represented in figure 4. 
Figure 4: parT for wholE mapping giving rise systematically to ComplEx  
EvEnT -Ó constructions.
Interestingly, the salience of these -Ó constructions comes from the fact that their bases are 
performatives (in the sense of Austin 1962) almost exclusively, such as esküvő (esküszik ‘to take 
an oath’+ -ó → ‘wedding’), keresztelő (keresztel ‘to baptize’+-ő → ‘baptizer/christening’), 
köszöntő (köszönt ‘to toast sb’+ -ő → ’gratulatory event’. The salience of these subevents there-
fore lies in the fact that without performing them, the complex events cannot come into exist-
ence or they are not considered valid. (A wedding without taking an oath to be a husband/wife 
is not a wedding, a baptizer without the act of baptizing is not a baptizer, etc.) In the case of 
complex event -Ó constructions with non-performative verbs in their bases e.g. találkozó 
(találkozik ‘to meet’ + -ó → ‘meeting’), it can be argued that these are more recent develop-
ments which were triggered by analogy from the ones with performatives in their base.
3.3. From ongoing aCtions to CharaCtEristiCs
The other line of meaning extension leads towards adjectival meanings, that is, from TEmpo-
ral rElaTions towards aTEmporal rElaTions. In cognitive terms: first, a TypiCal, habiTual 
aCTion is accessed through the aCTually oCCurrinG/happEninG aCTion (as it is illustrated in 
figure 2) exhibiting the spECifiC for GEnEriC as well as the aCTualiTy for poTEnTialiTy gener-
ic level metonymies. This metonymic shift can be further extended towards the more abstract 
category of GEnEral CharaCTErisTiCs, which does not involve the actually occurring action 
anymore. Example (3) shows an instantiation of this metonymic chain (cf. figure 5).
Figure 5: Metonymic chain giving rise to adjectival -Ó constructions.
Complex event ICm
 SALIENT ACTION/SUBEVENT
ONGOING ACTION HABITUAL ACTION CHARACTERISTIC
 (3a) (3b) (3c) (4)
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(3) a. Az idős bácsi mellett ott állt aggódó felesége is. 
 (‘Next to the elderly man there stood his worrying wife, too.’) 
 b. A gondos és aggódó anya a kapuban várta egyetlen fiát.
 (‘The thoughtful and worried mother was waiting for her only son on the doorstep.’)
 c. Az Ikrek odaadó , törődő , aggódó stb..  
 (’Geminis are affectionate and caring, and they are genuine worriers.’)
In contrast to (3a) where aggódó exhibits the core meaning of -Ó constructions, i.e. it involves 
an ongoing action closely tied to a given situation, in (3c) a meaning shift is represented 
ranging from the temporal relation of an actually occurring, ongoing action toward an atem-
poral relation type of characteristics. Here the same stabilization process is at work as it was 
seen in the case of (2b). That is, just like the profEssional aGEnT író in (2b), here aggódó 
‘worrying’ as an aTEmpoal rElaTion becomes an inherent feature of an agent, and as such, it 
acquires independence from a particular situation (such as standing next to another person 
and worrying, as in (3a)). Unlike (3a) and (3c), where the elaboration of the -Ó constructions 
is quite straightforward, (3b) exhibits a high degree of ambiguity between the senses of the 
core meaning, the onGoinG aCTion and the lower form of its meaning extension, the habiTual 
aCTion of aggódó. As such, here not even the context proves to be sufficient enough to dis-
ambiguate between this here and now versus the TypiCal, habiTual aCTion reading of the 
construction. This example points on the gradual nature of this meaning shift, with meaning 
shifts in aggódó presenting a slow transition from the core meaning to higher degrees of 
extension. 
In sum, what can be seen is that the line of meaning extension in the construction aggódó 
ranges from the aCTually oCCurrinG aCTion (which can be equated with the present particip-
ial function of -Ó constructions) towards the clearly adjectival target of CharaCTErisTiCs. 
Nevertheless, corpus data shows that the parts of this cline are not equally frequently elab-
orated i.e. not equally typically present in language use. Table 2 sheds light on the asymme-
try in the use of aggódó as a present participle and as an adjective respectively.
 Table 2: Token distribution of aggódó in the personal subcorpus of HGC.
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In naturally occurring language use, aggódó dominantly instantiates/tends to instantiate the 
core meanings (onGoinG aCTion) or low-level meaning extension (TypiCal/pErmanEnT aCTion). 
This dminance is represented in the fact that aggódó as a present participle exhibited 113 
tokens in the corpus, while the higher level of meaning extension (CharaCTErisTiCs, repre-
sented in the word-class category of adjectives) was instantiated only 10 times. Consequent-
ly, what can be concluded from frequency data is that although aggódó has the full potential 
to be elaborated on any point in the meaning extension cline ranging from ongoing aCTions 
to CharaCTErisTiCs, in language use a clear preference is present for the lower parts of the 
cline. As such, aggódó proves to be a better candidate for being a present participle than an 
adjective.
Now let us see by contrast an instance of -Ó constructions that is dominantly used as an 
adjective and let us see in which ways it deviates from the patterns of meaning construal 
represented in aggódó. Our example is forró (‘hot’) in example (4). As Table 3 shows, forró 
was used 980 times as an adjective but only 48 times as a participle. This clearly points on 
the established, lexicalized status (Pusztai 2011: 412) of the metonymic meaning shift in the 
construction.
 Table 3: Token distribution of forró in the personal subcorpus of HGC.
(4) Ó, azok a régi, hosszú, forró nyarak!
 (‘Oh, those old, long, hot summers!’)
In Hungarian, the word for the concept of hoT ( forró 
adj
) derives from that for boilinG 
( forró 
part
). This concept, however, lost its direct connection to boiling liquids, since we use 
it in all cases when referring to high temperature. In (4), for example, for the hot temperature 
in the summer. Notice that due to the established, lexicalized status of this meaning shift, 
there was no need to show the further elaborations of forró in other contexts, since in contrast 
to aggódó, context has a negligible impact on the existence of this lexically fixed meaning 
shift. Interestingly, due to this lexical fixedness and the dominance of the adjectival sense of 
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forró, in the course of lexicalization it became detached from its original and etymological-
ly prior source meaning. As a result, for its original source meaning, i.e. in reference to 
boiling liquids, forró is not used anymore. Instead, for actually boiling liquids another ex-
pression, forrásban van/forrásban levő (‘it is in boiling’), is preferred.21 Here therefore – 
unlike in straightforward cases of metonymy, the source domain – in our case the action it-
self, i.e. boiling – is not activated or present anymore. This is what Panther and Thornburg 
(2002) and Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2014b) calls post-metonymies where “the concept that 
was the metonymic source is no longer present synchronically as part of the lexeme’s mean-
ing” (Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2014b: 317). Their independence from an actual situation, such 
as boiling water, puts this type of meaning extension outside of the aCTion iCm circle (as it is 
represented in figure 2).22
In sum, the degrees of meaning extension in the different elaborations of the construction 
aggódó in (3) and the lexicalized meaning shift represented in forró in (4) show parallels with 
író constructions in (2).
Figure 6: The stabilization process in the semantics of -Ó constructions along  
the line of meaning extensions. 
first, as it is summarized in figure 6, all these cases of metonymic meaning shifts reflect a 
stabilization process leading from tied-to-situation type of relations expressing actual, 
21 Evidence for this preference is supported by a random sample (n=50) from one of the biggest Hungarian 
online recipe collection mindmegette.hu. Out of the 50 recipes in 37 cases the actually boiling water was 
referred to by the term forrásban lévő víz ‘water in [the state of] boiling’, while forró was used only 13 times. 
Although this pattern clearly shows the detachment of the lexical entry forró from its source meaning, it is 
far from being representative. 
22 Again, the scope of the present paper does not allows for a detailed discussion on the effects of this stabi-
lization process in terms of their grammatical coding (e.g. as a sign of conceptual autonomy, adjectival -Ó 
constructions can occupy a nominal complement position etc.). for the criteria on differentiating between 
adjectival and present participle constructions see, again, Laczkó (2000) and Kiefer (1998). for a cognitive 
grammar approach towards these criteria see Tóth-Czifra (2016). 
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ongoing reality to atemporal relations being independent from one given situation and  mak-
ing use of the general-level conceptual metonymies spECifiC for GEnEriC and aCTualiTy for 
poTEnTialiTy. Second, in line with this stabilization process, an increasing degree of concep-
tual autonomy from the resulting aCTion iCm can be detected. As a result, well-entrenched 
instances of higher-level meaning shifts, as in the professional agent író and in forró, have 
the capability for reaching out, i.e. become independent from this aCTion iCm. Third and fi-
nally, frequency data points on the influential role of the dynamics of language use in the 
process of idiomatization. As can be seen, level of entrenchment has a serious impact on the 
manifestations of metonymic meaning construal. In the case of constructions with a low-
er-level entrenchment, such as aggódó, we saw that metonymic meaning shifts were unfold-
ing as a slow transition from the core meaning towards higher levels of meaning extension. 
By contrast, in heavily entrenched instances of figurative meaning construal (e.g. in forró), 
metonymy took a more radical form, namely it came in the form of post metonymies. These 
results suggest that this complex relationship between idiomatization (lexicalization, gram-
maticalization) and language use is well worth studying in the context of -Ó constructions. 
5. Does such a thing as affix polysemy in a strict sense exist in -Ó? 
After modelling the semantic matrix of -Ó constructions and identifying the metonymic 
patterns in the discourse functions of -Ó, there is one more important question remaining to 
be answered, namely, on exactly which levels of meaning construal metonymy operates. Can 
we talk about affix polysemy in the sense of metonymic meaning shifts directly represented 
in the semantic structure of the affix as well, or is it restricted for specific -Ó constructions 
(such as író, forró, aggódó)? 
Notice that previous scholarship on word-formation metonymies is far from being unam-
biguous in this respect. A brief survey on the different views on the scope of metonymy in 
affixational word-formation was outlined in the Introduction. In our case, examples in (2)-(4) 
suggest that metonymic meaning shifts are limited to particular constructions in isolation, 
instantiating therefore cases of idiomatization due to entrenchment. Consequently, these 
instances of metonymic thought could be considered as a bunch of individual cases of con-
version which show no difference from conversion patterns in morphologically simple lex-
emes (such as drink 
noun
 → to drink 
verb
).  
In the following, however, I will argue for a more systematic account of the scope of 
metonymy in affixation. Namely, I attempt to outline a schema-based account for polysemy 
in -Ó constructions which yields a multi-layered representation of metonymic patterns 
operating on all 3 levels of meaning construal: 1. on the level of particular instantiations of 
-Ó construction schemas (such as forró or író), 2. on the schema level, be it a high-level 
schema (e.g. [V+-Ó]
part
 → [V+-Ó]
adj
) or a more elaborated, lower-level schema (e.g. [N+álló] 
‘Nproof’) and finally, 3. in the internal semantic structure of the affix -Ó. 
5.1. From individual instances to schema-level representation of polysemy: The role of 
analogy in schema establishment
As it was already touched upon (see footnote 12), the fact that -Ó constructions – moreover, 
all its meaning extensions – were established around the Uralic period of the development of 
Hungarian, i.e. far before the appearance  of the first written documents in Old Hungarian, 
causes serious difficulties in describing their historical development in terms of the consecutive 
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steps of the emergence of the above outlined metonymic patterns.23 Nevertheless, there are 
reasons to assume that the establishment of metonymic patterns follows a general evolution-
ary path of grammaticalization (as it is outlined e.g. in Bybee 2006) in that analogy had an 
important role in the emergence of systematic meaning extensions, that is, in the emergence 
of generic- and specific-level constructional schemas (Langacker 2000) from individual con-
structions. 
first, again, because of the early emergence of the affix it is not easy to define exactly 
which constructions served as starting points for meaning extensions and to identify the 
initial instantiations/cases of analogy. Instead, at this point only potential patterns of analo-
gy can be outlined, serving as a hypothesis for a more thorough diachronic corpus study. As 
an example, it can be put forward that the character trait törvénytisztelő (‘low-abiding’), 
jogkövető (‘law-abiding’ again) and istenhívő (‘believer’) are results of analogical coining on 
the basis of istenfélő, which is one of the earliest  -Ó construction24 that clearly exhibits an 
adjectival sense, i.e. the habiTual/pErmanEnT aCTion for CharaCTErisTiCs metonymy.25 All 
these constructions denote behavior patterns as characteristics that show a high degree of 
conformity to a given social-moral maxim (God’s laws or the law/legal canon).  
Second, the strength of analogy in -Ó constructions is clearly illustrated by the fact that 
apart from straightforward cases of analogous meaning shift carried out via conversion (as 
previously pointed out with regard to törvénytisztelő and jogkövető), analogy gave rise even 
to backformations. As an example, the adjective apró ‘very small’ has an Old-Turkish origin, 
and it base verb aprít has never existed as a regular base for apró. Instead, it is a result of the 
recategorization or remotivation of the borrowed adjective apró according to the very pro-
ductive to a [V+ó]
part
 → [V+-ó] 
adj
 word-formation pattern. As a result, apró became con-
sidered as a regular -Ó adjective, and as such, it received an analogously coined, fake base 
verb aprít (see Benkő 1967: 233) on the basis of the already existing [Vít]+[ -ó] → [V+ó]
part
 
→ [V+-ó] 
adj
 patterns, such as taszít (‘to repulse’) → taszító (‘unattractive’), segít (‘to help’) 
→ segítő (‘helping/helper’).  The same remotivation process is reflected by the emergence 
of the archaic verb gyarlik (‘to commit something bad’), as it is also a backformation from a 
false -Ó contruction, in this case from gyarló, (‘fallible’) which also has an Old-Turkish or-
igin (Benkő 1967).26 The fact that analogy was at work even in backformations clearly points 
out the strength of analogical formations in the development of -Ó constructions.
23 for a historical corpus-based study see, again, Tóth-Czifra (2016). 
24 The oldest accessible instance of istenfélő is dated as early as 1590, in the first full Hungarian translation 
of the Holy Bible (Károli 1590). The frequent use of the construction in Bible translations and codices could 
have significantly helped the construction to gain entrenchment.
25 Here, of course, the need for more thorough corpus studies is beyond question.
26 In the case of these analogously recategorized, fake -Ó adjectives it would be especially interesting to 
conduct an experiment with the same procedure as in wheeler and Schumsky (1980) or Nordquist (2004). 
As such subjects would have given a list of words and their task would be to slice them off in line with their 
morphological constituents. The results would shed light on whether these fake -Ó adjectives are still rep-
resented mentally as [V+ -Ó] 
adj
 constructions. 
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5.2. The establishment of constructional schemas along the lines of extension  
and elaboration
what follows from the above subsection is that analogy has the capability of triggering more 
systematic meaning shifts on the basis of individual suffixations/constructions.27 These sys-
tematic meaning shifts are then becoming abstracted and represented in the forms of con-
structional schemas (Langacker 2000).  It can be argued, for instance, that from the analo-
gous coinings of istenfélő, istenhívő, törénytisztelő and jogkövető , a schema (although with 
limited productivity) of bEhavioral paTTErns ComplyinG wiTh ConvEnTional soCial-moral 
maxims can be abstracted which in turn has the capability to give rise to other instances with 
the same generic meaning. Opposite to this subschema of -Ó adjectives, the more elaborated 
[Nsértő] (‘N hurting’) schema with the meaning of bEhavioral paTTErns noT ComplyinG wiTh 
ConvEnTional soCial-moral maxims is also observable in language use. Instantiations of this 
schema from the personal subcorpus of HGC can be found in in Table 5. 
Types English translation Number of tokens
törvénysértő ‘malfeasant’ 159
jogsértő ‘injurious’ 46
alkotmánysértő ‘unconstitutional’ 38
kegyeletsértő ‘impious’ 18
becsületsértő ‘libelous’ 16
jogszabálysértő ‘malfeasant’ 13
szabálysértő ‘malfeasant’ 10
határsértő ‘invader’ 7
fülsértő ‘grating, earsplitting’ 8
szeméremsértő ‘pornographic’ 4
bankitioksértő ‘hurting banking secrecy’ 3
államtitoksértő ‘hurting state secret’ 2
titoksértő ‘hurting a secret’ 2
szabályzat-sértő ‘malfeasant’ 2
légtérsértő lit. ‘airspace hurting’ 2
dobhártyasértő ‘grating, earsplitting’ 2
törvény/alkotmánysértő ‘unconstitutional/malfeasant’ 1
szimmetriasértő symmetry hurting’ 1
személyiség-sértő ‘personality threatening’ 1
rágalmazó-becsületsértő ‘calumniatory’ 1
normasértő ‘norm hurtung’ 1
27 Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2014b) outlines very briefly the same procedure regarding the polysemy of the 
Croatian place suffixation –iste.
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Types English translation Number of tokens
netikettsértő ‘hurting the norms of netiquette’ 1
közszeméremsértő ‘pornographic’ 1
kissebségsértő ‘minority hurting’ 1
irodalomsértő lit. ‘literature hurting’ 1
Table 4: Types instantiating the constructional subschema [Nsértő]. 
Table 4 shows that 1. many of the coinings are highly synonymous and 2. the [Nsértő] sub-
schema shows a higher degree of productivity28 than the bEhavioral paTTErns ComplyinG wiTh 
ConvEnTional soCial-moral maxims subschema.29 
Such constructional schemas “are able to capture the commonalities of specific expres-
sions at any linguistic level” (Benczes 2010: 234). figure 7 gives us an insight on the arrange-
ment of -Ó constructions in terms of their resulting schemas. Nevertheless, it is limited to 
the adjectival -Ó constructions and it is far from exhaustive.30
Figure 7: Generic-level schemas and some of the subschemas of -Ó adjectives  
in terms of extension and elaboration.31
Here, in addition to the generic-level meaning extensions of the [V+ó]
part
 [V+-ó] 
adj 
sche-
ma and the [Nsértő] subschema, another subschema is presented in order to illustrate corre-
lations of the two axes, extension and elaboration. The subschema [Nálló] ‘Nproof’ is at the 
same level of elaboration as [Nsértő], however, it gives rise to instances with a closer-to-ad-
jectival meaning (e.g. golyóálló ‘bulletproof’ (45), vízálló ‘waterproof’ 38). That is, unlike 
the behavioral patterns of törvénysértő, jogsértő etc., they are prototypical instances of Char-
aCTErisTiCs. 
28 There productivity is used in the sense of Bybee (2006, 2008, 2010), and as such, it is a phenomenon 
having to do with type frequency, i.e. the capability of a particular schema to motivate novel instances.
29 This finding is in line with Bybee’s markedness theory. 
30 A comprehensive account of all the subschemas of -Ó constructions is far beyond the scope of the present 
paper.)
31 This figure was inspired by Benczes (2010).
elaboration
 [Nsértő] [Nálló]
 HABITUAL/PERMANENET ACTION CHARACTERISTICS
 ((e.g. aggódó in (3b) aggódó in (3c) forró)
 extension
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In sum, the schema-level analysis revealed that apart from the individual -Ó construc-
tions, metonymic meaning shifts are also abstracted into schemas as well, at different levels 
of extension and elaboration. 
5.3. The emergence of a direct -Ónoun affix: evidence for the affix-level representation  
of metonymical meaning extensions
So far, it has been demonstrated that 1. metonymic meaning construal starts out from  indi-
vidual constructions (such as istenfélő). 2. These individual constructions trigger similar 
changes by analogy and as such motivate similar meaning shifts. 3. from these analogous 
constructions, constructional schemas can be abstracted on different levels of extension and 
elaboration. In sum, it was demonstrated that metonymy operates both on the level of indi-
vidual constructions and on the level of constructional schemas. The only question therefore 
remaining to be answered is whether we can identify these metonymic shifts within the se-
mantic structure of the affix -Ó, and if so, how such absorption has been carried out in the 
course of language use.
In the following, evidence will be shown to demonstrate how polysemy is represented in 
the semantic structure of the affix as well. On the exact way in which such semantic absorp-
tion is carried out in the course of language use, Taylor (2012) gives us an insight. “To know 
the word [or any other symbolic unit] involves knowing the contexts in which the word is 
used, where ‘contexts’ refers, not to the situations in the world which speakers wish to talk 
about, but the linguistic context in which the word is used” (ibid. 160). To put it in a more 
abstract way: “knowing the construction consists in knowing its established instances and 
their conventional semantic and pragmatic values” (ibid. 30). Accordingly, in the case of 
composite structures such as -Ó constructions, the established patterns of figurative use also 
become part of the semantic representation of their components (that is, in the semantic 
representation of their base and their suffixes respectively).  
The same process can be identified in the grammaticalization of -Ó. As it was touched 
upon previously, the meaning extensions in -Ó constructions analyzed so far are carried out 
either via conversion (e.g. aggódó
part
 → aggódó
adj
) or via ellipsis from an [[V+-ó]
adj
+N] 
construction (e.g. hálószoba ‘bedroom’ → háló ‘bedroom’). However, the comprehensive 
grammars Velcsov (1968) and Laczkó (2000)32 also mention a third possibility for the -Ó 
nouns.  They point out that not all of the -Ó nouns are the result of conversion or ellipsis from 
the present participial or adjectival senses, but rather some of them are directly derived from 
verbs via the addition of the affix -Ó, exhibiting therefore an alternative word-formation 
pattern: [V+-ó]
noun
. As can be seen, this involves the skipping of the intermediate stages of 
word-formation, and consequently the establishment of a direct, deverbal -Ó producing nom-
inal -Ó constructions. figure 8 illustrates this  pattern for this direct derivation of -Ó nouns 
together with the already familiar patterns of conversion and ellipsis.
32 An important difference in these two accounts is that Laczkó (2000) argues for a fake homonymy rela-
tionship between the present participle -Ó and the deverbal noun -Ó. By contrast, Velcsov (1971) puts the 
emphasis on the way in which the direct deverbal noun -Ó affix had emerged from the frequent exploitation 
of part→noun conversion. furthermore, in her account these two word-formation patterns giving rise to -ó 
nouns are co-present in synchronic language use. The present paper adopts this latter view, since neologisms 
(e.g. lépésszámláló készülék ’pedometer device’ → lépésszámláló ’pedometer’) show evidence for the pres-
ent-day productivity of ellipsis and conversion as well. 
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Figure 8: word-formation patterns giving rise to -Ó noun constructions.
Velcsov’s (1968: 38) examples for -Ó nouns resulting from this direct affixation include szereplő 
(‘character’), könyvelő (‘accountant’), (csecsemő)gondozó (‘nurse, caretaker’), although she 
presents no etymological evidence for the direct emergence of these -Ó nouns. Instead of such 
dubious cases, in the following I wish to show evidence for the existence of a direct deverbal 
noun -Ó suffix in the form of -Ó neologisms. Due to the (relative) availability of their etymo-
logical history, it can be clearly detected whether they underwent intermediate stages of deri-
vation (such as conversion or ellipsis) or are the result of direct addition of an -Ó
N
 suffix. 
The recently emerged agent noun szoftverfejlesztő (‘software developer’) seems to be a 
good candidate representing this direct development.33 A Google search shows no colloca-
tions for this construction (i.e. no such coinings as szoftverfejlesztő szakember (‘a software 
developer professional’ are available). furthermore, no present participle use of the construc-
tion is available. As an example for instrument nouns produced by direct affixation, kijelző 
(‘display’) is the case in point. It shows similar properties as szoftverfejlesztő, in that it is 
available neither in collocations, nor as a present participle. This clearly indicates that it could 
not have emerged either via conversion or via ellipsis.  
All in all, the emergence of a direct -Ó
noun
 affix clearly shows how patterns of metonym-
ic meaning shifts became represented in the semantic structure of the affix itself. This af-
fix-level representation in the intrechment of metonymic construal has led to the emergence 
33 On the other hand, however, this could be a direct translation from software developer as well. 
  PART PART/ADJ ADJ
  forró (‘boiling’), aggódó (‘worrying’) aggódó (‘worrying/worrier’) forró (‘hot’)
 + -Ó író (‘writing’)  hálószoba (‘bedroom’)
 V
 ír (‘to write’)
 aggódik (‘to worry’)
 forr (‘to boil’)
  N occasional
  író (‘author of a text’)
 + -Ó noun
  N professional, typical
  író (‘writer’) szűrő (‘filter’), esküvő (‘wedding’), háló (‘bedroom’)
	 	 kijelző	(‘display’),	szoftverfejlesztő	(‘software	developer’)
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of a new, figurative -Ó noun affix, homonymic with the present particle -Ó and existing as 
autonomous affix in the Hungarian affix system.
5. Conclusion
The aim of the present paper was to study some important features of affix polysemy in 
general and to provide a cognitively plausible account of the Hungarian deverbal suffixations 
in -Ó in particular by answering the following questions:
 
1. In exactly which ways -Ó constructions reflect cognitive construals?
2. How is the semantic structure of the suffix -Ó structured by meaning extensions?
3. what is and what is not metonymical in this semantic structure? And finally: 
4. On which levels of constructional organization can metonymic patterns of meaning 
construal be identified? That is, can we talk about affix polysemy in a strict sense in 
the case of -Ó?
with respect to questions 1–3, the corpus and cognitive analysis shed light on the metonymic 
nature of meaning construals represented in the semantic structure of -Ó. from the onGoinG 
aCTion core sense (which is coded grammatically as present participle) two lines of meaning 
extensions could be identified, both exhibiting metonymic chains. On the one hand, this core 
meaning provides mental access to ThinGs and human aGEnTs via the conceptual metonymies 
aCTion for aGEnT (either occasional or professional, e.g. író), aCTion for insTrumEnT (e.g. ri-
asztó), aCTion for purposE loCaTion (e.g. háló(szoba)) and aCTion for ComplEx EvEnT (e.g. 
esküvő).  On the other hand, another line of meaning extension leads towards adjectival 
meanings, that is, from TEmporal rElaTions towards aTEmporal rElaTions. In cognitive 
terms: first, a TypiCal, habiTual aCTion is accessed through the core meaning onGoinG aCTion, 
exhibiting the spECifiC for GEnEriC as well as the aCTualiTy for poTEnTialiTy generic level 
metonymies (e.g. aggódó). This metonymic meaning shift can be further extended towards 
the more abstract domain of CharaCTErisTiCs (e.g. forró ‘hot’). All these metonymic shifts 
are accommodated in an aCTion iCm. while the functions of -Ó produced by these meaning 
extensions proved to be straightforward cases of word-formation metonymies, in its core 
meaning, the present participial -Ó construction was interpreted 1. as profiling a secondary 
action in a multiple action scenario and 2. as a reference-point helping in the identification 
of the agent. 
with regard to the fourth question, evidence was shown for a multi-layered representation 
of metonymic patterns. It was demonstrated how such patterns are at work in all three levels 
of meaning construal, namely 1. on the level of  the particular instantiations of -Ó construc-
tion schemas (such as forró ‘hot’ or író ‘writer’), 2. on the schema level, be it a high-level 
schema (e.g. [V+-Ó]
part 
→ [V+-ó]
adj
) or a more elaborated, lower-level schema (e.g. [N+álló] 
‘Nproof’), and finally, 3. in the internal semantic structure of the affix -Ó.
Apart from providing answers for the above questions, the cognitive and corpus analysis 
revealed a significant amount of hidden complexities in the emergence of metonymic patterns 
giving rise to -Ó constructions. These hidden complexities are waiting to be explored.
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a SEmantic dEScription oF two mEaningS oF elvan  
in tHE diaLEct oF nyitragErEncSér
Katalin tóth
Abstract
The present paper offers a semantic description of two meanings of the verb elvan (consist-
ing of the preverb el- ’away’ and the verb van ’be’) in the dialect of Nyitragerencsér. Com-
pared to the standard language variety, the lexeme has an additional meaning in the dialect 
in question, namely the marking of constant spatial distance. The analysis makes it clear 
how the preverb contributes to meaning generation. Whereas in the dialectal meaning ’be 
far’, the preverb does not affect the temporal reference of van ’be’, it does so in the second 
meaning (’passes time by having fun’), where the ongoing, enduring nature of the activity is 
in profile.
Cognitive semantics aims primarily at the description of meanings by exploring the 
building up and schematization of conceptual structures. Linguistic units, which can be 
schematized or specific to varying degrees, are studied in context, i.e. against the back-
ground of texts derived from natural speech situations. In this way, cognitive semantics 
breaks with the tradition of describing language as an end in itself, and complies with the 
requirements of functionalist linguistics (cf. Ladányi–Tolcsvai Nagy 2008: 33). As Gábor 
Tolcsvai Nagy puts it, “the self-reflexive experiential sphere and Erwartungshorizont of the 
new millenium is aware of, and demands, usage data (...)” (Tolcsvai Nagy 2011). According-
ly, my study relies on corpus data collected and recorded by the dialectologist Ferenc Sima. 
Sima collected the dialectal vocabulary of the Nyitra region, including that of the village of 
Nyitragerencsér, with the aim of preparing a dialectal dictionary. However, his illness pre-
vented him from completing this task (Sándor 2007).
The paper adopts the theoretical and descriptive framework of Ronald Langacker (1987, 
2008), in which the preverb and the verb are to be interpreted as forming a composite struc-
ture. I have previously offered a description based on the notion of blending (Tóth 2013); 
however, an account in terms of composite structures promises to be more detailed and 
precise. The analysis aims to contribute to our understanding of semantic extensions affect-
ing the preverb el ‘away’, and to shed light on the basis of functional variability.
Keywords: cognitive semantics, composite structure, Nyitragerencsér dialect, preverb, se-
mantic structure, verb
1. The preverb el ’away’ and the existential verb van ’be’
The process of Hungarian preverbs taking on new functions has been going hand in hand 
with their grammaticalization (Ladányi 2007: 95). with regard to preverbs, two phases of 
grammaticalization can be discerned. The first of these produced the word class of preverbs 
(from adverbs, and ultimately from nominals with a lative suffix), as well as the systemic 
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organization of its members by the end of the Old Hungarian period. The second phase is 
still unfolding in the present, and is characterized by further semantic extensions and ab-
stractions affecting the class, as well as an increase in token frequency. 
The opacization of the original directional meaning of preverbs and their increase in 
token frequency are two processes which mutually reinforce each other (D. Mátai 1991: 
433–434). Grammaticalization includes a range of functional, phonological, grammatical and 
(crucially) semantic changes, among them the generalization of meaning with the loss of 
semantic specifications. However, grammaticalization also involves semantic enrichment. In 
the process of metaphorical extension, the semantics of the target domain contributes to the 
development of grammatical meaning, hence the semantic aspect of grammaticalization 
cannot be equated with the loss of meaning specifications (Sweetser 1988, Ladányi 2005). 
Semantic generalization and enrichment are best demonstrated on historical texts; however, 
they can also be illustrated by the description of particular meanings.
As a result of grammaticalization, the meaning of preverbs is schematic, simple, highly 
abstract and polysemous, which allows them to fulfill a variety of functions. The meanings 
of a polysemous linguistic unit form a network in which secondary meanings are related to 
the core meaning via semantic extension (Cuyckens–zawada 2001, Tolcsvai Nagy 2010: 
113–115). In their primary meaning, most preverbs express movement or directionality 
along a path, with respect to physical space, implying a spatial endpoint for the activity 
denoted by the verb when the end of the path has been reached. By marking directions of 
action, preverbs construe displacements in the spatial structure created by language 
(Szilágyi N. 1996: 17). They profile a part of spatial structure in their primary meanings, 
and allow for the perception and interpretation of subtle distinctions in directionality, sim-
ilarly to the function of suffixes with a spatial meaning. On the other hand, the directional 
meaning of preverbs has gradually moved to the background, with temporal reference tak-
ing centre stage in the focus of attention. As Mária Ladányi remarks, temporal boundedness 
(perfectivity) was the first secondary meaning to be added to the primary spatial one, owing 
to the fact that the reaching of a spatial endpoint coincides with a temporal one (Ladányi 
1999: 127–129). In some cases, when the action itself does not imply movement, the preverb 
may be central to the expression of the passing of time (e.g. tart ’hold’ vs. eltart ’endure, 
last’, cf. Kövecses 2005: 36–39). what stands in the focus of attention is not so much the 
directionality attached to a process but rather the temporal boundedness thereof, i.e. per-
fectivity.
Prototypically, the preverb el expresses directionality. This meaning can be characterized 
as follows: el represents the spatial position of an entity (the trajector) in relation to bounded 
space (serving as landmark), where the trajector in the preverb’s conceptual structure moves 
along a paTh from a sourCE to a Goal. More specifically, the entity serving as trajector (pri-
mary figure) is moving away from a place (functioning as landmark, or secondary figure), 
within three-dimensional space (Tolcsvai Nagy 2010: 70–71). 
The existential verb van ’be’ is one of the most basic and most frequent verbs of Hungar-
ian, its semantic description is nevertheless far from simple. In the Historical-Etymological 
Dictionary of Hungarian (Történeti-etimológiai szótár, TESz), the verb’s lexical entry in-
cludes the following passage: “the original meaning may have been ‘that which exists’. The 
verbal function of the word is secondary, and its development is closely related to the consol-
idation of vagy as a second person singular verb form. Van as a third person singular form 
emerged relatively late, through back formation from the third person singular vannak [vagy-
nak ~ vadnak].” Given the source of development mentioned above, the word may have 
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originally been a nomenverbum-like element, “interpretable as a first, second, or third person 
verb form, but also as a noun meaning ‘that which exists; an existing person’ (Benkő ed. 1976: 
1084–1085). The New Hungarian Dialectal Dictionary (Új magyar tájszótár) also remarks that 
the word used to have a nominal function in some dialect (B. Lőrinczy ed. 2010: 631). 
Despite its rich meaning, the existential verb has received less attention than it deserves 
in Hungarian semantic studies. A detailed description of distinctions between particular 
meanings is yet to be elaborated. In her paper, Márta Varga H. (2010) distinguishes between 
six functions of the verb, namely the expression of i. existence, ii. existence with a partitive 
meaning, iii. existence modified by an adverbial, as well as iv. use as an auxiliary, v. use as 
a verb of possession, and vi. use as part of a passive construction expressing a state (lenni 
’be’ + -va, -ve ’<participial suffix>’ pattern). However, she does not provide an elaborate 
semantic description, and does not back up her categorization with arguments. The Diction-
ary of the Hungarian Language (Értelmező kéziszótár) only lists two meanings: “1. Exists. 
2. Is in some state of under certain circumstances” (Pusztai ed. 2003: 1428–1429).
The primary function of the existential verb is the expression of existence; it can also 
construe a state in continuous aspect, with a full paradigm (Langacker 2008: 125, Tolcsvai 
Nagy 2009: 379). Similarly to other verbs, it profiles a process; compared to verbs of move-
ment, this process is more abstract. Its semantic structure includes mental representations of 
a trajector (somEThinG) and a landmark (somEwhErE), but at a high level of abstraction.
2. The meanings of elvan
The Dictionary of the Hungarian Language lists two meanings of the verb elvan (consisting 
of the preverb el- ’away’ and the verb van ’be’): “1. To be able to stay somewhere or in some 
state (for some time), 2. To get along with somebody (for some time)” (Pusztai ed. 2003: 300). 
By contrast, the New Hungarian Dialectal Dictionary supplies four meanings: 1. ‘to be away, 
to be absent’, 2. ‘to stay somewhere’, 3. <e.g. about news> ‘to spread’, 4. <with pejorative 
evaluation> ‘to be just about acceptable’ (B. Lőrinczy ed. 1988: 172–173). The above speci-
fications are far from exhausing the semantics of elvan. Not only do they fail to cover all the 
corpus examples to be examined in the next section, but they also insufficiently account for 
examples found in the Hungarian National Corpus (henceforth HNC). 
Based on the 1.267 tokens1 found in the HNC2 (the new, updated version of the corpus), 
at least five meanings can be discerned (without detailed semantic analysis). The distinctions 
between them are somewhat arbitrary, as it is impossible to draw a neat boundary between 
them; the most adequate presentation would take the form of a semantic network.2 Below is 
a list of the five meanings in question, illustrated by sample sentences.
(1) ’make a (good) living; do all right; get along (with each other); bear’
 
 a. (…) a honvédelmi tárcánál és környékén mindenki jól elvan.
 ’At the defence ministry and around it everybody is doing all right.’
1 The preverb+verb structure of elvan is highly lexicalized, as also suggested by the fact that there are no 
occurrences in the HNC2 in which the preverb and the verb would be separate.
2 A detailed corpus study may allow a more refined analysis of meanings; here I only provide the semantic 
groups which minimally need to be distinguished.
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 b. Csak léteznek, vannak. Jól elvannak ott, a maguk Párizsaiban és Perzsiáiban.
 ’They are just existing, living. They are getting along well there, in their own Parises 
and Persias.’
 c. Más szavakkal: az evolúció, a tudományos elmélet jól elvan Isten nélkül is – és 
ezt Te írtad le.
 ’In other words: evolution, the scientific theory is doing all right even without God 
– and You wrote this.’
(2) ’stay/survive in a good shape for some time; function (somewhere)’ 
 a. Állítólag ebben hosszú évtizedekig is elvan egy üveg bor, akárcsak egy pincében.
 ’They say that in this a bottle of wine can survive for decades, just like in a cellar.’
 b. Akkumulátora 800 mAh-s kapacitású, ezzel átlagosan 3 napig elég jól elvan, mire 
töltő után kellene néznünk.
 ’Its battery has a capacity of 800 mAh, with this it survives 3 days on average before 
we need to look for a charger.’
(3) ’occupy oneself, pass time while having fun (or staying idle)’
 a. Anyuka betérhet ide gyerekkel is pár percre, mert a gyerek elvan, amíg ő barnul.
 ’Mummy can pop in here for a few minutes even with a child, because the child is 
occupying himself while she is tanning.”
 b. Nincs hát benne semmi csodálni való, hogy órák hosszáig elvagyok egymagam-
ban és boldogan merengek el az emlékezetemben felvonuló képeken.
 ’So there is nothing strange about it that I am able to occupy myself for hours on 
end, and linger on happily with the images in my memory.’
(4) ’bear something; stay busy with somebody/something or the thought of something’
 a. Háromkor erős fájdalomra ébredtem, de valahogy elvoltam vele reggelig, amikor 
megnézett Cs. doktor.
 ’At 3 o’clock I woke up with a strong pain, but somehow I managed to bear it until 
the morning, when doctor Cs. arrived.’
 b. Egyszerűen dolgoznak es elvannak a maguk építette világában.
 ’They are simply working and staying busy in the world they have built for them-
selves.’
(5)  ’be far; be away’
 
 a. Már egész gyerekfővel is sokszor elvoltam hazulról.
 ’Already as a child I was often away from home.’
 b. Hát vártalak - gondolhatod - amíg elvoltál külhonokban.
 ’well, I was waiting for you - you may think - while you were away in foreign  
countries.’
Most occurrences of elvan exemplify the first meaning, accounting for 40% of tokens from 
the HNC2 corpus. Collocational analysis shows that elvan most frequently co-occurs with 
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the adverb jól ’well’, in 407 cases. In the next large group of data, the verb carries the third 
meaning, followed by the second and the fourth functions with approximately equal shares 
in the corpus. The fifth meaning is the rarest to occur.
In the two corpus sentences from Nyitragerencsér, the meanings of elvan are as follows: 
1. ’be far away’, 2. ’pass time while having fun’. Although it would seem that both of these 
have also been documented in the HNC2, the ’be far away’ dialectal meaning of elvan is not 
identical with the function attested in the national corpus. In the HNC2, the relevant inter-
pretation is that a person is far away at the time of speaking (cf. (5a) and (5b)), whereas the 
dialectal example refers to the (stable) distance of some place. It is also interesting to observe 
that most of the examples from the HNC2 feature verbs with preverbs which do not profile 
spatial distance. By contrast, in the New Hungarian Dialectal Dictionary, spatial relations 
are important even in the first two meaning specifications. 
3. Composite structure and frame of reference
Before we turn to the semantic analysis of the two corpus examples, it is necessary to give 
an overview of the notions of composite structures and frames of reference.
The preverb and the verb make up a composite structure, forming a linguistic unit (Lan-
gacker 1987: 57). with regard to conceptualization, this structure is processed by the human 
mind holistically, since it represents an event with well-defined, closed boundaries (wallace 
1982). features of composite structures can be described by reference to valency relations, 
including the following: 1. correspondences (as a function of overlaps between profiled sub-
structures of the component structures), 2. profile determinance (the profile of a given com-
ponent structure will also be the profile of the composite structure), 3. conceptual and pho-
nological autonomy and dependence (with the autonomous component structure elaborating 
a profiled substructure of the dependent component structure), and 4. constituency (compo-
nent structures are hierarchically combined in a given order, forming elaborate composite 
structures) (Langacker 1987: 277–326).
The main properties of Hungarian preverb + verb composite structures are summarized 
by Tolcsvai Nagy (2013: 188) as follows:
 
a) the semantic pole of the composite structure is provided by the relation between the 
meanings of the two components, i.e. of the preverb and of the verb
b) the composite structure profiles a process (temporal relation), unfolding with the par-
ticipation of schematic figures
c) the composite structure is based on partial correspondences and elaborative relations 
between the preverb and the verb; the composite structure functions as a linguistic unit 
whose internal structure is nevertheless transparent, and recognizable parts of the se-
mantic structure make specific contributions to the meaning of the entire unit, or ex-
tensions thereof.
 
It has been remarked above that the meaning of el includes directionality. As a matter of 
principle, directionality can only be interpreted in the context of some space, with respect to 
something; therefore, it is important to consider the role of reference points in the analysis. 
Reference points are mentally construed spatial vantage points from which figures (or pro-
cesses) are conceptualized. A reference point can be absolute, i.e. independent of the con-
ceptualizer (e.g. geocentric, such as North) or relative, i.e. contingent on the conceptualizer’s 
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perspective (perspective-centred, such as the human body). Heine (1997: 11–12) provides the 
following classification based on types of spatial orientation:
a) deictic (the deictic reference point as the centre: the speaker’s body),
b) object (some physical object, primarily a human body serving as reference point)
c) geographical object (the refernece point is supplied by a point or structure in the phys-
ical environment, such as a mountain or a river)
d) cardinal (the reference point as a centre is independent of the speaker and the speech 
situation; e.g. North, South).3
4. Az elvan igekötős ige szemantikai szerkezete
The corpus example in (6) below illustrates the verb elvan as used in the dialect of Nyitra-
gerencsér, with a meaning that is undocumented in HNC2.4
(6) Csȧk tőlünk elvȧ késztő nȧgyonn -:- Úlȧk /!/ -:- plāne, hȧ gyȧlog mën ȧ embër.
 Csak tőlünk messze van nagyon – Újlak5 – pláne, ha gyalog megy az ember.
 ’It’s just that it’s very far from us – Újlak  is – especially if one goes there by foot.’
In this example, the preverb has a static meaning, its function is to express spatial distance. 
Thus, elvan has the following meaning here: ’with respect to a place specified by the speak-
er, another place is (on a stable basis) at a distance.’
Figure 1: The semantic structure of the preverb el in sentence (6)
In this sentence, the semantic structure of el includes an abstract type of directionality, con-
strued with summary scanning. In a physical space, the preverb maps the directionality of a 
schematic entity (somEThinG), departing from the primary landmark (from somEwhErE) toward 
the secondary landmark (To somEwhErE). In the atemporal sourCE-paTh-Goal schema, the dis-
tance between the sourCE (primary landmark) and the Goal (secondary landmark) is in profile. 
3 The presentation of these types follows Gábor Tolcsvai Nagy (2013:198). 
4 This dialectal meaning of elvan can be identified in its collocations with kéztől ’from the hand’. The study 
of this pattern’s idiomatic properties is beyond the scope of the present paper.  It is important to note that 
this verb is still in use in the region, often without the adverbial kéztől. 
5 A municipality in Slovakia in the vicinity of the town of Nyitra (Nitra).
 1. lm 2. lm
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In addition to the path (representing the distance), the two spatial boundaries are also in the 
foreground of attention. The Goal (secondary landmark) is provided by unbounded physical 
space. In the semantic structure, the sourCE (the speaker’s physical position, her 3D space) 
marks the referential and deictic centre (signalled by R). However, the directionality from the 
starting point to the endpoint (from the sourCE to the Goal) is abstracted, with the distant end-
point being foregrounded and receiving holistic conceptualization: the trajector of the preverb 
(the entity) can be identified in the endpoint. This means that the preverb’s function is to profile 
spatial distance: it has a static role in the mapping. In figure 1, the schematic entity is marked 
by a circle, the spatial starting point and endpoint are represented by vertical lines, and the path 
is signalled by the horizontal line which represents the distance between the two boundaries.
In (6), the existential verb van profiles a process which does not involve change: the verb 
serves to designate the stable relation of the entity functioning as trajector with respect to 
the schematized space in which the landmark is situated (or which is specified by the speak-
er in the course of her speech act).
Figure 2: A schematic representation of the meaning of van
The existential verb designates an enduring state in some place, construed as temporally 
unbounded (in the immediate scope, time is conceptualized without starting and enpoints, 
as a succession of moments). In Langacker’s theoretical framework, the verb can be described 
as follows:
– it designates a process (in which the trajector’s position is stable), processed via sequen-
tial scanning; it is in continuous aspect; the construed process is temporally unbound-
ed (lacking an endpoint)
– the relevant cognitive domain is physical space
– the trajector is some entity
– the event structure of the process: the trajector’s continuous presence in a conceived 
physical space.
In the figure, squares represent three of the momentary states being processed via sequential 
scanning, while the arrow marks temporality. The circle corresponds to the schematic pri-
mary figure, or trajector, and the thin dotted line surrounding it signals the landmark’s high 
 … tr … tr … tr …
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degree of schematicity.6 In terms of conceptual content, existence may be bounded; however, 
it is construed in the immediate scope as lacking boundaries.7 
In the composite structure of elvan as used in (6), the verb and the preverb mutually 
elaborate each other. 
Figure 3: The semantic structure of elvan in its first meaning
The trajector of the existential verb corresponds to that of the preverb. The existential verb’s 
trajector (a bounded region of some entity) is more specific than the preverb’s one, therefore 
elaboration is directed at the preverb. The preverb’s landmarks are schematic, but still more 
specific than that of the verb, thus the preverb functions in an elaborating capacity, and con-
tributes two reference points to the semantic structure. 
As a result of the elaborative relations, what gets profiled is the (stable) distance of the 
municipality of Újlak with respect to the reference point. The structure has a continuous 
meaning, firstly because the preverb does not imply directionality toward the endpoint, and 
secondly because the process profiled by the existential verb does not contain any change in 
the relationship between the schematic figures. The composite structure foregrounds distance 
(as a static configuration): the trajector (marked by the circle in figure 3) is conceptualized 
in the secondary landmark specified by the preverb, in relation to the reference point residing 
with the primary landmark. The dotted line between the two landmarks serves to represent 
their distance schematically. The event structure can be described as follows: the time-stable 
distance of an entity (bounded physical space) with respect to a reference point. The stable, 
unchanging state profiled by the existential verb is put into the immediate scope via the 
preverb’s semantic contribution (cf. Langacker 2008: 153–154).
In (7), the verb elvan has the meaning ’passes time by having fun’. 
(7) Mëggyig ēvȧnnȧk ȧzonn ȧ hitvāny muzinn. 
 Meddig elvannak azon a hitvány mozin.
 ’How long they are passing time with that poor movie.’
6 whether the existential verb indeed contains a landmark in its semantic structure requires further inves-
tigation. 
7 “To say that something exists does not imply that it has always existed or that it always will but does por-
tray the situation as constant during whatever is taken to be the relevant span of time (the temporal imme-
diate scope)”  (Langacker 2008: 147).
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In its occurrence in (7), elvan does not profile spatial distance, but rather an enduring activ-
ity going on for a long time. In this example also, the deictic and referential centre lies with 
the speaker, the profiled process is occurring at a distance from her. However, in this case, 
distance is signalled by the grounded, case-marked nominal (azon a mozin ’on that movie’) 
rather than the preverb. 8
within the sourCE-paTh-Goal schema activated by el, this time the paTh (summarily scanned) 
and the directionality are foregrounded: the preverb expresses the direction inherent in the 
process (this is consequently a dynamic schema as opposed to the static function seen in (6)). 
However, what is important with regard to directionality is not the reaching of the endpoint but 
rather the direction itself and the mapped section of the route. This use exemplifies the case 
when the sourCE-paTh-Goal schema has a metaphorical spatial structure, owing to directional-
ity.9 whereas in the previous example, the preverb had an exclusively spatial meaning, this time 
the spatial structrure is transferred metaphorically into the domain of time, and consequently 
has both temporal starting and endpoints (which,  however, stay in the background). 
The two temporal boundaries are abstracted, and are in the background of the overall se-
mantic structure. Although in the the primary meaning of el, directionality and temporality 
(perfective function) are closely intertwined, this time the profiling of duration becomes prom-
inent, yielding continuous aspect. This follows from schematization (with the speaker profiling 
particular elements of the schema in specific usage events) and also from the conceptual content 
of the verb.10 figure 4 below provides a schematic representation of the preverb’s meaning in 
(7). Thin dotted lines correspond to the highly schematic landmarks, whereas the dotted arrow 
marks the paTh (indicating duration) and directionality of the process. 
Figure 4: The semantic structure of the preverb el in (7)
8 According to data in HNC2, examples of elvan with the meaning of ’have fun’ do not necessarily include 
’distance’ in their semantics (see examples  (3a,b,c,d)), and the latter semantic feature is restricted to other 
contexts (cf. (5a,b)). Example (7) may partially involve directionality; however, I would suggest that its main 
function is the expression of continuous aspect here. Directionality is (or may be) explicit owing to the de-
pendent azon a mozin ’on that movie’, and may be interpreted in both temporal and spatial dimensions.
9 The temporal meaning associated with el is shown by the pattern’s collocation with temporal interrogative 
pronouns.  The construct meddig elvannak (where meddig literally means ’until what time’, and elvannak 
is the 3rd person plural form of elvan) has the meaning ’how long they are having fun’. 
10 This continuous aspect is obviously different from the unboundedness associated with the verb lacking a 
preverb, and also from the aspect of constructs involving inversion (with the preverb following rather than 
preceding the verb). Since a sufficiently refined analysis of continuous aspect is not yet available, I will use 
the term “continuous aspect” in this paper. I do not consider the the notion of boundedness as used by Kie-
fer–Ladányi  (2000: 465–483) to be adequate, as boudaries have a perfectivizing function, and here it is 
precisely the enduring nature of the process that is being foregrounded.
 1. lm 2. lm
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Example (7) features an even more abstract meaning of the existential verb (whose basic 
meaning is already highly abstract): it provides a generic expression of an activity spanning 
a length of time.11 The process is construed as continuous (with the unboundedness of the 
activity/state being in the focus of attention). In this sentence, the use a verb with such ab-
stract meaning (in other words the lack of specific construal of the activity12) may be moti-
vated by the fact that the speaker is directing attention at a process unfolding without chang-
es, with the time-stable activity of the primary figure (trajector) receiving prominence. 
(Schematicity follows precisely from the fact that in the event structure of elvant, character-
istic phases of the process cannot be defined). The time of the speech act (or the time expe-
rienced/imagined by the conceptualizer) may serve as a metaphorical landmark (reference 
point).13 
The duration of the process denoted by the existential verb is foregrounded via the use of 
the preverb. The abstract, backgrounded temporal boundaries place the abstract process into 
the immediate scope in such a way that its duration transgresses the time of speaking. The 
trajector of the composite structure is elaborated by the verb, and the metaphorical land-
marks, having performed their function of placing the process into the immediate scope, are 
out of profile, thus attention is directed at the enduring nature of the abstract process. The 
overall structure has a continuous meaning. The backgrounded reference point (R) is the time 
of speaking, it is bounded (as represented by the line segment). The profiled activity is con-
strued as continuous with respect to this reference point. The semantic structure of elvan in 
(7) is schematically represented by figure 5 below.
Figure 5: The semantic structure of elvan in its second meaning
11 The meaning ’have fun’ is another highly lexicalized meaning, which is presumably secondary with re-
spect to more general meanings (such as ’existence’ and ’making a living’). 
12 In the speech act of (7), possible specific construals could have involved the meanings ’watching a film’ 
or ’having fun’.
13 In the corpus example, the film’s precise duration may serve as a reference point. The time of speaking 
(time of conceptualization) coincides with the time expressed by the existential verb, therefore the reference 
point cannot be visually represented in the figure.
 … tr … tr … tr …
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5. Summary
This paper made an attempt at the detailed semantic characterization of a lexeme which had 
not received such description before. The framework of cognitive semantics is well-suited to 
the exploration of highly abstract semantic structures, allowing one to describe the two 
meanings of elvan found in the dialect of Nyitragerencsér, with the associated differences in 
construal. whereas in sentence (1) the ’presence, stable state’ meaning of the existential verb 
is activated as a function of the preverb el, the second example profiles a meaning of ’abstract 
activity’ in the immediate scope. Both constructions involve continuous aspect, which, how-
ever, is conceptualized in two different ways. In (7), the fact that the abstract activity has 
temporal starting and endpoints remains implicit, and the preverb’s meaning includes the 
function of continuous aspect. By contrast, in (6), the preverb el has no influence on the 
temporality expressed by the verb van ’be’. The two examples also illustrate the schemas 
coded in the preverb’s meaning: (6) involves a static, while (7) a dynamic schema. These 
schemas are activated as a function of context.  Although in conceptualization, the preverb 
and the verb are processed as a single unit, the proposed semantic description is motivated 
on methodological grounds.
Particular meanings may undergo lexicalization in a given language community, as a 
result of frequent use. It would be beneficial for dialectology, but also for Hungarian linguis-
tics more generally, if further dialectal words received similar detailed semantic descriptions. 
An extensive, corpus-based case study of the existential verb (including elvan) seems to be 
especially necessary, given the uncertainties surrounding this verb and the constructions it 
occurs in. Such a description allows one to trace and understand the process of lexicalization. 
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bEyond tHE StratEgy oF ignorancE  
− how and what can benefit 
cognitivE LinguiSticS From pHEnomEnoLogy?*
gábor simon
“Interdisciplinarity is hard,
but it is the only option.”
(Ellen Spolsky)
Abstract
The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand I aim to demonstrate the benefits that 
cognitive linguistics can have from a phenomenological contemplation; on the other I would 
like to demonstrate that in spite of the anti-philosophical attitude of the naturalizing cogni-
tive sciences, a phenomenological reflection on the subject and the methods of cognitive 
linguistic research can provide numerous considerations which can help us to avoid both 
the problematic theoretical presuppositions (e.g. reductionism or the problem of isolated 
minds) and the conflation of the research field of cognitive linguistics with other fields in 
cognitive science. To make the case for choosing phenomeonology as one of the metatheories 
of cognitive linguistics I investigate the problem of representation and metaphor in standard 
cognitive science and in cognitive linguistics. The phenomenological discussion of the pro-
cess of cognition has several theoretical insights about the status of the experience and the 
subject, the meaningfulness of perception, the situatedness of experiencing the phenomenal 
world, the central significance of meaning as a constitutional pattern, and the implicit hori-
zon of intersubjectivity. The paper dwells on the methodological consequences of these in-
sights too.
Keywords: phenomenology, cognitive linguistics, representation, constitution, intersubjec-
tivity, metaphor
1. Introduction
More than a decade ago a debate was held on the adequacy of embodied realism for cognitive 
linguistic investigations (See Rakova 2002, Johnson−Lakoff 2002, Krzeszowski 2002, Sinha 
2002). Perhaps the most interesting result of it was not the various interpretations of concep-
tual metaphor theory, but the foregrounded relation between cognitive linguistics and phi-
losophy, since the main arguments and objections shed light on a latent anti-philosophical 
attitude of the mainstream theory of embodied cognition in linguistics. Though Rakova had 
made several critical claims about the role of preconceptual patterns in concept formation 
deserving attention from the representatives of the notion of embodiment, the main answer 
of Mark Johnson and George Lakoff for the critique was that 
“[b]ecause she [Marina Rakova] has successfully mastered and incorporated the 
western philosophical tradition and made it part of her mode of thought, she natural-
* The research was supported by the MTA Postdoctoral fellowship Programme and the Eötvös Loránd 
University.
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ly and systematically misreads our work – and will similarly misread a large body of 
the research in cognitive linguistics” (Johnson−Lakoff 2002: 258).
from this conviction it follows that if one aims at interpreting the philosophical framework 
of embodied realism from the western philosophical point of view, he or she will not meet 
with complete success, because Lakoff and Johnson “hold a third position” from which they 
can move beyond the rigid, dichotomous formulation of the questions in cognitive science. 
The essence of this position is motivated by empirical evidence:
“the question of the necessity and cognitive reality of embodied realism is an empir-
ical issue, not a matter of armchair speculation but rather a question of what view of 
human cognition is supported by the evidence and is necessary to explain human 
meaning and all forms of symbolic expression” (Johnson−Lakoff 2002: 246, second 
emphasis is added).
The skeletal structure of the theoretical argumentation is that (i) embodied realism is based 
on strong empirical grounds, the evidences of various fields of research (from neuroscience 
to historical linguistics) support only the embodied notion of meaning; (ii) because of the 
long standing but senseless speculative philosophical tradition, many of the researchers are 
not able to accept the new way of thinking; (iii) since embodied realism contradicts the as-
sumptions of the philosophical tradition, (iv) the solutions are ignoring philosophy as it is 
and directing our attention to the empirical evidences.
Although Tomasz Krzeszowski (2002: 266) raised in his comment that Johnson and 
Lakoff are forced “to see their data through their own glasses of embodied realism, in a way 
that best fits their own ideas”, i. e. they have their own lenses of theoretical assumptions, and 
reality is not given in the data, it is the data-driven, radical empiricist scientific position 
which is worth our attention. from an experientialist (or embodied realistic) point of view, 
philosophy is mere speculation, a first-person conception of the things in a world, which has 
nothing to do with reality itself, thus we had better abandon it.
It is the naturalistic attitude towards investigated phenomena and theoretical questions 
that can be characterized with the above mentioned anti-philosophical standpoint:
“a philosophical perspective on utterance processing [or broadly on cognition – S. G.] 
is not reducible to a scientific, psychological one: rather, in the latter there often re-
main hidden philosophical presuppositions, which may require overt philosophical 
discussion. what philosophy can say about utterance processing [and about cognition 
– S. G.], moreover, hardly count as a description of actual processes and is more like-
ly to hold as the rational reconstruction of how a certain understanding may be arrived 
at and justified” (Sbisà 2011: 7).
Unfortunately, by reason of the mistrust towards philosophy, and despite the fact that they 
consider their theory as a new philosophical perspective, Lakoff and Johnson are not able to 
recognize that philosophy is not an unrealistic (“armchair”) speculation, but it is a way of 
scientific thinking which always offers a more comprehensive approach to phenomena than the 
objectscientific explanation offered by particular disciplines (for objectsciences, see Kertész 
2004: 24), which treat things in their own original relations. A philosophical argumentation 
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takes the phenomena out of their natural context of appearance, and confronts them with the 
general possibilities of cognition (Mezei 1997: 98). As Dan zahavi states it, 
“[p]hilosophy is a discipline which doesn’t simply contribute to or extend the scope 
of our scientific knowledge, but which instead investigates the basis of this knowledge 
and asks how it is possible” (zahavi 2010: 6).
The other profit of philosophical contemplation is clarifying the core notions of linguistic 
research (Sbisà 2011: 9), and it is exactly such a clarification of the notion of embodiment 
which is initiated by Rakova (2002: 218), nevertheless in their answer Johnson and Lakoff 
refused both the reinterpretation of the core notion in the light of epistemological assump-
tions and the initiative of rethinking old concepts in view of the empirical evidence: “[w]e 
reject such classical notions of representation, along with the view of meaning and reference 
that are built on them” (Johnson−Lakoff 2002: 250).
It is clear from the foregoing that the debate on embodied realism seems to be sadden-
ingly unproductive:  as Krzeszowski (2002: 266) notes it, even in the case of highly contro-
versial perspectives of the participants, there would be a lot of emerging questions deserving 
discussion, but the clash of contemplative versus anti-philosophical standpoints makes the 
debate much less discursive. However, there are two ways out of this gap between first and 
third personal attitudes, both of which narrow the validity of the third personal attitude re-
minding us that in humanities the observer is one part of the observed world.
One of the viewpoints making the tightening of the gap possible is offered by the notion 
of evolution. Though the field of cognitive linguistics is heterogeneous regarding the theo-
retical presuppositions of the different investigations, there is a very important shared theo-
retical commitment: 
“the human mind is structured by the evolutionary and developmental processes 
which underlie, and have been selected by, the interaction between the human organ-
ism (brain-in-body) and its (developing) environment” (Sinha 2002: 274).
If we admit the constraints of the evolutionary process on our cognition, we will be able to 
recognize the predispositions affecting our observations.
The other perspective is the phenomenological one: following Husserl’s method “back to 
the things themselves”, we can realize the importance of subjective consciousness in expe-
riencing the world, as well as the multiple possible attitudes toward the phenomenal world, 
which determine how the world is given to us. The main aim of phenomenology – in contrast 
with the sciences based on mathematics – is not to explain the world as such but to describe 
in the most accurate way how the world makes itself evident for consciousness, how the 
things arise in our direct sensory experience (Abram 1996: 35, see also Reynaert−Verschueren 
2011: 218−219). Thus phenomenology can be indeed a productive approach for cognitive 
linguistics in the field of metascientific reasoning, for 
“[e]ven the most detached scientist must begin and end her study in [the] indetermi-
nate field of experience, where shifts of climate or mood may alter his experiment or 
her interpretation of »the data«. [...] Our spontaneous experience of the world, charged 
with subjective, emotional, and intuitive content, remains the vital and dark ground 
of all our objectivity” (Abram 1996: 33−34, see also Varela 2002: 140).
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In other words, phenomenology directs our attention to encountering the world as human 
beings in an environment which determines and adjusts itself to the structure of our experi-
ence. It is the active subject-environment interaction that is studied by phenomenology in a 
rigorous way as expected from a scientific discipline but with a theoretical attitude inherited 
from philosophical tradition. Therefore a phenomenological account of cognition can inte-
grate the first and the third personal methods of scientific inquiry: it can highlight not only 
the experiential grounds of meaning, but also its social aspects, the significant role of the 
intuitions and intentions of language users, which make the individual meanings convention-
al and intersubjective.
for these reasons I aim to elaborate an accurate theoretical system of notions and back-
ground assumptions on the basis of phenomenology and the cognitive application of its 
ideas. My hope is that such a philosophical framework can serve cognitive linguistics at a 
metatheoretical level, making on the one hand the cognitive linguistic enterprise more re-
flected, and making on the other the move beyond the classical dichotomies possible not 
without philosophy, but as a result of theoretical contemplation on notions and evidences.
The canonizing efforts of phenomenology in cognitive linguistics is very much on the 
agenda: though two handbook were published in 2008 and in 2010 about the fruitful inter-
relations between phenomenology and cognitive sciences (Mattens ed. 2008, Gallagher−
Schmicking eds. 2010), in Hungarian cognitive linguistics they remained without reactions: 
one of the representative handbooks of cognitive linguistics does not mention phenomenol-
ogy at all (see Kövecses−Benczes 2010), the other more detailed handbook acknowledges a 
partial effect of phenomenology, but it refers to the ideas of Husserl and Heidegger only in 
relation to time perception and the semantic structure of verbs (see Tolcsvai Nagy 2013: 35, 
72, 74). 
The study is structured as follows. first it is demonstrated through the dilemma of rep-
resentation that the naturalistic attitude in metascience cannot yield a real solution of theo-
retical problems in cognitive linguistics (2). Then I collect the most difficult notions and 
epistemological problems of the field in our days, and I attempt to demonstrate how a phe-
nomenological approach can help us give proper answers to the questions which have 
emerged (3). The study ends with a summary of the most important results of articulating a 
phenomenological cognitive linguistics (4).
2. A dilemma and what is in the background of it
It seems that the whole story can be grasped with the notion of representations. for one of 
the most fundamental questions arising in cognitive linguistic research is whether there is 
any need of representations to explain cognition and the role of language in cognition.1 The 
representationalist view (represented by e. g. Leonard Talmy, Ronald Langacker) claims that 
1 This question has a somewhat simplified formulation. A more sophisticated version of it is whether rep-
resentations are necessary for explaining all sorts of cognition or only some forms of cognition must involve 
representation (see Rowlands 2015). The latter can be answered with scalar terms, thus it is not a “yes or 
no” question, and fits in probably better with the evidences of cognitive science. Nevertheless making a 
sharp distinction between the representationalist and the anti-representationalist position makes the philo-
sophical differences more visible, and since this study does not aim at scrutinizing the possible alternative 
adaptations of the notion of representation in cognitive research, my hope is that this simplification is ac-
ceptable.
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meanings are mental entities residing in the mind and being grounded in conceptualization 
(see zlatev 2010: 421, 432−434). Since it attributes meaning to the individual mind, it can be 
accused with mentalism and subjectivism. The opposite anti-representationalist view (rep-
resented by George Lakoff, Mark Johnson [in their important work Philosophy in the flesh], 
or Tim Rohrer) identifies representations with the flexible pattern of organism-environment 
interaction, or with the neural structures of such co-ordinations, and hence rejects the clas-
sical notion of representation as a useful device in the explanation of meaning (see zlatev 
2010: 430). This radical view of embodiment can avoid the solipsistic attitude of conceptual 
semantics (Shapiro 2011: 14), however it cannot explain the large scale of conventional cog-
nitive patterns extending from cognitive maps to highly elaborated meanings.
The problem of representations is a so-called sceptical dilemma (Kertész 2004: 161): if 
we do not use the notion of representation, we will have to abandon the elaborated cognitive 
linguistic models of semantic structures, but if we accept the representational view of lan-
guage, we will not be able to bridge the gap between the elementary events and acts of 
cognition itself (perception for example) and the higher ordered, systematized linguistic 
meaning. Thus both standpoints are destructive (hence the question is dilemmatic) and both 
threaten the possibilities of cognitive linguistics as a scientific project (hence it is sceptical).
Thus the first question of this study can be formulated as follows:
Q1: How can we resolve the dilemma of representationalism?
There are answers to this question which assert exclusively one of the alternatives (as we 
have seen in the previous paragraph), but these answers cannot solve the problem, since the 
status of representations is not a dilemma for those radical views. Another solution is the 
strategy of ignorance: though both alternatives have some validity, the researcher considers 
the dilemma itself as irrelevant for his or her work, because it can be carried out without 
answering the difficult question of representations (Kertész 2004: 162−163). In one of the 
most canonical works in CL, in the first volume of the foundations of Cognitive Grammar, 
Ronald Langacker seems to follow the latter attitude: when discussing the notion of sensory 
images, he rejects the classical representational view of the homunculus metaphor (which 
models mental representations as images analyzed by a homunculus in the head), thus he 
accepts the non-representational theory of sensory perception, while the cognitive function-
ing preserves its autonomy in cognitive grammar. Langacker makes 
“a general distinction between autonomous and peripherally connected cognitive 
events. The sensation directly induced by stimulating a sense organ is an instance of a 
peripherally connected event; the corresponding sensory image, evoked in the absence 
of such stimulation, is an autonomous but equivalent event.” (Langacker 1987: 112)
At first sight this proposal is an efficient solution of the problem of representations, since it 
can handle the issue of elementary cognitive events and the “representation-hungry tasks”, 
the displacement of reference (see Clark 1999: 349, Sinha 2014, Simon 2014: 254) as well. In 
this respect it resolves the dilemma through detecting (and rejecting) a twofold overgeneral-
ization: the representationalist and the anti-representationalist views overgeneralize the sig-
nificance of their own assumptions (the notion of representation or the direct interactions 
between the organism and the environment) and hence both of them disregard the specifici-
ty and importance of the other. Investigating the process of cognition yields the consideration 
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that there is no uniform organization of human mental properties and abilities, since there 
are various subprocesses with different degrees of complexity in different contexts, conse-
quently it is unproductive to narrow the organisation of the mind for one or for another 
structure. from a metascientific perspective, the solution proposed by Langacker is the elim-
ination of the original scientific problem through a careful self-reflection of the cognitive 
sciences themselves. Consequently, the reflecting argument in the field of the (empirical) 
objectscience helps us to resolve the metascientific problem. This is the typical strategy of 
naturalism in metascience: Quine’s essential argument is that only the empirical self-reflex-
ivity can eliminate the sceptical dilemmas, the philosophical arguments and methods are not 
useful in solving epistemological problems (Kertész 2004: 162). 
The argumentation above can be summarized as follows: there is a hard theoretical prob-
lem in cognitive linguistics, but the classical philosophical method of metascience is not able 
to solve the dilemma, since both of the alternative answers have their own validity. Howev-
er, reflecting on the real, empirical subject of cognitive sciences makes it possible to recog-
nize that the radical views are overgeneralizations, thus accepting the validity of both views 
as a result of empirical self-reflections eliminates the theoretical problem. In other words, 
the naturalistic attitude of metascience can help us to solve philosophical problems of cog-
nition: the only thing to do is to replace the first-person argumentative method of philosophy 
with third-person observation of empirical phenomena.
There are, however, additional problems: if we consider − according to Langacker − the 
mental representations of sensory inputs as autonomous cognitive events, the gap between 
the “peripherally connected” subprocesses and the detached representations remains un-
bridged. Cognitive grammar provides a detailed approach to explaining semantic structures 
as representations, but it does not treat sensory images, the periphery of representation build-
ing, although Langecker admits that “sensory stimulation lays the foundation and provides 
the raw material for the construction of our conceptual word” (Langacker 1987: 112). The 
wording of the later handbook of CG (Langacker 2008: 31) is more careful in this regard,2 
but it emphasizes again that the task of a cognitive approach to language is to model the 
mental events of cognition via investigating linguistic structures. This is the reason why I 
have considered above the attitude of CG as the strategy of ignorance: admitting the impor-
tance of the sensory inputs or the embodied neural structures of organism-environment in-
teraction by a theory does not mean that it really treats these aspects of cognition, therefore 
focusing on the mental representation and disregarding the sensory/experimental base of it 
makes the theoretical proposal an implementation independent, functionalist model, a useful 
toolkit of examining meaning, but not its valid explanation. we can point out the instrumen-
talist attitude of CG and of all the approaches manifesting the strategy of ignorance: these 
theories of linguistic meaning can be considered well established if they offer useful expla-
nations of it (more accurately, if they provide falsifiable predictions about it), without fulfill-
ing the demand on describing meaning as it is in the real world (on instrumentalist attitude, 
see Dewitt 2010: 71−79).
2 “Ultimately, conceptualization resides in cognitive processing. Having a certain mental experience resides 
in the occurrence of a certain kind of neurological activity. Conceptualization can thus be approached from 
either a phenomenological or a processing standpoint: we can attempt to characterize either our mental 
experience per se or the processing activity that constitutes it.”
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The problem of representations and the answers of cognitive linguistics (meaning as 
mental entity or anti-representationalist standpoint in the terms of radical embodiment) high-
light the main tension of cognitive linguistics increasing nowadays (see zlatev 2010): if 
cognitive linguistics is an enterprise that explains language use as a part of human cognition, 
then it has to localize its subject, namely meaning in the mind (internalism and subjectivism) 
or in the empirical data, in corpora or in neural structures (objectivism and redutionism). As 
we have seen, the solution of the dilemma proposed by CG apparently moves beyond the 
theoretical dichotomy, in accordance with the self-reflexive method of naturalistic metasci-
ence, but it does not afford a real solving of the dilemma: although CG is able to eliminate 
the strictness of the dichotomy, it ignores the sensory inputs of cognition in the description. 
In contrast with the argumentation of András Kertész, who claims that reflective empirical 
observations can resolve theoretical problems, and this can be seen as the main advantage of 
naturalistic metascience for linguistic research, I do not think that any variant of naturalism 
can propose true answers for epistemological questions ever. Elimination is not a solution.
Nevertheless, the application of the naturalist metascientific method draws our attention 
to the latent tendency of ignoring hard theoretical problems in cognitive descriptions of 
language. Although cognitive linguists claim that meaning is grounded in conceptual struc-
tures, and conceptual structures are grounded in experiences, the arbitrary narrowing of the 
field of research to the semantic representations (which is a strong tendency in cognitive 
linguistics) has the fallacy of ignorance as its result: the belief that linguists can explain and 
describe the details of meaning without regard to the structure and process of experience. 
Experientialism that is claimed to synthesize the opposite views of objectivism and sub-
jectivism preserves partly the internalistic and solipsistic attitude toward cognition, because 
from the experiential point of view, meaning resides continually in the individual mind, 
though not in the form of logical computation but rather as symbolic conceptual structure. 
Experiential realism as a version of internal realism chooses another strategy for narrowing 
the epistemological gap between sense/perception and meaningful representation: it explores 
the continuum along preconceptual and conceptual structures. The central thesis of the ex-
periential strategy with reference to conceptual representations is that
“[a]bstract conceptual structures are indirectly meaningful; they are understood be-
cause of their systematic relationship to directly meaningful structures” (Lakoff 1987: 
268).
The “directly meaningful structures” are preconceptual (basic-level and image-schematic) 
structures that characterize experience through repeatedly emerging (as gestalts) from the 
functioning of the body in its environment. Consequently for treating experience as mean-
ingful we do not need representations, nevertheless conceptual ones are grounded in expe-
rience itself. Taking it seriously and completing it with its theoretical basis, however, we can 
recognize that experientialism does not offer any solution to the problem of representations 
in the same way as CG, but it raises additional problems. first, it overextends the notion of 
representation to the experience: the Putnamian version of internal realism – which is chosen 
by Lakoff and Johnson as solid epistemological basis – considers experience as being shaped 
by our concepts, hence our experiential knowledge is “conceptually contaminated” (Putnam 
1981: 54). we as humans rely on emergent preconceptual structures of experience in forming 
conceptual representations, while these representations shape our preconceptual structures 
– it is this circular argumentation which results in a radical representationalist view in 
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experientialism though prima facie it grounds conceptual meaning in pure body-environ-
ment interactions. (About the problematic role of preconceptual schemas from a developmen-
tal point of view see Rakova 2002.) 
On the other hand, the notion of experience itself becomes so extended, that it does not 
serve the empirical validity of experiential realism. As Lakoff (1987: 266) formulates it,
“»[e]xperience« is (...) not taken in the narrow sense of the things that have »happened 
to happen« to a single individual. Experience is instead construed in a broad sense: 
the totality of human experience and everything that plays a role in it – the nature of 
our bodies, our genetically inherited capacities, our modes of physical functioning in 
the world, our social organization, etc. In short, it takes as essential much of what is 
seen as irrelevant in the objectivist account.”
The broadening of the notion of experience from the actual events to the latent structures in 
the background of cognition makes the cognizing human being a part of the world cognized. 
In contrast with the objectivist paradigm (and with its metaphysical realism), and in accordance 
with internal realism, experientialism does not get the subject and the object of cognition apart, 
it does not separate them from one another, hence it could stabilize the position of the cognizing 
human mind in the world. But the price embodied realism pays for this epistemology is giving 
up the empirical verification. for we cannot experience directly our “collective biological ca-
pacities” (inherited genetically), our collective social experiences in an individual experimen-
tal design. Cognitive semantics based on experientialism remains thus nothing more than a 
useful approach for modelling conceptual meaning, which makes falsifiable hypotheses and 
generalizations possible, but which does not describe meaning as such.
The theoretical problem elaborated in the foregoing can be outlined with the following 
theses:
a) It is a hard theoretical question in cognitive linguistics whether there is any need of 
representations for explaining the processes and structures of cognition, as well as the 
cognitive functioning of language.
b) There are two radical answers to this question. One of them (the principle of mental 
representations) regards mental representational structures as the main subject of cog-
nitive explorations, the other (the principle of radical embodiment) denies the role of 
representations in the process of cognition.
c) we can argue that the problem cannot be resolved with classical metatheoretical meth-
ods, but if we recognize that the radical answers have the process of overgeneralization 
in common, since they extend the use or non-use of representations to the whole process 
of cognition, we will be able to eliminate the dilemma. The representational view can 
be applied to the higher level of cognition (e.g. language use), while the anti-representa-
tionalist approach is very productive in modelling perception. Thus the opposite views 
have different scopes of research, and the problem arises not in the theoretical field of 
cognition, but in the empirical field of investigations.
d) If theoretical considerations do not help answer epistemological questions, we have to 
turn to the empirical results of the objectscience, and through self-reflection the hard 
dilemmas can be eliminated. This is the methodology of naturalistic metascience, 
which banishes philosophical contemplation from the field of epistemology.
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e) However, this naturalistic metascientific argumentation seems to fail, because it results 
in instrumentalistic explanations in objectscientific research. One of its precedents is 
CG, which admits the importance of sensory/peripheral structures, but narrows the 
scope of investigation to the mental representation of meaning, therefore it instantiates 
the strategy of ignorance from the perspective of the holistic process of cognition. The 
other canonical theory on cognitive linguistics, namely cognitive semantics based on 
experientialism deals with the problem in another manner (it extends the notion of 
representation to the experiential structure, moreover it extends the notion of experi-
ence itself), but it is no less problematic, since it implements circular argumentation, 
and the results, models of experientialism cannot be verified with empirical experi-
ments because of the collective nature of experience.
f) The main conclusion of investigating – though in the broadest outlines − the problem 
of representations is that the method of naturalistic metascience does not offer any 
solution to the theoretical dilemmas in cognitive research: it can only disregard the 
dilemma, and instead of answering the question, it proposes serious reflections on the 
scope of theorizing. This has great significance in scientific research, but it yields only 
instrumentalistic explanations. 
The central question is: what is investigated when cognition is investigated? Since language 
use is part of cognition, the question above is valid in cognitive linguistics too. The endeav-
our of naturalism regards the cognizing human as one part of the world cognized, but as a 
psycho-physiological being, therefore the answers to epistemological questions can be given 
through considering the psycho-physiological characterisation of the human mind and body. 
There is no autonomous field of philosophy; the realm of sciences includes also the episte-
mological investigations. This is a viable alternative to Cartesian dualism, since it tries to 
explain the phenomena of cognition with the methods of scientific research, thus it avoids 
any reference to an immaterial substance. However, the metaphysical monism implied by 
naturalism can have two dangerous consequences (see zahavi 2010: 5−6): on the one hand 
it looks on the mind as an object explainable like any other phenomena of nature, thus it 
objectivises the functioning mind, which brings us back to the objectivist view of realism; 
on the other hand, naturalism can be radicalized as psycho-physical reductionism, which 
considers the structures and processes of mind caused by neural activity, hence this activity 
determines and directs our cognitive processes, giving no place and role to interpersonal, 
socio-cultural factors. As we can see, the radical reductionalism of naturalizing epistemol-
ogy arrives at the internalistic standpoint of representationalism.
In my view the most difficult problem which cognitive linguistics has to face is the fol-
lowing (paraphrasing the question of Searle 2000: 55):
Q2: How can we avoid both the Scylla of internalism, the solipsistic view of mental rep-
resentationalism and the Charybdis of determining reductionalism and objective monism in 
the objectsicentific research?
for getting out of this dilemma we do not need to abandon the naturalistic attitude in epis-
temology, but we have to be careful in applying the third-person perspective in cognitive 
linguistics: it must not be the absolute point of view in treating theoretical problems. As we 
have seen, the third-person naturalistic methodology is tightly connected with objectivism, 
SLH_30.indd   51 2016.01.22.   16:38:04
52 GÁBOR SIMON
whereas one of the most important considerations of the philosophy in the 20th century is that 
the subject and the object of cognition cannot be separated. 
while methodological decision or a specific interpretation of the central notions is the 
matter at issue, one cannot evade theoretical reflections. Still the proposal of naturalistic 
metascience to turn to the empirical evidence for eliminating the dilemmas demands reflec-
tions. In this study I propose the other way of treating these dilemmas: instead of avoiding 
philosophical contemplation, I consider it as necessary for solving the hard problems of 
cognitive linguistics. In other words I try to reverse the attitude of the objectscience toward 
philosophy, since my conviction is that the rigorous theoretical explication of our background 
assumptions can help us answer Q2, more accurately to formulate a new alternative direction 
instead of the radical ones (for an opposite evaluation of metascientific reflection see Kertész 
2004: 168). Phenomenology – as a philosophical method of investigating the process of ex-
perience and cognition – has particular significance in this endeavour. In the next section 
these processes are discussed from a phenomenological vantage point in order to renew the 
theoretical basis of cognitive linguistic investigation.
3. The phenomenological model of cognition
for demonstrating the genuine benefits of phenomenology for cognitive linguistics the main 
theses of Husserl’s philosophy must be surveyed.3 However, the aim of this section is not 
merely to enumerate the possible connections between phenomenological and cognitive lin-
guistic principles and concepts, since through it phenomenology would remain only one of 
the theoretical supports of cognitive linguistics, and it could not initiate reflections on the 
background assumptions of cognitive linguistic investigations. Nor would I like to recapitu-
late the phenomenological contribution to the hard problems of the philosophy of mind (e. g. 
consciousness or the body-mind relation), for it would be a philosophical explanation, which 
would change the field of contemplation. The real significance of phenomenology for cogni-
tive linguistics would be pushed into the background in both cases, and it would remain in-
visible how philosophical reflections can contribute to objectscientific research. Instead of 
these alternatives I demonstrate the phenomenological model of experience and cognition 
from the perspective of cognitive linguistics to show the potentialities of a theoretical con-
templation for moving beyond the strategy of ignorance.
My other preliminary remark is that the titles of the subsections imply the sourCE-paTh-
TarGET metaphorical mapping as if the phenomenological explanation of the process of cog-
nition could be grasped with the CoGniTion is moTion alonG a paTh metaphor. Though this 
metaphorical conceptualization is highly common in cognitive sciences (especially in 
3 following Jordan zlatev (2010: 415) I use the term of Husserlian phenomenology as metonymic for phe-
nomenological philosophy, since although several thoughts of Husserl were developed in the second half of 
the last century (by e.g. Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty), the core assumptions of phenomenology remained 
unchanged. The main notion reinterpreted by the followers of Husserl is transcendental subjectivity: Mer-
leau-Ponty rejected the disembodied conception of the ego (Abram 1996: 45), Heidegger considered the 
notion of the subject without its historical environment unsatisfactory (Schwendtner 2008: 147−148). How-
ever, with the notion of “Lebenswelt” Husserl could avoid the ontological idealism (and priority) of the 
subject, thus Husserl himself integrated the critiques against transcendentalism into his late works (see 
Gadamer 2002: 56−57). In this study, I outline the theses of phenomenology on the basis of Husserl’s works, 
and I refer to other philosophers only if it is necessary. 
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functional explanations), one of the main intentions of Husserl and his followers was to re-
place such linearity and sequentiality with the concept of direct participation in the situated 
action of cognition (Gallagher−zahavi 2008: 8). from this it follows that the process of ex-
perience in fact comprises the factors of sensation, subjective intention and impression, 
schemas and meaning, and assuming the perspective of the other. I preserved in the subtitles 
nevertheless the convention of sequentiality for it serves as a basis compared to which the 
phenomenological considerations can be evaluated.
3.1. From perception to understanding: constitution
It is scarcely disputable that “sooner or later any science of cognition has to tackle the fun-
damental condition that we have no idea of what is mental or cognitive, apart from their 
experience by us” (Varela 2002: 126). This condition – inherited indeed from behaviourism 
− makes the scientific explanation especially difficult in the field of cognitive linguistics 
which considers meaning to be based on experience. According to Varela, one can experience 
the outer world and one’s own mental states and processes as well, but it does not follow from 
this that there is a causal relationship between these experiences. we can mention concep-
tual metaphor theory as an example: the source domain of a conceptual metaphor is more 
concrete or physical: “[o]ur experiences with the physical world serve as a natural and logical 
foundation for the comprehension of more abstract domains” (Kövecses 2010: 7). The ex-
planatory power of CMT depends on how we interpret the notion of experience. As Kövecses 
states, metaphor comprehension is founded on the direct experience of the world, in accord-
ance with embodied realism, and it can be a productive explanation in the cases of simple 
(everyday) source domains, e. g. lovE is a journEy, since everybody has experiences of 
journeys. But the role and the nature of experience is a matter of dispute in the case of arGu-
mEnT is war, because it is by no means certain that one has direct/physical experiences of 
events of war. At this point the extended notion of experience (cited above from Lakoff 1987) 
can help us arguing for experience based metaphorization, but it causes a tension between 
the narrower and the wider interpretation of experience: the former refers to the situated 
encounter with directly perceptible phenomena, related to the embodied nature of cognition; 
the latter includes everything mediated by the body and the community, and the central role 
of culture is emphasized. Thus it remains an open question whether metaphor has physical 
(individual) or cultural (supra-individual) validity.
This tension cannot be dissolved unless we differentiate between the actual experiential 
situation (with its physical factors) and the situated process of cognition in the broader sense: 
both are important for understanding utterances but they ground meaning in experience in 
different ways. My opinion is that the omission of this differentiation generated some mis-
interpretations of the philosophy of embodied realism in the debate on the pages of Cognitive 
Linguistics: while Rakova argued for the direct interpretation of experience (and hence she 
considered experientialism as a radical empirical theory), Johnson and Lakoff rejected this 
interpretation without outlining their own conception of what experience is and how it 
grounds conceptualization.
Husserl’s phenomenology proposes an essential approach to the role of experience: he 
distinguishes between the psychological concept of the subjective consciousness and the 
phenomenal aspect of it: the former is the experiencing self with her/his actual psychological 
processes (perception, concept activation and so on), the latter is the conscious mind which 
constitutes the world for herself/himself (Husserl 1972: 213). Identifying these aspects would 
SLH_30.indd   53 2016.01.22.   16:38:05
54 GÁBOR SIMON
mean naturalizing the consciousness, reducing it to observable psychological processes and 
structures and identifying the sensory inputs with an observed entity. when I look at a table, 
however, I see its profile from my own perspective, I can see one or two sides of it, I can see 
its surface or its legs, but I cannot see the table as a whole. Nevertheless, I see a table, more 
accurately I interpret my visual sensations as a table. On the one hand there are partial sen-
sations of an entity in the world, on the other there is a perceived – i.e. consciously processed 
– object. The formers belong to the psychological self, the latter belongs to consciousness; 
from a psychological point of view, perception can be seen as partial, non-holistic in nature, 
but from a phenomenological perspective it is holistic and meaningful (Merleau-Ponty 1992: 
215−218, Gallagher−zahavi 2008: 92−98). 
It is worth realizing that our perception is always the perception of something, as our 
consciousness is always the conscious experience of something – it is this aboutness which 
differentiates the psychological from the phenomenal, and the root of it is intentionality. As 
Husserl formulates it, 
“[i]f we pay attention to the stream of the modes of appearance, as well as to the mode 
of their »synthesis«, then it become evident that every phase and section is in itself 
»the consciousness of something«, nonetheless during the sequence of the new phas-
es it is the synthetically unified consciousness of one and the same entity which 
arises” (Husserl 1972: 197). 
Since the act of the conscious mind is intentional, i.e. our minds are directed at the world, 
the objects of consciousness are delimited as entities of the world. To put it differently, our 
mind always transcends the perceptual sensations to a unified and delimited object of per-
ception and acts of consciousness, hence the phenomena of cognition are transcended con-
structions. “Transcendental” does not mean in this context something unreal or something 
not tangible, rather it means a perspective from which we can constitute the entities of the 
world despite the partiality of our perception: we do not have to fit the psychical sensations 
together in order to experience something in its totality, because our mind has the capacity 
to transcend the sensory inputs (see Seregi 2010: 600, Mezei 1997: 127−128). 
Because of the mind’s intentionality our experience is directly meaningful: there is no 
need for mediating representations or for any other mental structures to perceive and under-
stand the world from our subjective point of view. Our experiencing look “directs itself ex-
clusively to things, thoughts, purposes, devices at all times, and not to their psychically 
living experience within which they become the objects of consciousness” (Husserl 1972: 
195) – as Ricoeur put it into words, “meaning is always prior to self-consciousness” (Ricouer 
1997: 35). from this it follows that phenomenology is not a mere philosophical speculation 
on the possibilities of cognition: it seems to be the exact theoretical model of everyday cog-
nition. In other words a phenomenological argumentation makes the essential processes of 
cognition visible and explainable – it is both the valid alternative of a naturalistic-objectiv-
istic attitude and the prerequisite of a hermeneutic investigation (Ricoeur 1997: 33). 
The other important consequence of the phenomenological view of perception and cog-
nition is the recognition of the phenomenal world as the base of our experiences. what we 
perceive is not the physical factors of the environment but the entities in their surroundings. 
Thus if a theoretical framework considers our conceptual system or the linguistic meaning 
to be based on experience, then it must be added that experience from a phenomenological 
point of view must not be equated with physical sensations. we experience the phenomenal 
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world with our consciousness, and the reflections on the physical appearance of it are sec-
ondary in our naive attitude toward the world. At the moment when perceiving the phenom-
ena proves to be unsuccessful, we direct our attention to the sensory inputs for gaining rel-
evant information: we try to get more inputs, or we adjust our (sense) organs or our technical 
devices to the actual environment. As Merleau-Ponty (1992: 227) points it out, 
“there is a natural attitude of vision in which I make common cause with my gaze and, 
through it, surrender myself to the spectacle: in this case the parts of the field are in an 
organization which makes them recognizable and identifiable. The quality, the separate 
sensory impact occurs when I break this total structuralization of my vision, when I 
cease to adhere to my own gaze, and when, instead of living the vision, I question my-
self about it, I want to try out my possibilities, I break the link between my vision and 
the world, between myself and my vision, in order to catch and describe it.”
for phenomenology, perception is a double-edged process: the visible/audible/tangible sen-
sations and the transcended object of consciousness are two sides of the same coin. However, 
the latter has priority in the explanation, since it is concerned with our naive experience. 
Therefore cognitive linguistics, which explains meaning as experience-based representa-
tion, has to take it into consideration that neither meanings nor concepts are reducible to 
physical sensations. In my opinion experientialism – and consequently conceptual metaphor 
theory – did not take care of this irreducibility, and the theories of embodiment also identify 
the sphere of experience with the physical, and not with the phenomenal world, while the 
idealized cognitive models or conceptualizations correlate with the phenomena of conscious-
ness and not with physical entities. The problem of representation remains unsolved in cog-
nitive linguistics unless we recognize the irreducible nature of concepts and meanings to the 
physical. This irreducibility does not mean of course that sensory inputs are detached from 
concepts or mental structures, as the classical view of cognition as symbol manipulation 
stated; there is an obvious relation between the physical process of experience and the phe-
nomenal experiencing, which can be called correlation. However, the phenomenological 
interpretation of experience (as an intentional act toward the world results in and is based on 
transcended objects of consciousness) makes the observed action, the socially mediated ac-
tion, moreover the cultural evaluation of actions real sources of understanding the world. In 
the phenomenal world observing something or discussing something are experiences in the 
same way as doing (seeing, hearing and so on) something since these activities are directed 
equally towards intentional objects; and this is what makes such metaphors like arGumEnT is 
war comprehensible, according to the phenomenal interpretation of experience.
This has an unavoidable methodological consequence in cognitive linguistics: we have 
to realize that we do not know what part of empirical evidence is phenomenologically real. 
There are artificial stimuli in an artificial experimental situation, which trigger some sort of 
responses from the subjects, but they reflect in some measure on their mental activity, the 
secondary process of self-consciousness precedes the primary action of directly meaningful 
experience; therefore we cannot interpret the results as the data of everyday cognition. we 
can observe at most the psychical processes that make the experience of the phenomenal 
world possible, but since the subject of these experiments is the psychological self, the task 
of mapping how the mind forms concepts from sensations belongs to the field of psychology. 
As phenomenology can draw our attention to it, explaining linguistic meaning starts with 
the conceptual level which correlates with the intentional functioning of the conscious mind 
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wherein representations have a central role. Thus the problem of representation can be re-
solved with the cautious delimitation of the field of linguistic research and with the model of 
the intentional mind. 
Again the notion of correlations is highly essential at this point: starting from the con-
ceptual does not mean that concepts or meanings belong to the realm of immaterial mind or 
soul, therefore the claim that the objects of consciousness are not irreducible to physical 
sensations does not mean acknowledging Cartesian dualism in investigating the process of 
cognition. Bridging the gap between the sensory inputs and higher ordered cognitive struc-
tures is one of the most difficult tasks for cognitive sciences; though connectionism seems 
to provide an adequate model for explaining the emergence of representations, the experien-
tial paradigm in cognitive linguistics ignores the gap and implies the direct identification of 
conceptual structures with physical states of the body (and the mind) and with their separat-
ed sensorial effects undergone by the subject. Nor is phenomenology united in this respect 
whether intentionality is peculiar to the consciousness (Husserl) or the body itself has a latent 
knowledge of transcending the sensations into a holistic view in the process of perception 
(Melreau-Ponty), therefore a phenomenological argument in itself is not able to fill the gap 
mentioned above. Nevertheless, it can draw our attention to the fact that the physical factors 
being observable from a third-person perspective have only secondary significance in expla-
nation, because we do not collect sensory data to orient ourselves and to act successfully in 
the natural and naive attitude toward the world, rather we interact with the entities as phe-
nomena of consciousness.
The intentional relation of the mind toward the world is one of the important claims of 
phenomenology. The mind does not contain the representations in this sense (the contain-
er-metaphor implies the internalist conception of cognition), rather it participates in an active 
relationship with the world and forms (transcends or synthesizes, from the perspective of 
perception) representation-like structures in concrete situations for concrete purposes. Con-
sequently the entities of the phenomenal world afford themselves as possibilities of manipu-
lation: a chair for sitting on it, or for standing on it to reach other things being laid on a 
higher level, or for closing an entrance and so on. It is the active “interchange” (Abram 1996: 
52) between the mind and the environment which determines how the phenomenal world is 
constituted in the mind. Thus perception is directly meaningful not only because of the in-
tentionality of the conscious mind (which transcends the perceived profiles to a whole), but 
also because of the context of situated action in which the intentional act proceeds – the 
situated action is the other pillar of experiencing in the phenomenal world. 
The role of the mind-environment interaction, as well as the role of the body in it, i.e. the 
active and constructive functioning of the mind gained a central significance already in the 
Gibsonian theory of active perception (see Shapiro 2011: 29−37). Yet the standard idea of 
embodied cognition partly preserved the black-box schema of behaviourism referring to the 
mind. To illustrate this I quote how Vyvyan Evans summarizes the notion of embodied 
cognition: its essence is that “the nature of concepts and the way they are structured and 
organised is constrained by the nature of our embodied experience” (Evans 2007: 66). As we 
can see, in the framework of embodied cognition the environment is the source of the stim-
uli, the body is the apparatus which filters the information or lets it through (the example of 
Evans is the human visual system with three colour channels, compared to the system of 
rabbits or goldfishes), the response is the conceptual structure being mapped from the lin-
guistic data, thus we can infer the internal representation of the mind from the stimuli and 
the bodily devices. This version of embodiment has clear phenomenological roots since it 
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grounds our cognitive structures in direct interactions with the world. Yet it disregards the 
different nature of the experience of being embodied and reflecting on being embodied. As 
Merleau-Ponty says, 
“[t]o say that it is still myself who conceive myself as situated in a body and furnished 
with five senses is clearly a purely verbal solution, since I who reflect cannot recognize 
myself in this embodied I, since therefore embodiment remains in the nature of the 
case an illusion, and since the possibility of this illusion remains incomprehensible” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1992: 213).
In embodied experience the species-specific biological and physiological systems of the 
human body determine the “nature and range” of perception (Evans 2007: 67−68), and from 
this it follows that we can grasp the embodied conditions of our cognitive processes through 
analysing the bodily perceptual systems. In other words the standard idea of embodiment 
takes the access to the embodied constraints of cognition for granted, as if the observer of 
embodied cognition were not herself an embodied subject, and hence she could examine the 
process of cognition from an outside position. However, there is no external viewpoint for 
investigating cognition; therefore the standard embodiment thesis commits the fallacy of 
objectification. It separates the subject of cognition from the object, and considers the body 
as a mere mediator between them. It is unaware of the fact that phenomenal consciousness 
interacts with the world in a given situation actively and reciprocally, which has two conse-
quences: on the one hand the real embodied experience is not accessible in its totality for the 
external observer, and hence on the other hand one cannot make general universal patterns 
of embodied experience from even the most accurate third-person observation (and thus the 
empirical evidences of embodiment seem to be overgeneralizations).4 
There are other extended conceptions of embodiment in cognitive sciences which inte-
grate the phenomenological theses on perception and experience (see Shapiro 2011 for a 
detailed treatment), but the standard view of embodied cognition canonized in cognitive 
linguistics ignores the role of the mind in concept formation in so far as it explains linguistic 
meaning from physical bodily experience. How can we arrive in this framework at the colour 
concepts of the mind for example? from one perspective, they are determined by the physi-
ological structure of the organism and its visual system, and from the other they are acces-
sible directly via collecting and analysing the linguistic expressions of colours. Hence the 
structure of the concepts is explainable from the structure of the organism, and language is 
transparent in this respect since it mirrors the conceptual structures. Consequently we can 
trace linguistic meaning back to the body: concepts become mere labels, and the mind be-
comes gloomy. It loses the active role in cognition, and as Varela points it out, we have no 
idea about the concept-construing function of it. That is why I termed the idea of embodied 
cognition as a “black-box”-like conception of cognition. The embodied view in cognitive 
linguistics turns a blind eye to the intentional nature of the mental, to the situatedness of expe-
rience, as well as to the tight interrelation between consciousness, body and environment, 
4 The methodological framework of Gallagher’s “front-loaded phenomenology” tries to avoid the reification 
fallacy and to approach the embodied experience with forming the experimental design on the basis of 
first-person reports (Gallagher 2010).
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consequently it has a latent tendency to regard the mind as a black box, or simply to ignore 
the aspect of phenomenal consciousness.
I demonstrate this with another example: the vertical sensorimotor stimulus (moving up) 
is evaluated positively because of the wider sight of the horizon, which makes successful 
preparation for dangers possible. Since “language reflects conceptual structure then it follows 
that language reflects embodied experience” (Evans 2007: 66), the experiential correlation 
between up and Good grounds the conceptual metaphors morE is up, ConTrol is up, raTional 
is up, happy is up (Kövecses 2010: 40), from which the latter is considered as universal map-
ping (Kövecses 2010: 195−197). But it is easy to imagine such situations in which moving up 
does not mean solely and clearly positive changes in mental state: e.g. flying up, moving up 
in a roller coaster, or being on the top of a cliff. Of course we can argue that these events are 
artificial in part, therefore our cognitive capacity is not adjusted to these experiences. How-
ever the point of this example is not the nature of the event, but the situatedness of the expe-
rience. Our biological, physiological, neurological apparatus contributes to the process of 
cognition in the concrete situation with an action in its centre. The idea of active interaction 
with the environment − foregrounded by the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty 
− draws our attention to the body not as a mere filtering and constraining apparatus but a 
dynamic system which resonates to its surroundings – it is only the extended view of em-
bodied cognition (which regards the body as the active part of the cognitive process, see 
Shapiro 2011: 158−200) which has phenomenological reality.
The main notion of the phenomenological idea of (embodied) cognition is constitution: 
the mind constitutes the world for itself in a given situation through bodily interactions with 
the environment. In this regard the body, its surroundings and the situation are the constitu-
ents of the process of cognition which yields intentional objects of the conscious mind. In 
the phenomenological tradition constitution means being confronted with preliminary con-
ditions, without assuming absolute preconditions in cognition (Seregi 2010: 601). when the 
conscious mind constitutes the world, it becomes part of the world and at the same time it 
creates the world in the intentional relation to the world. Therefore as experience is not iden-
tical with the physical sensations (it is rather the (re)cognition of a phenomenon), the embod-
ied character of cognition cannot be seen as a mere constraining factor on conceptualization, 
it is rather the dynamic capacity of interacting successfully in the world and creating mean-
ing as a result. 
Some readers may find a contradiction in my argumentation: if the main mistake of em-
bodied cognitive linguistics is to disregard the role of the mind in concept formation, how 
can we as cognitive linguists start our enterprise from the conceptual terrain of cognition, 
ignoring the embodied processes? To put it in another way, does the explanation of semantic 
structures require the description of the brain processes from perception as far as to concep-
tual representation, or not? The answer is twofold, it depends on the perspective of the in-
vestigation, and hence the contradiction is only apparent. If we recall the phenomenological 
proposal of differentiating the psychological self from the phenomenal mind, we can see that 
describing the processes of perception and sensation processing makes only the psycholog-
ical self explainable. from the fact that we know how the brain processes the sensory data 
and which psychological processes can be localized in the neural structure it does not follow 
that we have a causal explanation of the mind and its concepts. what phenomenology directs 
our attention to is the fallacy of determinative reductionism: having experimental evidences 
about perception or sensory processes is no reason for claiming that these are the evidences 
of how the mind functions, because mind is intentional in its nature, and intentionality is not 
SLH_30.indd   58 2016.01.22.   16:38:05
59BEYOND THE STRATEGY Of IGNORANCE…
reducible to physiological structures. To claim that intentionality cannot be naturalized (see 
Searle 2000: 92−94) does not mean that the mind is an immaterial capacity in a dualistic 
ontology; it only means that the sciences do not have satisfactory devices for understanding 
the intentionality of the mind. 
from this it follows that to understand the functioning of the mind we need phenomenol-
ogy. Since the body forms part of the world that is experienced by it, and the world offers 
itself as meaningful through this active participation, cognition is not the process of data-col-
lection and processing, but it is the process in which the environment becomes saturated with 
meanings for human minds. The physical factors affect the environment and the body in it, 
but the true task is to understand how the mind experiences this effect, and how it constitutes 
the world through the experience of it. Since the standard cognitive view reifies the mind and 
its functioning after the fashion of sciences, it is unable to explain how the mind grasps the 
world for itself. Instead of this reification we can follow the phenomenological model of 
experience and cognition: the mind (in the body) takes part in a situation within which the 
entities gain their significance through the action of the subject of cognition (or through her 
purposes, intentions and beliefs). This is the process of constitution, and the human mind is 
adapted to perform it, it is equipped with a neuro-cognitive apparatus that makes constitution 
possible (see Sinha 2002: 274 cited above). 
This redefines the subject of investigation in cognitive sciences fundamentally: cognition 
is possible not only because the human body and the brain are natural entities (hence the 
authority of nature prevails in them), but because the conscious mind being in correlation 
with the actual situation has the capacity of constituting the world as a meaningful environ-
ment. we must recognize this twofold determination of cognition, and the aim of phenome-
nology is to explore the basic structure of it (Mezei 1997: 145). The main function of the mind 
is to constitute the world for itself, which proceeds intentionally; however it takes place only 
in situation, and only through the active participation of the body in the situation. from a 
phenomenological point of view we can interpret the empirical evidences as concerning 
constitution, and thus it becomes evident that it is the subject experiencing and constituting 
the phenomenal world that has the central significance in cognition. 
As a consequence, phenomenological argumentation reminds us to be careful in plan-
ning, carrying out experiments, as well in interpreting their results: cognition is situated, and 
the subjective consciousness is the focus of it. we can therefore observe a lot of behavioural 
or linguistic patterns, but these data are connected to the actual situation and to an experi-
encing subject for her/his consciousness the world affords itself. with the help of this phe-
nomenological reflection we can avoid the overgeneralization of conclusions that can be 
drawn from the data. As Daniel Casasanto (2009: 127−128) calls our attention to it, the 
conceptualizations used in language are importantly different from the conceptualizations 
used in other situations of cognition (remembering, perceiving, acting without words). what 
can be analyzed thus through linguistic patterns is not the conceptual organization itself, but 
a way of constituting the world by a conscious subject in a situation, hence conceptual or-
ganization must not be identified with the patterns of constitution. To return to vertical ori-
entation as an example, the conceptual metaphors related to the spatial domain up are the 
following: ConsCious is up, ConTrol is up, God is up, happy is up, hEalThy is up, morE is up, 
raTional is up, virTuE is up (from the metaphor index in Kövecses 2010). However, there are 
Hungarian expressions like felbosszant (‘annoy’), felbőszít (‘enrage’), in which the concep-
tual domain up (symbolized in the preverbal element fel ‘up’) is related to the experience of 
being angry, and this cannot be explained with morE is up, since the expression lenyugszik 
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(‘calm down’, with the preverbal element le ‘down’) demonstrates that there is a constitution-
al pattern in which we experience the state of angry and calmness along a vertical axis. Our 
(not systematic, but intuitively correct) observation is that Hungarian offers a pattern for 
understanding negative mental states as being up. A standard cognitive linguistic explanation 
would be that there is a language specific conceptual pattern (anGry is up) which has univer-
sal experience-based conceptualization in its background (anGEr is hoT fluid in a ConTainEr). 
These conceptual structures are in the human mind originated from experiencing the phys-
ical world in a human body; hence their activation is automatic in the context of language 
use. The radical view of embodiment would complete this explanation with the notion of 
primary metaphor: for inTEnsiTy is up (or morE is up) is learnt from the active experience of 
the world by the same bodies in the same relevant environment, it can be considered a neural 
co-activating pattern, which motivates the meaning of the expressions. 
what is the alternative phenomenological answer? In a given situation the subjective 
consciousness constitutes intentionally the world for herself/himself, and the basis of this 
process is the access to the phenomenal world offered by the body, in other words the expe-
rience of being in the world. The state of being angry is experienced differently in different 
situations, depending on e.g. the cause of the anger, the physical circumstances and so on. In 
one of the potential experiences the subject feels herself/himself as being in a more and more 
intensive physical, mental, emotional state (correlated with the needs of action in the actual 
situation, e.g. the need of physical motion), and this experience of increasing intensity (or 
increasing preparedness for action) can be related to the process of moving along a vertical 
axis. It is important not to consider experiences as mere states and directions, since they are 
processes experienced by a subjective mind. It follows that constituting the experience of 
being angry does not have universal validity, though linguistic patterns offer intersubjective-
ly acceptable (and analogically reusable) ways of constitution. A vast number of constituting 
possibilities are available theoretically, from which language offers for the subject some 
patterns. There are several other intentional relations toward the phenomena of the world and 
of the subjective consciousness in it, as we can observe other gestures which manifest the 
constitution of anger on a horizontal axis, e.g. the move of the hands rapidly away from each 
other referring to the tension of anger. what we can explore through linguistic investigations 
is not conceptual structures but the alternative ways of constitution. Another example is 
constituting the domain of time: while the conceptualization paradigm claims that it is the 
sagittal axis (front/back) which structures the experience of time, analysing co-speech ges-
tures of English informants demonstrates that the horizontal (left/right) axis is also essential 
in time-constitution (Casasanto 2009: 130). 
Consequently the important conclusion of the phenomenological argumentation is that 
linguistic meaning represents constituting patterns and not conceptualization. while the 
latter refers to the content of human mind, and thus it implies both the internalistic concep-
tion of cognitive (mental) representations and the radical reductionist approach to them from 
the perspective of embodiment, the former means that the human mind is always a conglom-
eration of dynamic acts within which the subject create her or his attitude to the experienced 
world. As a result of phenomenological contemplation we can avoid both internalism (con-
sciousness is not a container but it is an active constituent of embodied experience) and re-
ductionism (the phenomenal experience is not reducible to sensory inputs), and the homun-
culus-problem does not arise either. 
At first this seems to be a mere terminological specification, but there is an essential differ-
ence between the standard (or embodied) view of conceptualization and the phenomenological 
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approach to meaning and cognition: the conceptualization paradigm is theoretically deductive, 
whereas the phenomenological approach uses induction in explaining the process of cognition. 
The conceptualization theory uses double deduction: (i) it assumes the priority of conceptual 
structures over meanings (hence meaning can be deduced from conceptualization), and (ii) it 
assumes the priority of the physiologic body over conceptualization (hence concepts can be 
deduced from bodily organisation). In comparison with the deductive theorizing of conceptu-
alization, phenomenology begins the investigation by mapping the situation and the active 
consciousness correlates with it; on the one hand it makes possible not to reify the constituents 
of cognition, and to avoid ignoring one or another constituent though simplifying its role; on 
the other hand it determines the boundaries of generalization: not every observed behavioural 
pattern is general, but only those which follow from the correlation of the consciousness with 
the world, since these have intersubjective validity.5
The central notion in conceptualization is causal motivation: the direct cause of meaning 
is the conceptual (for it determines what mappings evolve in understanding), the indirect cause 
of it is the body (for it determines what conceptualizations emerge during learning processes). 
By contrast, the central notion of a phenomenological epistemology is correlation: the consti-
tuted world and the constituting consciousness cannot be reduced to each other, however their 
relation is not accidental, since the cognitive apparatus with which the human mind adapted to 
survive provides a common ground for experiencing and understanding a shared world. 
Looking at the problem of representation (Q1) from the phenomenological perspective, 
the main question is not whether there is any need for mental representations in explaining 
linguistic meaning, since experiencing the phenomenal world involves some kind of mental 
structures which transcend our sensations to phenomenal objects for the purposes of rep-
resentation-hungry tasks (planning, memorizing, discussing etc.), and these structures can-
not be reduced to physical-physiologic data. The real question is what the representations 
stand for: the standard cognitive answer is that these are the representations of the mind’s 
concepts, whereas the phenomenological answer is that the mental structures represent al-
ternative constitutions of the phenomenal world. They are flexible and dynamic patterns of 
cognitive acts being suitable for adapting them in a given situation. The constitutional pat-
terns i.e. the mental representations are in other words possible attitudes of the mind toward 
the environment and toward itself, and because of the ability to act without words we can 
assume that there is a representational mind prior linguistic meaning.
In the process of constitution, the experiencing self becomes a subject. It is therefore not 
an unreliable point of view with restricted validity, but the main result of every cognitive act, 
as well as the vantage point of understanding and explaining everyday cognition. from a 
phenomenological perspective, experience is always subjective, which means that it is the 
constitutional act of a subject within which a possible correlation between the conscious mind 
and the world becomes visible. But a difficult question follows from the subjective nature of 
5 I do not follow the husserlian argumentation in this regard, since it proposes an idealistic method for the 
problem of generalization: for Husserl it is the transcendental subjectivity, and idealized being which 
grounds the individual behaviours in the generality of humankind, and which can be revealed through 
phenomenological reduction (Husserl 1972: 214−215, see Gadamer 2002: 62). Since cognitive linguistics 
dose not assume a priori entities for elaborating general explanations, this kind of reduction (and the ideal-
istic metaphysical background of it) is alien to its nature. It is a difficult but promising task for cognitive 
linguistics to find and integrate such theses of phenomenology with which the explanation of cognitive 
functioning of language becomes more natural and not more obscure.
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experience: how can we be sure of experiencing the same world as others? How can we find 
ourselves in a shared world, and how does the world not collapse into an infinite number of 
subjective phenomenal worlds? This is the hard problem of solipsism; in the next section I 
demonstrate how phenomenology moves beyond it.
3.2. From the subject to the other: intersubjectivity
The foregoing demonstrates that phenomenology proves to be productive for cognitive lin-
guistic research at a metatheoretical level: the reflections initiated by it explicate important 
presuppositions, e.g. the differentiation between psychological self and phenomenal mind 
(through which we can re-evaluate the methodological and theoretical significance of exper-
imental investigations), or the prevailing first-person perspective of experience (which di-
rects our attention to the importance of constitution instead of generalized patterns of con-
ceptualization). The latter claim, however, leads us to the problem of solipsism, and unless 
it is not reflected, phenomenology cannot be applied as epistemological background for 
cognitive sciences, since a solipsistic attitude toward the world is inconsistent with any sci-
entific enterprise which has the aim of exploring the world in itself. The claim that world 
appears always for a subject, hence there is no world in itself (or we are not able to reach it, 
as Kant stated) would make the modern scientific endeavours senseless.
But if one interprets carefully the notion of correlation in phenomenology, the objection 
of solipsism does not arise either. for correlation means that two entities (the constituted 
world and the constituting consciousness) are not reducible to each other (Mezei 1997: 100). 
As Husserl notes it,
 “The following should be noted in this connexion: Just as the reduced Ego is not a 
piece of the world, so, conversely, neither the world nor any worldly object is a piece 
of my Ego, to be found in my conscious life ar a really inherent part of it, as a complex 
of data of sensation or a complex of acts” (Husserl 1982: 26).
And though Husserl makes his claim about the phenomenologically reduced ego, the essence 
of his words is that the affordance of the world in the consciousness does not mean that the 
world exists only in the field of consciousness, or that it forms a part of it. Idealism states that 
one of the two entities (the constituted world or the constituting consciousness) is a priori: 
either the world (objective idealism, as we find it in Kant’s epistemology and in the notion of 
the world in itself [Ding an sich]) or the subject (solipsism, as we find it in the philosophy of 
Berkeley). The subjective consciousness has the priority in the process of experience, be-
cause the world appears from its perspective, thus subjectivism is peculiar to phenomenolo-
gy,6 yet the perspective of the subject is not only prior but also partial: the acts of conscious-
ness cannot grasp the world as a whole; that is why consciousness needs to transcend the 
sensations to a phenomenal object. Because the subjective consciousness never can cognize 
the world in its totality, the priority of the subject is tenable without any idealism (Mezei 
6 It is this subjectivism which received a serious critique from hermeneutics (see Ricoeur 1997: 29−31), but 
if one conceives the subjective consciousness as a vantage point and as an inherent factor of every experi-
ence, whereas the subject is the (self-)reflecting consciousness which find herself/himself in a relation to the 
world (see Maclaren 2009, Ullmann 2013), the epistemological subjectivism does not mean ontological 
apriorism of the subject.
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1997: 129). Husserl himself regards transcendence as the central notion of correlation be-
tween the world and the consciousness:
“[t]his »transcendence« is part of the intrinsic sense of anything worldly, despite the 
fact that anything worldly necessary acquires all the senses determining it, along with 
its existential status, exclusively from my experiencing, my objectivating, thinking, 
valuing, or doing, at particular times” (Husserl 1982: 26).
In my interpretation, the act of transcendence (or the act of intentionality in other words) 
links the world in itself and the consciousness, making correlation, becoming the psycholog-
ical self (being one part of the nature) a phenomenal consciousness (participating in the world 
as a subject) possible. Intentionality is therefore the essential capacity of our cognitive appa-
ratus. It is one of the adaptations of the human mind, thus it can be naturalized only with 
evolutionary and not with neurobiological terms. The question, however, that why the sub-
jectively constituted world is valid for others remains unanswered. On the one hand inten-
tionality is a common inheritance of humankind, on the other one can experience only 
through her /his own intentional acts. 
The dilemma can be solved with the Husserlian notion of horizon, which presupposes 
that we do not experience the world as isolated intentional fields (Husserl 1972: 201), our 
intentional acts direct toward the other too in the world. we experience the other as inten-
tional subject of the same kind, so the consciousness of the other forms a part of my con-
sciousness. As we can interpret the notion of horizon as a latent field of possibilities (Spiel-
raum der Möglichkeiten), the unbroken system of possible acts and actions setting the 
directions of the experience (see Ullmann 2013: 35), we can also assume an intersubjective 
horizon around our conscious acts. The perspective of the other as intentional consciousness 
(intentional mental agent, intentional being having purposes, attention and the ability deci-
sion making as Tomasello terms it, see Tomasello 2002: 83) appears implicitly in every act 
of the conscious mind. The intersubjective horizon, and the perspective of the other figured 
in this horizon can become explicit, which is a special kind of intentionality called empathy 
(Gallagher−zahavi 2008: 183), but as a latent field of experience it is implied in every acts 
of consciousness from perception to decision making. 
why is the phenomenological idea of intersubjective horizon important for cognitive 
linguistics? what are the main differences between the standard cognitive scientific and the 
phenomenological approach to intersubjectiviy? The first is that cognitive sciences have 
thematized the notion of intersubjectivity as the problem of cognizing the other in the context 
of discoursive and cultural practices. This thematization regards the subject as an individu-
al embodied conscious mind, thus it maintains the isolation of it in spite of directing our 
attention towards the social life (see zlatev−Racine−Sinha−Itkonen 2008: 1). Contrary to the 
standard approach, phenomenology considers intersubjectivity an essential terrain of expe-
riencing the world, hence it is significant not only in social acts, but in cognition in the 
broadest sense. And while the standard approach preserves partly the solipsist attitude in 
explaining cognition, since individual minds turn to the others only if they have something 
communicable for them, Merleau-Ponty (1992: 361) notes: 
“[s]olipsism would be strictly true only if someone who managed to be tacitly aware 
of his existence without being or doing anything, which is impossible, since existing 
is being in and of the world.”
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Since humans live evidently in a social world, and since sociality is one of the most important 
evolutionary developments in and for human cognition, the perspective of the other must be 
an inherent (explicit or latent) factor of cognition.
The second difference is the model of intersubjectivity: while cognitive science elaborat-
ed the analogy + inference model of recognizing other minds, phenomenology rejects the 
analogical modelling (for a detailed discussion of analogical modelling and implicit simula-
tion in phenomenology see Gallagher−zahavi 2008: 177−183). The reason of rejecting anal-
ogy in understanding the other is complex. On the one hand it implies the assumption of one’s 
own mind’s transparency for itself: one can identify the conscious state with one’s own, but 
this procedure is successful only if one’s own states are totally known to oneself. To put it 
differently, analogical modelling presupposes the knowledge of the subjective mental states 
by the subject through introspection. However, introspection presupposes the separation of 
the external from the internal, and renders the mind an internal entity not participating in 
the world, phenomenology therefore rejects introspection as a valid method of cognizing the 
consciousness (Gallagher−zahavi 2008: 21). The consciousness itself cannot become the 
object of the acts of consciousness, consequently the mind is never immanent for itself, and 
the subjective consciousness has to transcend itself through constituting the other if it wants 
to know something about itself. Hence analogy never leads us to understand other minds.
On the other hand, as Merleau-Ponty argues (relying on Scheler’s declaration, see Mer-
leau-Ponty 1992: 352−353), analogy always presupposes what it is called on to explain. It 
takes the sameness of one’s own and the other’s mind as a starting point; hence through 
analogy we lose the otherness of the other, and instead of mapping the other mind, we analyse 
our own projected mind as other. Analogy makes a double failure in explaining cognition: it 
preserves the individual mind as a central and transparent vantage point, which results in the 
illusion of understanding otherness. Analogy is the true but hiding solipsism.
The inferential processes of analogical modelling are simulations: I try to understand the 
perspective of the other from my own one, and then I can infer through simulating the situ-
ation from the other’s point of view. Explicit simulation (in which comprehending one’s own 
intentional state is prior to understand the other’s) raises however the homunculus-problem, 
and it has no objective verification from a developmental viewpoint (Tomasello 2002: 85); 
whereas implicit simulation (in which simulation proceeds directly in cognition, thus there 
is no mediating phase of introspection-like comprehension) is not distinguishable from direct 
perception and action: the neural activations which are identified with simulation can be 
interpreted as the subprocesses of perception, and the mirror neurons (which are said the 
most powerful evidences of simulation) can function in the sensori-motor process of percep-
tion. The main difficulty with implicit simulation is that its empirical evidence is a matter of 
interpretation: if we extend perception from a passive to an active process and we interpret 
it as a kind of action (as phenomenology does), it includes the firing of the mirror-neurons as 
well. The important conclusion is that the question of simulation – like the question of rep-
resentation – cannot be answered from an empirical standpoint with naturalistic argumen-
tation, because the evidences are interpretable either as supporting or as opposing the exist-
ence of a simulating process. Scientific research needs theoretical contemplation and 
philosophical reflection in order to interpret carefully the empirical evidences. 
According to phenomenology, intersubjectivity is an essential dimension of conscious 
life. The appearance of the other in the horizon of subjective consciousness is not equal with 
the perspective of the other, or with the implicit or explicit knowledge of what is in the other’s 
mind, since successful interaction (with or without words) presupposes that (i) the other 
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experiences the same phenomenological world (though not the same physical one because of 
the different perspectives), and (ii) the vantage points, the backgrounds and the situations are 
in principle shareable, thus the other would or could be in the situation of the subject (though 
not exactly in the same situation). Consequently, intersubjectivity is to be conceived primar-
ily not as perspective taking (for it preserves the separate view of individual minds) but as 
the origin of understanding the world: 
“this intersubjectivity of cognition and language relies on the notion of ‘truth’ which 
implies that what is true or false, correct or incorrect, is also true or false, correct or 
incorrect for other persons” (Praetorius 2010: 308). 
Intersubjectivity ensures that the phenomenal subject is able to understand the environment as 
a meaningful world and she/he can manipulate the entities around herself/himself to execute 
successful actions, despite her/his limited cognitive abilities. The human mind needs the other 
for constituting the world as such through perception, cognition and action, since it experiences 
the world with others, and it experiences the others as intentional mental agents of the same 
kind – this is our cognitive inheritance and the main factor of our cultural evolution. 
The importance of intersubjectivity is far from new in cognitive linguistics: in the last 
two decades, fundamental theoretical and empirical investigations have been conducted on 
developmental psychology and language acquisition with the recognition of the central role 
of intersubjectivity (i.e. the understanding of the other as an intentional mental agent similar 
to me) as a result (see Tomasello 2002, Sinha 2014 for details). However, the notion of inter-
subjectivity has not gained its real significance in the theory of linguistic meaning. In the 
pragmatic tradition, the term is conceived as “mutual attribution of intention and understand-
ing”, hence it is the context of language use which is intersubjective in nature (Harder 2009: 
67−70, Tátrai 2011: 30). The pragmatic interpretation adheres itself to the attribution of in-
tentions, but it implies the priority of the individual mind (and the subjective vantage point 
as well), a monolithic theory of mind (which developmentally questionable), and an analog-
ical-inferential model of interpersonal epistemology with its view of separated minds. An-
other important model on intersubjectivity in cognitive linguistics is due to Arie Verhagen: 
he considers some areas of grammar (negation and negation-related costructions, comple-
mentation, discourse connectives) as the scaffolding devices of engaging in “deep cognitive 
coordinations with others” (Verhagen 2005: 4). In his framework it is not the context of the 
discourse, but linguistic structures themselves are regarded as intersubjective constructions, 
hence the notion of intersubjectivity gets central significance in describing linguistic mean-
ing. Nevertheless this significance does not extend to meaning as such: only one part of 
grammatical constructions proves to be intersubjective, and though it is the core of their 
meaning, intersubjectivity remains the dimension of coordinating meanings being otherwise 
individual and isolated. 
A phenomenological approach to intersubjectivity can not only explicate the erroneous 
presuppositions of investigating human meaning creation from a cognitive point of view (e.g. 
the solipsistic attitude towards the other mind, the fallacy of analogy in explanation), but it 
also extends the application of intersubjectivity in semantics. Merleau-Ponty (1992: 354) 
describes the event of a discourse as phenomenal experience: 
“[i]n the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and 
myself a common ground; my thought and his are interwoven into a single fabric, my 
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words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and 
they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator. we have 
here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of behaviour in my 
transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in consummate 
reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a com-
mon world.”
It is worth recognizing that the process of experience is itself intersubjective, namely it pre-
supposes the consciousness of the other, consequently not one or another linguistic construc-
tion has intersubjective character. we can distinguish the phenomenological notion of inter-
subjectivity from the canonized one: whereas the latter can be seen as an explicit interpretation 
(which presupposes the individual meaning, and according to which intersubjective construal 
consists of specific subprocesses like perspective taking, inference, coordination through 
constructions, negotiation on meaning), the phenomenological interpretation conceives inter-
subjectivity as an implicit factor of every meaning (from the nominal/verbal/adjectival ones 
through indexicals and pronominal meanings as far as to clausal meaning), it is the substrate 
of conceptualizing or construing entities and events of the world (hence it is not confined to 
verbal discourses, see Harder 2009). To interpret the clause Just put it on the table!, it is not 
enough to know that the reference of it is elaborated in relation to the common ground; it is 
not enough to know what the verb put means in the context of use and what kind of interper-
sonal relations are symbolized in the imperative construction; we need to know what table 
means and why can we use the on preposition with the table nominal in the context of the verb 
put. The latter knowledge is intersubjective, though we do not make any negotiations on it, as 
well as no perspective taking is needed for meaning creation: knowledge of the table (as a 
phenomenal object having an extended vertical surface that can be used to laying something 
on it) is shared, i.e. it is intersubjective knowledge. It must be realized that meaning has an 
implicit intersubjective character in its every aspect; to put it differently, intersubjectivity of 
meaning is prior to its subjectivity. As Praetorius (2010: 308) notes, 
“intersubjectivity must be the rock bottom, the very point of departure from which 
any discussion about our knowledge and description must be based and proceed – 
whether such discussions concern our knowledge and description of thing in publicly 
observable reality, or our internal states, such as our emotions, thoughts or feelings 
of pain.”
Cognitive linguistics can profit from the phenomenological interpretation of intersubjectiv-
ity on multiple fields of explaining linguistic structures. At first it is worth noting that the 
schematic semantic descriptions provided by the most elaborated theories in cognitive lin-
guistics model the intersubjective ground of the meaning of linguistic structures being spec-
ifiable in the discourse. The so called idealized cognitive models are based on experiencing 
the phenomenal world; their validity is therefore not universal but intersubjective. Also the 
semantic matrices of cognitive domains elaborated in cognitive grammar demonstrate that 
core of linguistic meanings originating from the intersubjective experience of a shared phe-
nomenal world, just as the semantic descriptions of frame semantics can be regarded as in-
tersubjective categorizations of experiencing the world, hence they can motivate actual 
meaning in a discourse. Phenomenology as a metatheoretial perspective does not serve for 
refining the proposed schematic structures (although it directs our attention to the synthetic 
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configuration of sense experiences in spite of their separated description in domains for 
example), the real benefit of its application is to redefine the character and significance of the 
elaborated models. 
Nevertheless we can build new explanations on phenomenological claims about intersub-
jectivity in the cases of (creative or poetic) innovations. Creativity has a strong intersubjec-
tive character: it is neither creating something from nothing (Pope 2005: xv), nor a purely 
subjective act of cognition. Instead of a binary (yes/no answer for the question whether 
something counts as innovation) and subjectivist approach in which innovation is a solely 
act of the individual, the phenomenological reflection can propose a scalar idea of innovation 
ranging from the conventionality of intersubjective constitution of the phenomenal world to 
the more and more subjective constitution patterns. If semantic descriptions provided by 
cognitive theories of linguistic structure are the models of the intersubjective ground of 
meanings, then the process of subjectivization can be grasped on the level of semantic struc-
tures, and not only on the level of the discourse: in so far as conventionality carries out the 
intersubjective constitution, in which the conscious mind does not want to step out from the 
shared phenomenal world, every departure from conventionality highlights a new way of 
constituting the world from a consciously changed perspective, be it an archaism, a neolo-
gism or other poetic formation;7 yet every innovation is only partial departure, since the 
intersubjective ground of meaning does not disappear, it only goes to the background (see 
the principle of optimal innovation in Giora 2003: 176−184). The exact, absolute degree of 
departing from the conventions (and hence from the intersubjective constitution) cannot be 
measured, but from a phenomenological point of view (as from a cognitive linguistic one, 
see zawada 2005) innovation and creativity are relative phenomena. The benefit coming 
from phenomenology is again not the elaboration of a strict methodology but of a theoretical 
frame in which innovation is interpreted as the symbolic marker of relatively subjective 
constitution.
The phenomenological idea of intersubjectivity can put the canonized notions of cogni-
tive linguistics into a new light. One of the examples is the generic space in the model of 
conceptual integration: according to Turner (2007: 378) it “contains what the inputs have in 
common”. However, this definition does not elaborate the status of the generic space in the 
blend: it is open whether the generic space is the result of an a posteriori generalization or it 
is the prerequisite of creating a blended space. Considering the famous example This surgeon 
is a butcher, is the generic space needed for interpreting the metaphor, or is it a useful device 
for analyzing the semantic structure? well, if we recognize that the generic space summa-
rizes such aspects of the blended entities or events which are indisputably valid in the shared 
world (the use of sharp devices, the process of cutting flesh or meat for executing the pur-
posed act successfully and so on), we can conclude that the generic space functions as the 
intersubjective ground on which the new (metaphorical) meaning emerges. In other words, 
the reference of the butcher to the surgeon, as well as the emerging conceptualization of 
incompetence is meaningful only for those who have the intersubjective knowledge of what 
a surgeon and a butcher do in the shared phenomenal world. As we can see, even in creative 
conceptual integration, there is an intersubjective substructure, since without it the blend 
7 The redefinition of subjectification from a phenomenological perspective as a new way of constituting the 
phenomenal reality is of specific importance in cognitive stylistics and in cognitive poetics: insofar as 
nonconventional linguistic solutions symbolize the subjectivized perspective in experiencing the world, 
stylistic and poetic formation can propose new constituting relation or attitude towards the shared world. 
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would be totally incomprehensible. The generic space ensures that the emerging meaning 
remains intersubjectively understandable. Therefore blending seems to be a useful device for 
constituting the phenomenal world from a new perspective without abolishing its shared 
character. Mark Turner formulates this phenomenal function of conceptual integration as 
achieving a human scale (Turner 2007: 382−383).
The other example comes from the theory of grammaticalization and from the theory of 
construction grammar: the term constructionalization designates the process when a con-
struction becomes more schematic and less compositional in its meaning, hence the increase 
of its use results in the increase of the emergent character of its meaning; the new construc-
tion is a new node at a higher level in the network of linguistic knowledge, thus construc-
tionalization leads to convergent use of linguistic structure, in other words to a shared gram-
mar (see Hilpert 2015: 134−140). The emergence of a construction is the stabilization of an 
intersubjective constituting pattern in the discourse community. As it was demonstrated 
above, innovations count as departures from the conventional, intersubjectively valid con-
stitution of the phenomenal world. Constructionalization can be seen as the reversed process 
through which a subjective way of experiencing the shared world becomes intersubjective. 
from this it follows that the corpus-based investigations are of overriding importance, be-
cause the quantitative analyses can demonstrate what kinds of constituting patterns are ac-
cessible in a language community, and through measuring their frequency we can infer their 
degree of intersubjectivity. Phenomenology leads us to the claim that language is not only 
the medium of cognition but it is the socio-cultural context of emerging new patterns of 
cognition, thus language use can yield new insights into the world around us.
4. Back to the problem of representation: conclusion
The aim of this paper was twofold: on the one hand I aimed to demonstrate the benefits that 
cognitive linguistics can have from a phenomenological contemplation; on the other I wanted 
to demonstrate that in spite of the anti-philosophical attitude of the naturalizing cognitive 
sciences, a phenomenological reflection on the subject and the methods of cognitive linguistic 
research can provide numerous considerations which can help us to avoid both the problem-
atic theoretical presuppositions (e.g. reductionism or the problem of isolated minds) and the 
conflation of the research field of cognitive linguistics with the other fields in cognitive sci-
ence. Though I agree with András Kertész that metascientific reflection “is not capable of 
solving objectscientific problems per se” (Kertész 2004: 168), the contribution of metascien-
tific reflection to objectscientific investigation is not limited to motivate ignoring certain 
phenomena or aspects in explanation – an accurate theoretical reflection can set the task of 
taking new realms of cognition (e.g. phenomenal consciousness, the implicit intersubjectivity 
of meaning) into consideration, and it helps to define the subject of objectscientific researches.
The main theses of a phenomenological contemplation on cognition are:
a) the differentiation between the psychological self and the phenomenal consciousness; 
between the actual situation of experiencing and the situated process of cognition;
b) the direct meaningfulness of perception;
c) the recognition of the phenomenal world as the basis of our experiences;
d) the irreducibility of concepts and meaning to physical sensations;
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e) the secondary importance of direct empirical (external) observations in investigating 
cognition;
f) the inherent situatedness of experiencing the phenomenal world, in which not only the 
body, but also the situation becomes the constituent of the intentional object;
g) the definition of cognition – instead of mere data-collecting and data-processing – as the 
process in which the environment becomes saturated with meanings for human minds;
h) the recognition of constitution as the active functioning of the human mind;
i) the recognition of the subject’s central role in the process of cognition;
j) modelling linguistic meaning not as conceptual but as constitutional patterning;
k) the recognition of intersubjectivity as an implicit horizon of the conscious mind;
l) attributing an implicit intersubjective character to linguistic meaning.
As we can see, a phenomenological argumentation can alter the subject of the inquiry and 
the interpretation of the central notions as well. The naturalistic metatheoretical reflection 
eliminates some of the research dilemmas construing new conditions on the grounds of 
empirical evidences within which both of the destructive alternative of the dilemma become 
avoidable, limiting their application to only one part of the investigated phenomena. Thus if 
we consider the behavioural aspects of cognition, we do not need representations, but if we 
consider the higher ordered tasks of cognition, representations are needed. In comparison 
with it – and this is the central metatheoretical claim of this study – a philosophical reflection 
carried out as phenomenological argumentation can solve the dilemma without ignoring 
important aspects of the phenomena investigated. 
To recall the problem of representation I reformulate it with the terms of standard cogni-
tive science. The representationalist alternative claims that we need representation-like struc-
tures in order to understand and explain cognition, and hence the main purpose of cognitive 
linguistics is to model the (conceptual or semantic) representations in the background of 
actual meanings. In the course of this endeavour we can maintain the embodied (experi-
ence-based) nature of these representations, but we can ignore the specific explanation of it 
– a rigorous description of semantic or conceptual representations. The anti-representation-
alist alternative goes as follows: because of the non-observability of representations these 
are mere labels of the analyst, there is no evidence for using intermind structures; thus the 
only vivid and true alternative is to consider representations as neuronal activation patterns, 
and though in a special sense they can be seen as (bodily) representations, the actual rep-
resentations of these physiological structures (in language, in discourse and so on) are of 
secondary significance, i.e. ignorable.
Phenomenology ignores neither the embodied, nor the representation-like aspects of cog-
nition: by placing the human mind into a situation of action which is meaningful through the 
acts of the participating mind it can balance the significance of body, mind, and environment. 
The intentionality of the subjective consciousness pervades the process of cognition making 
both the correlation between the mind and the world and the correlation between the subject 
and the other possible; however, neither aspects of cognition can be reduced to intentionali-
ty, since it is the factor of correlation, not of causal relation. Intentionality is the character-
istic feature of the human mind, an adaptation to acting successfully in the world, yet it 
cannot develop without (epigenetically) interacting with the world. In so far as the cognizing 
human mind directs itself toward the world through intentional acts, explaining cognition 
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needs representation in any aspect of the process, but these representations are subjective 
representations of the shared world having intersubjective (not universal) validity.8
To the question whether phenomenology also ignores something, namely the psycholog-
ical self and the empirically tested process of cognition, the answer can be given that phe-
nomenology does not ignore it, but it limits the validity of the results of empirical observa-
tions and testing. we can explore many important details of cognition through third-person 
observation, but neither linguistic structures nor cognition itself can be explained causally 
with it. The data need to be interpreted from a theoretical point of view, and phenomenology 
serves as an accurate and reflected device for this interpretation. The only thing being ig-
nored in a phenomenological contemplation is the naturalistic attitude toward the mind: I 
admit that a phenomenological perspective is not promising regarding the wished synthesis 
of humanities and sciences. However, a synthesis must involve an active discourse between 
humanities and sciences which will initiate the redefinition of the central theoretical con-
structions such as cognition, experience and representation. Instead of being dominated by 
the ideal of sciences, humanities – and especially philosophy – can offer theoretical consid-
erations which are essential for scientific explanation, and phenomenology carries the prom-
ise of a two-directional, real interdisciplinarity of humanities and sciences – it can lead to a 
new cognitive linguistics. 
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two FiELdworkErS’ EFFEctS on a rESpondEnt’S  
LanguagE uSE in SzEgEd, Hungary1
miKlós némEth – miKlós Kontra – balázs sinKoviCs
Abstract
Interviewing techniques in variationist sociolinguistics may work in one location but fail in 
another. In this paper we test the effect of a dialect (ö-speaking) fieldworker and a Standard 
Hungarian (e-speaking) fieldworker on the speech of the same respondent who uses ö [Ø] 
in place of Standard e [e]. Quantitative analyses showed no effect of any of the traditional 
explanations such as Labov’s audiomonitoring, Bell’s audience design, progress of time in 
the interview, topic or emotional loading. However, Watzlawick’s interactional view of com-
munication provides an adequate means to interpret the data. What did have an effect on the 
speech behavior of the respondent was how he placed himself vis-à-vis the two interviewers 
on a social hierarchy axis. The importance of constructing profiles of the persona of the 
respondent and that of the interviewer is emphasized.     
Keywords: fieldworkers’ effects in a sociolinguistic interview, bidialectals in hiding, Labov’s 
audiomonitoring, Bell’s audience design, trust between interlocutors, watzlawick’s interac-
tional view of communication, the respondent’s and the interviewer’s profiles, the respond-
ent’s position in the interview, indirect effect of the fieldworker’s persona 
1. The Variation and Change in Szeged Speech project
The dialect traditionally used in and around the city of Szeged (population c. 160,000) in 
South Eastern Hungary is a nationally conspicuous one, using the front mid round ö [Ø] in 
place of Standard Hungarian e [e] in certain syllables as in köröszt [kØrØst] vs. Standard 
kereszt [kerest] ‘cross’. 
when we began our project to study variation and change in the dialect of Szeged
2
 in 
2012, we assumed that
•	 the dialect was probably disappearing fast, 
•	 most of its users are bidialectal in Standard and local speech, 
•	 they are very skillful code-switchers (“bidialectals in hiding”).
One more consideration we had to take seriously is that about one-third of the city’s popula-
tion are in-migrants, many of them from non-ö dialect regions.
1 This paper is based on our presentation at the International Conference on Language Variation in Europe 
(ICLaVE 8) in Leipzig, Germany, 28 May 2015. 
2 This project is supported by OTKA, Grant no. K-105720. 
SLH_30.indd   73 2016.01.22.   16:38:06
74 MIKLóS NéMETH – MIKLóS KONTRA – BALÁzS SINKOVICS
Our major methodological tool is a modification of the interview designed by Labov 
(1984) and adapted to Hungarian in the Budapest Sociolinguistic Interview project (see 
Kontra–Váradi 1997, Kontra–Borbély 2010). we have a fair number of conversational mod-
ules, subjective reaction tests, reading passages, modules on local speech, questions designed 
to gauge respondents’ attachment to/solidarity with Szeged, forced-choice tests such as 
“which of these two words do YOU use?” and “which of these two is correct?” Also includ-
ed are two map-drawing tasks (see Preston 1999) and some other components typical of 
sociolinguistic interviews.
Our basic linguistic hypotheses state that the use of ö (vs. e) is (1) influenced by the po-
sition of the ö-able syllable in the word: initial, medial or suffixal, and (2) the position of a 
preverb like fel-/föl- ‘up’, which may be either preposed (e.g. fölad ‘it gives up’) or postposed 
(e.g. nem ad föl ‘it does not give up’). we also hypothesize that some additional linguistic 
variables may covary with our major variable (ö).
As regards social variables, it is hypothesized that
•	 the young use the dialect less than the old, 
•	 the less educated use it more than the more educated, 
•	 it will be used more in interviews than in reading passages or tests,
•	 people more attached to Szeged use it more than those less attached.
we have no hypothesis regarding the sex of speakers. 
we also hypothesized six types of respondents on the basis of in-migration status and 
linguistic behavior (see Berente–Kontra–Sinkovics, forthcoming). Some people born and 
raised in Szeged may be able to use the local dialect, in which case they may be either speak-
ers of it (ö-ing people) or they may avoid using it (using e almost always). Others born and 
raised in Szeged may never have learned the dialect and use e categorically. In-migrants are 
defined as speakers who were born and raised outside the ö dialect region and who moved to 
Szeged after age 14. Some in-migrants cannot use the ö dialect and use e categorically. Other 
in-migrants may be able to speak the dialect and they speak it (ö-ing people), yet others may 
be able to speak it but avoid doing so (using e almost always). The avoiders (those who can 
use ö speech but avoid using it almost always) will be identified as using ö in less than 20% 
of the ö-able syllables, which is the researchers’ admittedly subjective threshold. Thus the 
avoiders can use the local dialect (a qualitative decision), but avoid doing so (a quantitative 
decision).
All members of our random representative sample of 160 respondents will be categorized 
as belonging to one of these six types ex post facto, on the basis of their in-migration status 
and use of ö in the guided conversations. One of our aims is to find out whether these six 
posited categories of speakers will actually show important sociolinguistic differences.
2. On bidialectals in hiding
Based on our everyday experience of language use or speech behavior in Szeged, we are 
aware that almost all speakers of the local dialect are extremely good at code-switching 
between ö-ing speech and near-Standard (e-ing) speech. They also seem to be very good at 
choosing the right code or variety with practically all their interlocutors: they use ö with 
people they know are good speakers of the dialect, and e with everybody else. They are bi-
dialectals in hiding, which makes it very hard to observe their use of ö. They are a nightmare 
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for the fieldworker if s/he is not a native speaker of local Szeged speech. Here is what a 
22-year-old male respondent told our fieldworker in an interview:
Respondent: De énbennem valahogy mindig az van, hogyha jön szembe egy ismeret-
len, akiről nem tudom biztosan, hogy ő ö-ző tájszólást beszél, akkor én nem fogok 
vele úgy beszélni. Még itt Szegeden sem. és hogyha most én itt vagyok az egyetemi 
épületben, akkor itt is bennem van egy ilyen, hogy nagyon nehezen kezdek el úgy 
beszélni.     
fieldworker: Aha.
Respondent: és az iskolában is így volt. Hogy főleg inkább, ha elmöntünk ëgymáshoz, 
akkor ott jobban előjött ez,[köszörüli a torkát]de egyébként szóval a többiekkel, akik 
nem szögediesen beszéltek, azokkal tehát mi mindig tudtunk ezen így változtatni, 
hogy ha akartuk így, ha akartuk úgy. és nekem ez gyerekkorom óta így van. én nem 
emlékszem olyan időre, amikor nem tudtam volna eldönteni, hogy most kivel beszé-
lek hogy. 
  
(K01, 00:12:50 – 00:13:34)
3
 
The above is a simplified transcript of about 45 seconds of the interview. An English trans-
lation follows:
Respondent: when I see a stranger coming towards me, someone who I don’t know 
for sure that they speak the local ö-ing dialect, I won’t use it to them. Not even here 
in Szeged. And when I am in this university building, I would start ö-ing only with 
great difficulty. 
fieldworker: Right.
Respondent: And it was like that at school too. when we visited each other, ö-ing 
speech would more likely be used, but when we spoke to the others, those who did 
not use the Szeged dialect, we didn’t use it either. So we could always easily switch 
between speaking this way and that way. And I have been like that, since I was a child. 
I don’t remember a single situation when I couldn’t decide which kind of speech I 
should use to someone.      
In order to hopefully minimize the respondents’ use of Standard (e-ing) speech, which they 
would likely use to strangers like our fieldworkers, we instructed the fieldworkers, native 
speakers of the dialect, to consistently use ö-ing from the first minute of the interview to the 
last. However, as will be shown below, the respondent in this case study used his ö-ing speech 
over 75% of the time, regardless of the different (local vs. Standard) dialects of the two field-
workers. This lack of accommodation in the speech of the respondent and the interviewers 
3 The extract is from the interview with Respondent K01, between 12 minutes and 50 seconds and 13 minutes 
and 34 seconds in our project archive. 
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prompted us to look for an explanation which is different from such traditional views as 
Labov’s audiomonitoring, Bell’s audience design, the progress of time in the interview, the 
trust between the interlocutors, topics, and emotional loading.
3. Research Questions
As a methodological exercise outside the main thrust of our project, in order to test the field-
workers’ effects on respondents’ speech, we set up two interviews with the same respondent: 
one conducted by a native speaker of the local ö dialect, and the other conducted by a stand-
ard e-speaking fieldworker.  Apart from the dialect differences, the two fieldworkers were 
very similar: female university students of humanities in their twenties. The setting was the 
same (the porch of the respondent’s house) and the topics (conversational modules) were also 
as similar as possible. A few months elapsed between the two interviews, and their real 
purpose was disguised as “research on the life of people in Szeged”. 
Our respondent is a retired male who had earlier worked as a printer. He was born and 
raised in Szeged and is a skillful bidialectal speaker of Szeged (ö-ing) speech and near-Stand-
ard (e-ing) speech.  
The following research questions were addressed:
1) Is there any intra-speaker variability in the frequency of use of [ö] in the respondent’s 
speech with the two different fieldworkers? Our working hypothesis: the respondent 
will use different frequencies of [ö].
2) If the answer to (1) is “yes”, is the use of [ö] by a fieldworker correlated to its use by the 
respondent? Our working hypothesis: the respondent will use [ö] more frequently with 
the ö-ing fieldworker than with the e-ing one. 
3) Is the frequency of use of [ö] by the respondent correlated to 
 (a) the progress of time in the interview (cf. Shepard–Giles–Le Poire 2001),
 (b) the amount of attention paid to his own speech, and
 (c) the building up of trust between him and his interlocutor? Our working hypotheses: 
(i) with the progress of time, the respondent’s use of [ö] will increase in both interviews 
as his audiomonitoring decreases, (ii) in the interview with the ö-ing fieldworker, the 
respondent’s use of [ö] will increase as a result of the trust building up between them. 
4. Findings
The two interviews have been transcribed and coded with ELAN (https://tla.mpi.nl/tools/
tla-tools/elan/).4 Table 1 shows the essential properties of the two interviews.
4 we are indebted to Naomi Nagy for coming to Szeged in June 2014 to teach us how to use ELAN and for 
discussing with us the linguistic minutiae of the ö dialect.
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Fieldwork-
er’s dialect
Setting Time Purpose of
interview
Fieldworker Conversation-
al modules
e
(standard)
respondent’s 
porch
approxi-
mately  
2 hours
research on 
local lore
female human-
ities student  
in her 20s
same
ö
(local)
respondent’s 
porch
approxi-
mately  
8 hours
research on 
life in Szeged
female human-
ities student  
in her 20s
same
Table 1: The two interviews analyzed
Table 2 demonstrates the frequency of use of [ö] vs. [e] in the two interviews. The data 
demonstrate a 5.1% difference between the interview conducted by the e-speaking fieldwork-
er and the ö-speaking one.
Fieldwork-
er’s dialect
Number of all 
ö-able syllables
Realized 
with [ö]
Realized 
with [e]
Realized 
with [ö] %
Realized 
with [e] %
e (standard) 954 778 176 81.6 18.4
ö (local) 2707 2070 637 76.5 23.5
Table 2: The frequency of use of [ö] vs. [e] in the interviews with  
two different-speaking fieldworkers
As can be seen, our hypothesis (1) is corroborated: the respondent used the [ö] variant in 
81.6% of all the ö-able syllables with the standard speaking fieldworker and used it 76.5% of 
the time with the local dialect speaking fieldworker, a highly significant difference (chi-
square [df=1] = 10.550, p < 0.001). However, we must reject our hypothesis (2) because the 
respondent’s use of [ö] is not more but less frequent with the ö-speaking fieldworker than 
with the e-speaking one. Thus these two interviews provide evidence against our expectation 
that the fieldworkers’ dialect differences influence the respondent’s speech in harmony with 
accommodation theory.
Let us review why the data in Table 2 are perplexing. first, our respondent is not a bidi-
alectal speaker in hiding: in the interview with the Standard-speaking fieldworker he uses 
his vernacular style realizing over 80% of the tokens with [ö]. Second, these data go against 
the view, widely held by both linguists and non-linguists, that the use of a dialect (feature) 
presupposes a good amount of trust between the interlocutors. (Such views have also been 
voiced by several respondents in our Szeged project.) Third, the results of our case study 
cannot be explained by Bell’s (1984) audience design theory either. fourth, the frequency of 
use of [ö] by the respondent does not vary between different topics discussed, nor between 
modules characterized by different degrees of his emotional involvement.
In order to answer our research question (3a) on the role of the progress of time, we looked 
at the interview with the ö-speaking fieldworker in some detail. This interview lasts for 8 
hours and was recorded in two sessions. we divided each session into two parts and com-
pared the respondent’s percent of ö-ing vs. e-ing session by session and part by part. Table 3 
shows the results.
TwO fIELDwORKERS’ EffECTS ON A RESPONDENT’S…
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Syllables real-
ized with [ö]
Syllables real-
ized with [e]
Percent of syllables 
realized with [ö]
Percent of syllables 
realized with [e]
part 1 904 260 77.7 22.3
part 2 496 109 82 18
part 3 435 170 71.9 28.1
part 4 235 98 70.6 29.4
Total 2070 637 76.5 23.5
Table 3: frequency of use of [ö] vs. [e] in four equal parts (and two sessions)  
of an 8-hour-long interview with an ö-speaking fieldworker
The data shows very little difference in ö-ing between the first two hours and the second two 
hours of a session: ö-ing increased by 4.3% in the later part of the first session, and decreased 
by 1.3% in the later part of the second session.  
In summary, the linguistic behavior of our respondent cannot be explained by the prin-
ciples of audiomonitoring, or trust between interlocutors, or Bell’s audience design.
5. A possible explanation
we believe that the unexpected lack of the effects of our fieldworkers’ language use on the 
respondent’s linguistic behavior can be explained by an interactional framework, in which 
the key factor is the relationship between the fieldworker and the respondent in the inter-
change. More specifically, we think the most important factor is how the respondent strives 
to strengthen his own position – at the expense of the fieldworkers’ position. In this attempt 
to explain the dynamics of language use by the respondent and his interlocutors, we draw on 
watzlawick’s interactional view of communication. In this view, “[a]ll communicational 
interchanges are either symmetrical or complementary, depending on whether they are based 
on equality or difference” (watzlawick–Beavin–Jackson 1967: 70). Symmetrical interaction 
is characterized by the minimization of difference, “while complementary interaction is 
based on the maximization of difference” (ibid. 69). The crucial issue is who controls the 
interchange. “One-up communication is movement to gain control of the exchange. A bid for 
dominance includes messages that instruct, order, interrupt, contradict, change topics, or fail 
to support what the other person said. One-down communication is movement to yield con-
trol of the exchange” (Griffin 2012: 186). we also draw on the role of sex difference and 
power asymmetry in the interview discussed illuminatingly by Schilling (2013). In the Hun-
garian literature Bartha–Hámori’s (2010) analyses of speakers’ discursive-interactional strat-
egies are precursors of the explanation we are about to present.
However, one should not run away with the idea that a fieldworker will necessarily end 
up in a hierarchy where s/he is dominated by the respondent. for instance, Szabó (2013) 
demonstrates that a young Hungarian schoolboy radically changes his opinion on a language 
issue during an interview as a result of recognizing the authority of his adult fieldworker, a 
teacher. Referring to Eckert’s and her own work, Schilling (2013: 205) also notes that “even 
teenagers and children can take over [control of the interview] when talking with adult in-
terviewers.”     
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In what follows, we will show the linguistic means the respondent uses in order to gain 
the dominant position in the interactions, to weaken the fieldworkers’ positions, and to con-
trol the overall communication. first, we need to sketch a profile of the respondent on the 
basis of his statements during the interviews.      
6. The respondent’s profile
• Our respondent has a negative attitude to all foreign languages, which is demonstrated 
by statements like büdös angol, tanuljon meg magyarul ‘Damned English people, they 
should learn Hungarian!’ 
• He is also negative about any Hungarian dialects different from the Szeged ö-ing dia-
lect, including the mekögő dialect ‘e dialect spoken by people who can but will not 
speak ö’. This is shown by how he always cites a person he dislikes: mekögő people are 
always cited as speaking Standard Hungarian e-ing speech. 
• His statements are unmistakably anti-intellectual and anti-humanities. His views of 
young female university students of the humanities are extremely negative. (Once we 
consider the social hierarchies in the two interviews analyzed, it is clear that both of 
our fieldworkers were in an extremely difficult situation, quite different from “the 
power asymmetry that inheres in the relationship between the researcher, usually some-
one with an advanced education who is affiliated with an authoritative research insti-
tution, and the community, whose members are often far removed from mainstream 
power structures” [Schilling 2013: 197].)
• On the other hand, our respondent holds positive attitudes to
 1. his Hungarian mother tongue,
 2. his own dialect, 
 3. people in Szeged,
 4. peasants in general,
 5. all kinds of manual labor,
 6. the Kádár regime (Hungarian socialist regime, 1957–1990), and
 7. the past in general.
7. The respondent’s position in the interviews
Here we will show how our respondent uses, consciously or unconsciously, verbal strategies 
to gain superiority in the interviews. Some of the elements in the respondent’s profile make 
it inevitable that the two young female fieldworkers start out with a great disadvantage in the 
discourse if they mean to gain recognition for their chosen profession. The quotations below 
offer ample evidence that the respondent wants to gain superiority and he does not recognize 
his interlocutors as equals. He is projecting his own view of his own position in society, and 
tries to make sure that these views also dominate the entire discourse. He uses several lin-
guistic means to achieve this goal, and the common denominator of all of them is his attack 
on the fieldworkers. Examples follow:
TwO fIELDwORKERS’ EffECTS ON A RESPONDENT’S…
SLH_30.indd   79 2016.01.22.   16:38:06
80 MIKLóS NéMETH – MIKLóS KONTRA – BALÁzS SINKOVICS
1. T/V form of address
 Violating the rules of Hungarian politeness, the respondent has sometimes used T 
forms of address to the fieldworkers who categorically used V forms to him, e.g. De 
tudod? ‘But do you [T form] know?’ (A163e 405)5
2. He used dozens of face-threatening moves to the fieldworkers, for instance
 a) Mikó<r> látott tyúkot, igazi tyúkot életibe<n>? ‘when did you ever in your life see 
a real hen?’ (A163e 320)
 b) Kuncsaft szót ismeri? ‘Do you know the word kuncsaft »customer«?’ (163e 639)
 c) Tudja mi a cserje? ‘Do you know what a shrub is?’ (A163e 768)
3. There are countless examples of the respondent interrupting the fieldworker, examples 
will not be cited.
4. He uses pejorative language regarding the fieldworkers’ chosen profession, for instance 
Hát bö- böl- hát két diplomája van. Bölcs is, meg ész is. ‘Untranslatable linguistic 
mocking of the Hungarian expression bölcsész diploma ‘degree in the humanities’, as 
if such a degree were two degrees, one in wisdom and the other in mind’. (A163.2. 197)
5. Attacks on women, for instance
 (a) … és ez a maga korosztálya a legundorítóbb. ‘… and your [V form] age cohort is 
the most despicable.’ (A163e 489)
 (b) nem pici lány, mán tudja, hogy milyenek a nők. ‘You’re not a little girl, you know 
what women are like.’ (A163.1. 91)
 (c) Hány gyerököt vitt má<r> a bölcsödébe? ‘How many children have you ever taken 
to the kindergarten?’(A163e 227)
6. Teaching a lesson
 Úgyhogy nagyon szépen megkéröm, hogy le- legyen szíves bemutatni majd a diplomá-
ját. ‘So I ask you to please show me your university degree.’ (A163e 1005)
7. Patronizing vocatives
 Tündérkém ‘sweety’ (A 163.1. 919, A163.2. 405), pici baba ‘little babe’ (A163.3. 420), 
édös lelköm ‘my li’l sweetheart’ (A163.2. 417)
8. Role-shift: respondent takes upon himself the role of interviewer
 De én a gyerökkorát, most én is visszakérdözök a gyerökkorára, hogy … ‘ But your 
childhood, now I’m gonna ask you  back about your childhood…’ (A163e 324)
8. Speaking time
The hierarchical relationship between the respondent and his two interlocutors is also shown 
by their speaking times in Table 4. This table also demonstrates that the respondent used 
more time vis-à-vis his standard (e-speaking) interviewer than with his local (ö-speaking) 
one.  
5 A163 is the code for the respondent. when this is followed by an e, this shows that the fieldworker is an 
e-speaker. A163 without an e indicates an ö-speaking fieldworker in the interview. The final digits in paren-
theses indicate the location of the segment in the ELAN transcript. 
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Fieldworker’s dialect minutes percent
Fieldworker Respondent Fieldworker Respondent
e (standard) 16.3 90.3 15.3 84.7
ö (local) 109.6 252.5 30.27 69.73
Table 4: Speaking times in the two interviews
9. What has and what has not had an effect on the respondent’s use of [ö]?
Now that we’ve seen the quantitative data on the use of [ö], the profile of our respondent, and 
the hierarchical relationship between the respondent vis-à-vis the fieldworkers, we will look 
at which factors did, and which did not, have an effect on the use of [ö] in the two interviews. 
Table 5 demonstrates the factors which did or did not have an effect on the use of [ö]. 
Factors Their effect on the use of [ö]
fieldworker’s use of [ö] + (negative effect)
Length of the interview –
Progress of time in the interview –
Topics –
Emotional loading –
Respondent’s identity +
Respondent’s linguistic identity +
Respondent’s view of his own social position ++
Respondent’s self-assigned social position 
vis-à-vis his interlocutor
+++
Male vs. female hierarchy as seen by the re-
spondent
++
Table 5: which factors have an effect on the use of [ö] in the two interviews?
This case study has thus demonstrated that the use of the salient dialect feature [ö] by our 
respondent was not influenced by the fact that the two fieldworkers spoke different varieties, 
nor was it influenced by his audiomonitoring, the topics in the interviews or the variation in 
emotional loading. On the other hand, the respondent’s local peasant identity and his ex-
tremely positive attitudes to the local speechways have been shown to be important influenc-
es. Most important of all the factors, however, is the social hierarchical relationship assigned 
by him to himself vis-à-vis the two fieldworkers. This effect is enhanced by his self-assigned 
male vs. female hierarchy. In the interviews the respondent does his best to take the position 
he believes he deserves: he positions himself so much higher than the fieldworkers that he 
shows no sign of behaving according to the fieldworkers’ implicit or explicit expectations. 
There is no trace of linguistic accommodation in his speech.
TwO fIELDwORKERS’ EffECTS ON A RESPONDENT’S…
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10. Conclusion
As Tagliamonte (2016: 93‒99) states in a recent review of fifty years of variationist sociolin-
guistics, interviewing techniques which had been successful in one location did not work 
well in other places. “Even though Peter Trudgill interviewed a broad range of people in 
Norwich, the Danger of Death question got him nowhere” (p. 96). She notes that “The inter-
viewer him or herself can have a major impact on the nature of the data in any interview 
situation” (p. 97) and goes as far as saying that the fieldworker is the prime variable. In this 
paper we hope to have contributed to this discussion.      
Our case study has demonstrated that there exists a kind of sociolinguistic interview in 
which the respondent’s linguistic behavior cannot be explained by a number of traditional 
explanations: Labov’s audiomonitoring, Bell’s audience design, the progress of time in the 
interview or the building up of trust between the interlocutors. However, an interactional 
view of communication provides adequate means to interpret the data. Our two interviews 
show that the fieldworkers’ language use has no direct effect on that of the respondent. The 
fieldworkers’ personae, however, do have indirect effects in as much as the respondent plac-
es himself vis-à-vis the fieldworkers on a social hierarchy axis in the interview and in soci-
ety in general. Thus the fieldworker’s effect is not triggered by their speech behavior/style, 
but by the respondent’s positioning himself vis-à-vis the fieldworker on a social hierarchy 
axis. This same explanation can also hold for a mirror image of the social hierarchy: a Hun-
garian schoolboy positioned himself below the fieldworker (a teacher), and radically changed 
his opinion on a linguistic issue, adopting the views of the fieldworker in the second half of 
the interview (Szabó 2013). 
Our general conclusion is that some sociolinguistic interviews may yield data which can 
only be meaningfully interpreted by (1) constructing a profile of the persona of the respond-
ent, (2) of the persona of the fieldworker, and (3) by defining their position vis-à-vis each 
other on a social hierarchy axis by means of analyzing explicit linguistic features. This case 
study poses the perplexing question: what kind of linguistic data would be provided by the 
same respondent if he were interviewed by a fieldworker he places above himself, or by one 
he regards as an equal? 
As regards our Szeged project, we have learned that the indirect effect of our fieldworker’s 
persona (who uses ö speech categorically with all respondents) on the speech behavior of a 
respondent can neither be predicted, nor excluded. The methodological lesson we have 
learned is that we must attach interlocutor profiles to each of our interviews.     
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poStcoLoniaL LinguiStic FEaturES in cEntraL EuropE
gábor tolCsvai nagy
Abstract
The present paper gives an overview of the linguistic situation in Central Europe. The in-
vestigation focuses on the features of language, in particular on the social, cultural and 
political power factors of the languages used in the region, and the relations between them. 
The linguistic situation is described in two historical periods: one is the Soviet colonial era 
between 1945 and 1990, the other one is the postcolonial period after 1990. The historical 
developments have had an elemental effect on the communication and linguistic systems of 
the region. The Soviet colonial rule introduced a hierarchical and centralized communica-
tion system with strict communist party control of ideology, ways of thinking and ways of 
talk, apparent everywhere from public opinion to the private sphere. Censorship was a 
powerful tool in the region. In 1990 the situation turned into its polar opposite in most cas-
es. A heterarchical, decentralized communication system was built, with freedom of speech 
and human rights in general in focus. This radical change resulted in linguistic plurality, the 
acknowledgment of and reflections on variability in language, its functions for adequate 
conceptual construal, linguistic expression, individual and group identity.1
Keywords: colonialism, Central Europe, communication system, heterarchy, hierarchy, lan-
guage community, postcolonialism
1. Central Europe has had a special history during the 20th century. The future of the region 
was basically determined by the Paris peace treaties that followed world war I, with partly 
artificial borders that forced masses to flee to other countries, during and after world war 
II, too. In 1945 the whole region was occupied by the Soviet army and was placed under 
Soviet colonial rule, which ended in 1990. The countries and societies of the region were 
forced to introduce the Soviet communist system in every domain of life, controlled by the 
Soviet and the local communist parties. In 1990 Central Europe was freed from the Soviet 
occupation, and a postcolonial period began in its history. Ever since this historical turn, the 
region has had a double face. On the one hand, modernization has been performed in a very 
fast, determined and effective fashion, bringing radical changes again in all aspects of life. 
On the other hand, the cultural and socialization schemas of the previous era still live on and 
influence the ways of life in the region.
The historical developments have had an elemental effect on the communication and 
linguistic systems of the region. The Soviet colonial rule introduced a hierarchical and cen-
tralized communication system with strict communist party control of ideology, ways of 
thinking and ways of talk, apparent everywhere from public opinion to the private sphere. 
1 The paper includes sections taken over, partly in an abridged form, from Tolcsvai Nagy (in press).
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Censorship was a powerful tool in the region. In 1990 the situation turned into its polar op-
posite in most cases. A heterarchical, decentralized communication system (see Luhmann 
1998) was built, with freedom of speech and human rights in general in focus. This radical 
change resulted in linguistic plurality, the acknowledgment of and reflections on variability 
in language, its functions for adequate conceptual construal, linguistic expression, individ-
ual and group identity and the like. In this process the view of language as a simple tool to 
be used for control turned into one of language as the human capacity for joint actions and 
comprehension, with creativity and innovation related to conventions.
Central Europe is defined in the present paper as the region coextensive with the prevail-
ing geographical, linguistic and state territories of Poland, the former East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia, the present Czech Republic and Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, and Slovenia 
(cf. Szűcs 1983, Szűcs–Hanák 1986, Kosáry 2003). In this sense, Central Europe is a region, 
formed by cultural cumulation, that is, through the rational, intelligible economic, political, 
cultural and communicative activities of communities, with communicative and cultural 
activities showing identical or similar features for prolonged periods (they are added and 
become conventionalized), and differing significantly from the communicative and cultural 
activities of the communities of neighbouring regions (from a general perspective, see Bas-
sand and Hainard 1985, Lipp Hrsg. 1984, Győri-Szabó 2006).
2. The present study interprets the linguistic situation of Central Europe from 1945 to the 
millennium, with the help of the basic categories of colonialism and postcolonialism. The 
occupation of the region by the Soviet Union that lasted forty-five years was colonization, 
with specific features. These features are partly the same as those of the relations between 
the western European states and their Asian and African colonies, and partly different. As 
a consequence, the linguistic aspects of colonialism and postcolonialism in Central Europe 
can be described with the canonical categories only in part; here the categories of the gener-
alizations of the specific circumstances are used too. The present description has an essen-
tially historical and linguistic perspective, not a political one. It is not a critical approach, it 
is a description written with objectivity in view with a perspective of a functional, us-
age-based approach to language.
The basic features of Soviet colonialism in Central Europe are as follows (see Courtois 
et al. 1999, Romsics 2013).
A main feature is the control and leadership of the political, military, secret service, 
economic and cultural life either directly or indirectly by country leaders nominated and 
confirmed by the Soviet communist party, both on the highest and other important levels. 
On the other hand, Central European countries did not form a part of the Soviet Union in the 
sense of constitutional law, the head of the Soviet state or the communist party was not the 
head of the state or the communist party, say, in Czechoslovakia or Poland.
The society was (or was expected to be) transformed totally in line with the communist 
ideology. However, the occupiers did not become a large and formative part of the societies 
of the countries in question. They lived instead in closed communities and barracks (mostly 
because Soviet paranoia expected imagined enemies everywhere), they did not join forcibly 
the elites of the countries. Nevertheless, a new elite was created in the countries of Central 
Europe, along with the elimination of the earlier one (by forced emigration and exile, depor-
tation within the country, forced declassing, having to hide one’s social background, or ex-
ecution following a show trial), directly from communists and working class people, or by 
the approval of ‘converted’ individuals and sympathizers.
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The total control of society, transformation of thinking and world knowledge, and the 
brainwashing of individuals, according to the ‘correct’ ideas was another fundamental goal 
of this colonization. The process of the transformation and total control of social structure 
and thinking was completed with an awareness of the supremacy of the Soviet colonizers 
and their local servants. This supremacy was presented as an ideological and moral status 
(see the self-evaluation of the communists: a communist is a “vanguard”, “made of special 
material”). The drive for the colonization was not a mission for civilization, it was only a 
mere ideological commitment, the idea of the world revolution of the proletariat.
At the same time, the Us vs. Them relation was clearly present, with specific characteristics. 
No general inferiority complex became widespread as a reaction towards the colonizers. The 
societies of the occupied countries felt suppressed by the Soviet invaders and their local com-
munist allies, after some years of early support mainly by working class groups and leftist in-
tellectuals. Nevertheless, western ideological and cultural patterns were alive, though hidden.
Also, it was a striking difference between western colonization in Asia and Africa and 
Soviet colonization in Central Europe that there were no basic ethnic and traditional cultur-
al differences between the Soviet occupiers and the suppressed nations. 
Postcolonialism – in its widely shared interpretation – developed as a critical academic 
study of specific political and cultural circumstances in countries and regions colonized 
earlier by western powers, freed from this state some time after world war II, and suffering 
from the aftermath of the previous era (cf. Said 1975, Bhabha 1990, Spivak 1990, 1999). In 
the present study, postcolonialism is a basically non-critical term used for the objective 
naming of the historical situation with a process-like character: Central Europe has existed 
in the postcolonial state for twenty-five years after being freed from the Soviet occupation 
and the communist rule in 1990. 
After 1990 the military occupation of the region came to an end. The countries became 
independent of the Soviet party, the direct and indirect Soviet control stopped. 
The communist elite ceased to exist, it partly transformed and adjusted itself to the new 
conditions. New elites arose. One is the economic elite, based on primary capital accumula-
tion, in a relatively short period of ‘wild capitalism’, usually without much intellectual back-
ground, coming from various social groups. Another one is the cultural elite, combining the 
remnants of the historical middle classes and intelligentsia, the non-Stalinist moderate left-
ists, and the liberal, conservative and nationalist groups that emerged recently.
The social structure changed slowly into a network, with different parts of it guided by 
diverse ideologies and values. The socialization patterns of the periods before 1945 or 1990 
seem to be active as well as the western European ones at the millennium.
Because no elite or population of the colonizers stayed in the earlier colonies after 1990 
(in Central Europe, unlike in the Baltic states), the societies as complete units consider them-
selves freed from the Soviet rule. On the other hand, certain groups still feel the need to 
adjust themselves to external power centres at the state and social levels, while other groups 
take national independence as the default case, the starting point that was achieved with 
struggles and must be preserved, in cultural and linguistic respects, too.
The Us vs. Them relation of the colonial age almost disappeared. Instead, a fresh one 
became important in the region, the comprehension and application of western patterns and 
schemas, including successes and frustrations.
The knowledge about language as well as language use shows postcolonial markers, at 
the level of community, group and the individual as well: language became part of the 
SLH_30.indd   87 2016.01.22.   16:38:07
88 GÁBOR TOLCSVAI NAGY
ideological and power struggles, while the proliferation of language variants in public com-
munication may cause uncertainty.
It can be stated that the situation in Central Europe at the millennium is postcolonial. 
Postcolonial – due to the backwardness originating in the forty-five years of colonial sup-
pression and imposing a heavy socio-psychological burden on the region. Democracy, free-
dom and the responsibility for actions and creativity were introduced very fast, in a top–
down manner, not allowing enough time for the processes of internalization.
3. Central Europe as a region as defined above was put under Soviet political, military and eco-
nomic rule in 1945. The Soviet Union introduced the total communist (Bolshevik) dictatorship 
in the occupied Central European countries. This situation had its consequences and develop-
ments in everyday life and culture, in linguistic communication and language policy as well.
One of the main factors in a community’s self-maintenance, autopoiesis and self-reflec-
tion is the native language or a variety of it. Language communities as well as speech com-
munities take this as a natural, default setting, since a person is born into one such commu-
nity, s/he acquires the language/variety of this community as her/his vernacular (or dialect, 
see Halliday 1968), s/he construes her/his utterances in this variety, closely related to her/his 
conceptualizing, cognitive operations. Language maps knowledge about the world that is 
based on experiences in a perspectivized way. Phenomena may be processed in various ways, 
thus, our knowledge about the world and its linguistic mappings have culture specific fea-
tures in addition to universal cognitive and linguistic schemas. 
Communication is essential for the communities’ maintenance and normal functioning, 
in all ages and settings. A community operates its long term linguistic norm system with 
minor modifications and innovations, in order to secure good results in its everyday activi-
ties. Violent changes in this communication system or changes preventing its functioning 
endanger the existence of a community in its foundations.
The destruction of the language and communication system yields the destruction of the 
community. One of the main factors of the colonial situation following 1945 was the coarse 
intervention, the significant change in the languages and communication systems in Central 
Europe. The basic outcomes of this process are as follows. Certainly, there were some dif-
ferences between the states of the region, but the main ideological trends and political actions 
were controlled by the Soviet Union.
The military enclosure of the individual states by the Iron Curtain both physically and in 
a symbolic sense, particularly in the 1950s, blocked the societies in question almost hermet-
ically from chances of natural everyday linguistic contacts and the reception of innovations.
One of the main goals was the homogenization of society, on the basis of the Marxist idea 
of the class society and the Stalinist notion of class war. with respect to language, this de-
velopment, directed from above, from the communist party centre 
• regarded the language of the majority as the one state or official language,
• neglected other languages of minority ethnic groups spoken in the given state,
• supported the standard version of the given state language, with a levelling ideal of 
education, also centrally controlled.
The general education programs run centrally by the party propagated the centrally defined 
cultural values, including linguistic knowledge and made them a conscious part of the pop-
ularized knowledge. Thus, censored knowledge was spread in a highly homogeneous way 
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among people of different social statuses, while the cultural goods banned by the censors 
remained simply unknown to the majority.
The political and ideological intention to homogenize society was connected with overt 
or covert nationalism that was meant to be realized in linguistic homogenization, among 
other things. That was the case in those states like Romania and Czechoslovakia where large 
ethnic (national) minorities lived. The communist ideology, being international on the pub-
licly presented surface, but nationalistic in practice and not asserted as such in public, man-
ifested itself in the extreme discrimination of minority language use in all domains of com-
munication and at all levels. Such domains were state politics, public administration, 
jurisdiction, media and public information, workplace communication (note that all firms 
were nationalized and headed by a local party secretary besides the director), education, 
healthcare, the army, and also spontaneous public communication (e.g. in the street, on pub-
lic transport, in movies, theatres, and restaurants). 
As a result of the homogenization efforts, people were forced to speak one variety of the 
state language, unified in its semantics and pragmatics: this meant that people had no choice 
but use the words related to social life with the meanings defined centrally, repeat the same 
clausal and idiomatic constructions used by the political leaders, not to deviate from the 
central ideological line, thus not risking punishment (whether formal or informal) for a joke 
or a critical note. 
The centralizing language policy used censorship as a fundamental instrument (cf. 
Schöpflin 1983, Thom 1989, Bourdieu 1991). Censorship controlling the public is an evident 
effort to break the free spirit and to prevent the self-creation (self-maintenance) of the indi-
vidual and the community. Moreover, it has further significant linguistic consequences. 
Censorship suppresses or calls off some of the main functions of language. One such function 
is mediation of the flow of information. Another one is conceptual innovation that depends 
partly on linguistic innovation. By the process of innovation people always reflect on the 
already known in one human domain, for the sake and in the hope of improvement. The 
suppression of linguistic innovation by censorship results in the suppression of creativity; 
prevention of the spreading of linguistic innovations obstructs the spreading of knowledge 
and leads to the material and intellectual damage of the community (state or society).
Censorship was directed primarily inwards, but also outwards, in relation to other states 
and countries. The central control and censorship defined those entities (e.g. books, newspa-
pers, ideas and innovations, words, works of art) that were allowed to go across the border 
and those that were banned from coming in, and, on the other hand, what may go out even 
to the neighbouring ‘sister’ countries within the region. The censors and other party officials 
were fully aware of the fact that, for instance, a new loanword entails the learning of a new 
concept, the pretensions to possess new things, and considered such “western effects” harm-
ful and dangerous to the political system. 
Censorship in the countries of the region turned slowly and as a result of different meas-
ures into ‘self-censorship’. from a later period, mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, it was not 
necessary to supervise all public messages by the central party officials, because the reliable 
state officials and adherents of the political system did the controlling at every level.
Another result of the homogenization efforts was that the social, ethnic and linguistic 
distinctions became stiff and sharp bordered, based on emotional attributions and the asym-
metric counterconcepts (cf. Koselleck 2004). The system of asymmetric counterconcepts is 
created between the representatives of communities, powers, and ideas that are at odds with 
each other or are distinguished from each other although they are in close contact. In this 
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dichotomous interpretation, the “we”, the home value community represent the positive pole, 
while the “they”, “those”, i.e. the aliens, represent the negative pole. One group may form an 
opinion about another one; this group may name and evaluate it. These opinions, evaluations, 
namings and addresses may imply the appreciation of the other, but, in contrast, they may 
be condemnatory, disdainful, too. “The simple use of “we” and “you” establishes a bound-
ary and is in this respect a condition of possibility determining a capacity to act. But a “we” 
group can become a politically effective and active unity only through concepts which are 
more than just simple names of typifications. […] In the sense used here, a concept does not 
merely denote such an agency, it marks and creates the unity. The concept is not merely a 
sign for, but also a factor in, political or social groupings. […] An acting agency might, 
therefore, define itself as a polis, people, party, Stand, society, church, or state without pre-
venting those excluded from the agency from conceiving of themselves in turn as a polis, 
people, and so on. Such general and concrete concepts can be used on an equal basis and can 
be founded upon mutuality. It is certainly true, however, that historical agencies tend to es-
tablish their singularity by means of general concepts, claiming them as their own. […] In 
such cases, a given group makes an exclusive claim to generality, applying a linguistically 
universal concept to itself alone and rejecting all comparison. This kind of self-definition 
provokes counterconcepts which discriminate against those who have been defined as the 
“other”” (Koselleck 2004: 155–156).
The system of asymmetric counterconcepts developed totally during the 1950s through-
out the whole Central European region, based on earlier collective conceptualizations, main-
ly by folk attributions. The process was helped by the formal and informal actions and 
communication of the local ruling communist party. That was both the result of earlier and 
the origin of later hostilities between the ruling social strata and the rest of society, or be-
tween the majority population speaking the state language and the ethnic and linguistic 
minorities.
The linguistic homogenization efforts between 1945 and 1990 deprived the ethnic and 
linguistic minorities of using their native languages in public administration, jurisdiction, 
education and healthcare in many countries in the region (mainly in Czechoslovakia, Romania, 
partly in Yugoslavia, and certainly in the Soviet Union). The formal or informal hindrances to 
prevent minority native language use in public were everyday practice. Linguistic and social 
homogenization was part of the larger process aimed at the elimination of smaller local com-
munities, regardless of ethnic origin. This process was supported by the argument of the ex-
tension of the presumed equality, although the main reason for this was the more effective 
ideological control of social groups. Private associations of any kind were banned or reorgan-
ized under strict political control. The elimination of local communities resulted in the weak-
ening of language varieties, again helping the destruction of local communication networks 
and the disturbance of the traditional ways of conceptualization and construal.
The homogenization process hinders the useful bilingualism of the minorities, i.e. the 
fluent, functional working of everyday communication in a bilingual environment. Since the 
representatives of the communist homogenization do not want to accept the minorities’ right 
to have their mother tongue, they interpret proficiency in the state language and its use by 
minorities as a legal question and a demonstration of accepting the general rules of the so-
ciety as a whole. within the complex frame of the international communist ideology and state 
nationalism, minorities are expected to learn and use the state language, meanwhile its ac-
quisition and modest use was (and is in many cases even today) not ensured. This discrimi-
nating situation of the minorities elicits, through its socio-psychological consequences, 
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resistance to the compulsory learning of the majority state language. Also, the absolutization 
of the majority state language narrows the prestige domains: the prestige of the minority 
languages becomes low. Practical existential opportunities become less accessible, too: 
school education and authentic knowledge acquisition, profession and job opportunities are 
all tied to knowledge of the state language, while these existential goals are increasingly 
difficult to reach.
One basic feature of the colonial situation is the manipulation of long term concepts 
maintained by communities and cultures. The ruling party in each Central European country 
centrally controlled the ideologically fundamental concepts as part of the practice run by the 
communist dictatorship. One manifestation of this control was the abandonment of 
long-standing concepts and the introduction of new ones with newly coined or reinterpreted 
words and expressions. Language had a basic role in this development. 
To take one transparent example, when the concept and word mayor was simply banned 
in the countries in question, and the expression president of the council introduced instead, 
seemingly a plain change happened (see the entries e.g. in Juhász et al. 1972, or Schubert–
Hellmann 1968). Actually, the political power completed a highly complex change. As a part 
of it, the concept of mayor was eliminated, that is, the notion, the conceptual domain accord-
ing to which a settlement as a community elects its leader in a democratic process from 
among contesting candidates based on a knowledge of these candidates; the winner carries 
out her/his program autonomously with the endorsement of the municipal representatives 
forming the municipal board. Instead of this conceptual and semantic frame, the new expres-
sion, president of the council is the component of a frame or the label for the creation of a 
frame whereby the leader of a settlement is singled out by the only political organization, the 
communist party, no other candidates are to be nominated freely, and the leader voted under 
pressure this way executes the instructions that come from above, from the party centre, the 
ministries and the upper levels of the public administration. The council, i.e. the local unit 
of public administration is the managing board of the settlement, with members nominated 
by the single party, a political and administrative unit in the dependency hierarchy totally 
controlled from above. Thus, the change in linguistic naming mapped and prescribed the 
corresponding political and social change and its newly created and settled content. Children 
learned already this new concept and the expression denoting it, while they did not know 
about the former one, the change and the opposition.
The main domain of communication and medium for the manipulation of concepts and 
words expressing them were public administration, the party units, the workplace, education, 
commerce, propaganda and adult education, always organized from above, by the central 
authorities. Among the important thematic domains one finds politics, social structure, pub-
lic administration, official human contacts, community and social life and customs (e.g. the 
system of addressing), and religion. Partly as the result of these developments, generations 
grew up between 1945 and 1990 in Central Europe without any knowledge of religious con-
cepts, for instance.
The manipulation outlined here is based on the cognitive principle that the meanings of 
linguistic expressions form a system of encyclopaedic concepts based on experience closely 
related to world knowledge (see Chapter 3.1.). The linguistic system and its use in this sense 
are extremely large for the individual and the community, although limited qualitatively for 
memory and mental reasons. The individuals’ and the communities’ knowledge about the 
world may be formed by education and propaganda, i.e. by manipulation: certain concepts 
and words may be banned or stigmatized, mostly in dictatorships, forcing populations to 
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change their worldviews. without linguistic expressions even the entities do not exist, or 
entities denoted by stigmatized words become taboo, being unutterable. Thus, concepts qual-
ified as non-existent or taboo cannot be discussed; this results in the severe restriction of 
freedom and human creativity.
It is particularly interesting from a sociolinguistic perspective that the linguistic bases of 
the conceptual and linguistic manipulation in the region were almost exclusively the standard 
variety. The reasons for this are manifold. The standard variety provided the necessary level 
of linguistic unity throughout the whole state territory for the mediation of the ideological 
contents in every social and linguistic group and the desired efficiency of the propaganda, 
albeit not all native speakers were familiar with the standard varieties of the language in the 
region. At the same time, this role of the standard eroded its own social status and prestige, 
since it became increasingly evident that the manipulative publications came from the cen-
tres, and the overt lies were all formed on the standard regarded as the perfect variety.
The linguistic manipulation, the intentional and artificial changes in the coherent world 
knowledge were completed with the contribution of other factors. This development was 
sustained by the centrally forced industrialization and urbanization. Masses were compelled 
to move to towns, e.g. fleeing from the forced founding of co-operative farms, the arbitrary 
compelling of independent farmers into them, or because they were hounded for their social, 
primarily middle class origin. The persecuted social groups were forced into anonymity: they 
hid themselves by linguistic, behavioral and clothing ways, mingled with the grey and ever 
growing poorer urban crowd. Cultural levelling up caused the overshadowing of many lan-
guage varieties, mainly a colloquial standard of the middle classes and the rural dialectal 
vernaculars, often manifested in the open stigmatization of these varieties. Individual and 
community identification by linguistic and behavioral expression was not possible, and, 
according to the central party ideology, it was not even necessary, since the linguistic map-
ping of the communist ideology controlling all domains of everyday life was completed in 
one uniform way, and deviations from this line counted as ideological deviation and were, 
thus, condemned. On the other hand, the homogenization intention and the notion of social 
equality demanded linguistic homogeneity, for the party ideology.
4. The region of Central Europe became free from the Soviet colonial rule in 1990. The es-
tablishment of liberal societies (of the western European and American type) has been com-
pleted gradually, through different methods, under the circumstances of postcolonialism (see 
Ekiert and Hanson 2003, Romsics 2013, Valuch 2015). 
The change of regime in 1990 left language in general and the languages spoken in the 
region, and even the communities using these languages and their relation to these languages, 
largely untouched. Still, the fundamental political and social transformation radically mod-
ified the relation to language, even if the subject and the predicate have been agreed in the 
same conventional grammatical structures in the Czech, Romanian, and Hungarian languag-
es, for instance. It is just that point where the inherent togetherness of the language system 
and the linguistic functions, the diverse schemas of usage present themselves – not only in 
practice, but as a consequence, in the description, too.
One main reason for the change in the relation to language was the introduction of free-
dom for speech and human rights in general. These rights were enacted in the countries of 
the region immediately in 1990 with prompt and substantial effects, i.e. every citizen could 
make the best of this opportunity, and many of them did, of course.
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The overall introduction of human rights has had liberating consequences in every re-
spect. free talk and free language use became a basic condition of communication in public 
and private scenes as well. 
A lively, open and discussing discursive order was being formed, or more precisely: the 
basic political and legal conditions were provided for this discursive culture. The historical 
and cultural dispositions of the populations living in the period as participants in the histor-
ical moment made the absolute success possible only to a restricted extent, since the circum-
stances of the given situation and the dispositions of the participants affected the realization. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of open and effective participation in the affairs of the commu-
nity became part of the conscious and intuitive knowledge of people gradually. Still, there 
are people who fear the consequences of their public statements, and others would use cen-
sorship in certain situations. These are, at least partly, the social psychological remnants of 
the communist era.
The radical change in 1990 was a historical moment for the creation of democracy in the 
region. One of the main events and fundamental experiences of this development was the 
cathartic moment of declaring truth: truth can be stated, language has regained its human 
and moral content, i.e. the warranty of its functioning. And this could be experienced by all 
those present and participating actively or passively in the historical process. 
In what follows, the restructured communication systems of Central European countries, 
with the general features in focus of the postcolonial situation will be discussed in more 
detail. Other  domains, like (i) the level of linguistic performance, the affinity toward or the 
lack of linguistic and conceptual creativity, (ii) the uses and effects of e-communication, (iii) 
the role of rhetoric in public communication, (iv) language ideologies in the cultural and 
political domains, and (v) external linguistic and cultural contacts, orientation towards pres-
tige centres, are detailed in Tolcsvai Nagy (in press). All these domains show heavy postco-
lonial effects in all Central European countries.
5. The communication systems of societies and states show typical historical instantiations 
(cf. Luhmann 1998: 312ff). One basic type is the hierarchic communication order. This sys-
tem is centralized, with control and influence being directed from top to bottom, and the 
information sent from the centre usually spreading successfully through to the destination, 
the audience which it is aimed at. 
Another one is the heterarchic communication order. This system is shared, decentral-
ized, has a network structure, and the contacts hinge upon the spatial–temporal conditions 
of the situation. 
The geographical diversity of printing, and the complexity of the contents pushed cen-
tralized communication systems towards heterarchy, mainly in modern times. Still, at the 
same time, the continuous development of message forwarding resulted in the opposite trend 
of integration. The communities, or in a wider realization, the societies created and spread 
the public nature of discourse, i.e. the widespread and simultaneous learning and discussion 
of new information. Thus, communication is detached from its direct spatial conditions and 
becomes a dynamic acting system maintaining much of the developments in social life. The 
simultaneity of current knowledge of events and affairs in a community, in a society formed 
what we know as public opinion. 
The modernized European society and language community in the twenty-first century 
is a community built as a network of speech communities and individuals in a dynamic, 
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self-creating, i.e. autopoietic and self-reflexive style (cf. Luhmann 1998, from another per-
spective see Jackson ed. 2014).
The network structure can be pointed out in an earlier traditional community type, too. 
The essence of societies and language communities at the millennium is the relatively bal-
anced but continuously evolving inner structuring and external contacts, less present in 
historically earlier societies or just taking other shapes.
The inner structure of a network style communication system is based on 
(i) the existence of numerous elements, speech communities and individuals in particu-
lar, 
(ii) the interplay or interaction of these elements, and 
(iii) the dynamic, discursive social semantics (more widely, construal through language 
use in varieties) and pluralistic public opinion. 
The speech community is a community that is structured by frequent linguistic intercourse 
between members. That frequency of use causes the joint forming and use of similar or 
identical linguistic structures, including semantic interpretations and linguistic and concep-
tual perspectivization and categorization of the mental contents in focus (Gumperz 1968). 
The family, friends, the inhabitants of the village, the local part of town, the kindergarten 
and school (school class), the members of a profession, a workplace, a hobby group, the con-
gregation, etc. all form speech communities, because their everyday communication results 
in joint registers within the complete language system including usage. 
Individuals are members of various speech communities, firstly that of the family, obvi-
ously. During the process of socialization, the individual joins other speech communities and 
learns their varieties, while s/he adds her/his own specific linguistic features if accepted. It 
is the general competence of humans that they can adjust themselves to another community 
with enculturation processes when joining it, and also, they can add to the norm system of 
that community. In the current situations, the relations are much more complex and the 
variability of the registers used by an individual is greater.
The network system of a language community functions as a dynamic and open structure. 
This system is self-creative (autopoietic) in the sense that it changes continuously: new con-
tacts evolve, new speech communities arise from one day to the other. These dynamics and 
this openness are also initiated and supported by electronic communication. People form 
communities just by occasional meetings or through the internet, agree on how to define and 
create the language variant and meaning they use, using ways of communication and joint 
actions impossible ten or fifteen years ago.
It is well known that a wider system of discourses functions upon the network system 
characterized above. This system of discourses has a cultural basis. Discourse in this sense 
is a cultural activity in a community, whereby the participants focus on and talk about a certain 
topic (or related topics), even through historical periods (see foucault 1971). Discourses are, 
for instance, on abortion, capital punishment, metaphor, environmental protection, in Central 
Europe on the legal responsibility and legal prosecution of communist leaders, etc. Conver-
gent and divergent views are confronted within a discourse, although the discourse order 
determines – as foucault points out –, by the leading personalities of the discourse, the 
topic(s), the ideologies and views, the language (style) used for those who intend to participate 
in a discourse. The discourses in this sense form larger intellectual networks.
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5.1. These general characteristics have some particular postcolonial specification in Central 
Europe.
One of the first political decisions completed by the communists in Central Europe after 
1945 was to put social and state communication under strict central ideological supervision. 
The measure of this totality altered in the countries and also in certain periods, still, the 
party control remained in service until 1990 in the whole region. This control was, for in-
stance, extremely severe during the 1950s in the whole region, looser in 1968 in Czechoslo-
vakia, in the 1980s in Hungary, and much stricter in the DDR and Romania than in Poland 
or Hungary during the last two decades.
This hierarchic communication system was changed formally to a modernized heterar-
chic one within a strikingly short period of one month, in 1990.
One basic change was the transformation of public discourse. The instinctive distrust felt 
when talking to strangers or principals faded in general, at least with respect to the commit-
ment to the central ideology required earlier throughout society. Certainly, many social and 
institutional dependencies kept on functioning. In any case, the legal and structural condi-
tions of the overall system took a shape that was unlike the previous one:
• any kind of communication from diverse sources, including that of the state and public 
administration became subject to independent control and discussion,
• any communication of local scope (e.g. information and statements by and in settle-
ments and districts, bureaus, firms and other workplaces, schools, institutions) was 
rendered independent from the direct control and practice of the central government 
organizations and other (e.g. political party) headquarters,
• informal talk among family members, friends, colleagues and acquaintances was freed 
from the fear of informing (i.e. report on the subjects’ views and acts by spies), organ-
ized and maintained by the secret police until the last minute of the collapsing regime, 
and also from its constraining power on linguistic expression.
The Central European countries needed much more time for the transition of the social 
structure than for the changes in politics and economy. within this historical process, the 
new rights and forms of communication affected generations and social groups in different 
ways. Although it seems a matter of fact that younger generations adopt innovations more 
easily and faster than the older ones, it should be stressed that people socialized during the 
years of the communist rule, i.e. the older generations in 1990, could cope with the new ways 
of thinking and acting more slowly and with only more mental efforts than their counterparts 
in western Europe. Mental and social flexibility played a great role here. The general change 
into effective and expedient ways of talk was also quick and hard to cope with for many 
social groups.
This drawback comes from the retarded and then sudden and quick process of moderni-
zation that occurred during a four decade period before 1990 in western Europe. Since the 
transition period was too short and the nature of the outcome itself at the end of the transition 
was totally in opposition to the social and communications patterns people got used to, the 
adjustment proved to be hard for the middle generations and the elderly. 
Also, it generated tensions between the young and the older generations. The gap that 
emerged quite quickly in the linguistic forms and content of politeness show clearly the 
radical change, comprehended only with difficulties, even with total disapproval, completed 
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with higher intensity than in western Europe. Knowledge of linguistic behaviour and of 
varieties of politeness usual in western European culture was very low, proficiency in Ger-
man, french or English too, so when the cultural barriers ceased to be, influential forms and 
behaviours were introduced in intercultural contacts, though in translations, i.e. in interpret-
ed and adjusted ways.
This general – but not tragic – opposition was amplified by electronic communication, 
learnt by the young quickly and with pleasure, while many people followed developments of 
the computer and internet suspiciously – almost everyone was banned from computers (and 
copy machines) in Central Europe until 1990 for censorship reasons.
The general features of communication changed in every important domain: private 
conversation, public talk, institutional and office interaction. It was the main trend that lin-
guistic communication became fast, concentrated, economic, expedient, adequate for the 
situation and the goal of the speaker, intended to be effective. Great variability and creativ-
ity in this complex world of actions also started to have functions. This course was complet-
ed in sharp contrast to the ways of talking, public and official in particular, characteristic of 
the communication system before 1990. This latter was pursued under the pressure of the 
compulsory ideology and censorship of the communist era, in order to avoid falling under 
the suspicion of acting against the “working class power”. But this kind of talk, having fea-
tures like euphemism, circumlocution, impersonality, and the desemantization of political 
clichés, tried to diminish and hide responsibility, at least at the level of linguistic expression. 
5.2. Another fundamental factor of the historical change was the development of speech 
communities, individual and group networks.
The communication system was interpreted by social and ideological terms during the 
forty-five years before 1990. This means that, on the one hand, the tripartite idealized social 
stratification was imposed upon the communication system, with a generalized hierarchy of 
the settlement structure of the countries: the capital, towns, and villages. On the other hand, 
in a strictly close relation to the condition mentioned above, the centralized state communi-
cation always profiled and emphasized the ideological background of the messages, connect-
ed to the social status of the addressees.
This imagined but ideologically supported world changed into a network system of com-
munication in Central Europe that is shaped by dynamic changes, and the basic factor in the 
nature of the network is that it became open and self-creative. In this respect communication 
systems in Central European countries have developed similarly to those in the western 
world – with, however, some postcolonial with features, too.
The prototypical communication system (as one per country or language community) of 
the region is open, compared to the earlier periods. It is open because it is not bounded, and 
it is open 
(i) to new interlocutors, 
(ii) to new speech communities or new forms of communication communities to re-
ceive them as organic units created by members of the system, 
(iii) for new ways of linguistic communication, for the construal of new linguistic struc-
tures and the re-interpretation of existing ones, 
(iii)  for self-reflection, self-interpretation.
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The prototypical communication system is self-creative, because 
(i) in its ways of functioning it is not controlled from external political or ideological 
power sources, 
(ii) the dynamics of its inner development is directed by its own regularities, formed 
by the participants themselves, 
(iii) it evolves by continuous innovations in communication methods, ways of talk, types 
of interpersonal and intersubjective contacts.
The communication system run before 1990 was grounded in a static, one-way hierarchical 
communication model, whereby the active speaker sends her/his message to the passive 
hearer. The latter has to comprehend the content of the message as it was meant by the speak-
er, since this message can be interpreted only in the same way. 
After 1990, a radically different view of communication was gradually introduced. This 
communication system is based on the tripartite schema of joint attention focusing and 
meaning construction (see Tomasello 1999, Tátrai 2011). This kind of communication dom-
inates linguistic interactions to an increasing extent in the region. This means that speaker 
and hearer (both interpreted as roles at a given moment) participate actively in the course of 
talking. The speaker directs her/his own attention at something which s/he expresses by the 
construal of meaningful linguistic structures that directs the hearer’s attention to the same 
entity, and s/he makes an effort to comprehend what the speaker construed and said. They 
join in understanding the discourse uttered by the speaker in a given situation. The speaker 
initializes the interaction, but they go through it together, in joint actions. 
This way of communication is a relatively balanced one with respect to the interlocutors: 
as a principle that was moulded first in practice and makes communication an adequate 
factor in communities preferring participation. 
Certainly, the communication system characterized above is still being developed, with 
varieties in the region. It is not introduced as a ready-made way of talk by licence, but some-
thing that is gradually elaborated in practice and reflection.
Also, the network of cultural discourses (in foucault’s sense) was transformed. During the 
colonial rule, discourses were constrained in number, themes and spreading, and directed from 
the party centre as efficiently as possible. After 1990, discourses started to develop freely in all 
respects. However, as a postcolonial feature, the order of these discourses, i.e. the inner control 
of the topics, the participants and the variety used prove to be stricter, more centralized with 
signs of intolerance in many cases, compared to the western practice. This feature, partly an 
element of the heritage from the dictatorial socialization, has clear linguistic mappings, for 
instance, in the strong stigmatization of words, expressions, and as a consequence concepts 
from all sides of the participants, in the high frequency of superficial and simplified argumen-
tation and manipulation, or in the sheer rhetoric aim of direct effect and stylistic vulgarity.
Some of the observable and identifiable factors are analysed briefly below. These are as 
follows: new types of speech communities as a result of the self-creative nature of the com-
munication system, the re-interpretation of traditional varieties (local dialects and standard, 
their acceptance and stigmatization), the new system of community semantics.
5.3. The transformation of the communication system in the Central European region took 
place not as a development by a given schema, whereby the participants have a clear knowl-
edge of where and how to go. Instead, speakers find their ways in joint experiences and de-
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cisions, during real time linguistic interactions. This did not mean that the interlocutors 
adjusted themselves to preconditions or newly given principles, but they re-formed some 
features of the discourse space and the interlocutors, i.e. themselves, too.
for a long time in European modernity, there were some prototypical social and cultural 
groups that belonged to basic types of language varieties, i.e. those who spoke regional or 
local dialects and those who spoke the standard. In the Central European region these two 
types dominated the linguistic communication system (and its scientific description) during 
the 19th and the first half of the 20th century. As a result of the lower level of urbanization 
and the high proportion of the population living in villages (in traditional village communi-
ties) and working in agriculture, the role of local dialects was more important in the region 
than urban dialects, as compared to western Europe. Certainly, there were and are diver-
gences from this average, e.g. the Czech territories had a higher level of urbanization than 
others (Poland, Hungary or Romania). The German settlements in Transylvania, and north-
ern parts of the historical Hungary lived in closed towns for centuries, and used traditional 
dialects that slowly diverged from the German originals and the German standard. 
In general, the two basic speech community types dominated most of the Central Euro-
pean region until the millennium, although in a gradually weakening and changing fashion. 
At least one-third evolved and joined the two, transforming the social and cultural back-
ground of language.
One basic type is the peasant speech community. Rural people belong here, farm labour-
ers, farmers, craftsmen. They live in villages, where all the members of the population are 
aborigines, they are acquainted with each other, usually speak the same dialect as their 
vernacular, supported by their everyday talk, and have similar cultural customs. Important 
factors are as follows:
• the cumulative culture of these communities is based on traditions, i.e. the replicative, 
repetitive nature of the schemas, including linguistic ones, when participating in inter-
actions; this means, among other things, that the linguistic markers of local dialects are 
maintained despite growing influences from other language varieties,
• the individual belongs basically to one social group, also as a speech community, this 
group is the village; this is the social, linguistic and intellectual, emotional domain 
where the individual forms and experiences directly her/his identity, e.g. when s/he gets 
into contact with others whose identity rests also on the same cultural and linguistic 
knowledge,
• the individual of these communities usually has an awareness of the wider relations, 
with reflexive and self-reflexive knowledge on locality,
• the communities of this type have strong regional contacts (in the sense of local region), 
for instance by marriages, local fairs or markets, church, regional centres of commerce, 
public administration, health care (the latter ones rather since the 1950s or 1960s), while 
cultural and linguistic contacts with remote centres, the global national or even Euro-
pean communities are rare and loose.
Another basic speech community type is the one that speaks the standard or a variety close 
to the standard. Intellectuals, educated people, many of the urban citizens, also those who 
speak dialects close to the standard belong here. The populations of these groups come from 
all parts of a society and language community. Some of them have the standard as their 
vernacular, others have learned it at a certain stage of socialization, as an addition to the 
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knowledge of other varieties, primarily the vernacular (see e.g. Chambers 1995). Important 
factors include the following:
• the cumulative culture of these communities is based on the maintenance and improve-
ment of the codified language variety, the standard, closely related to other domains of 
education; moderate innovations are accepted and supported; the standard is main-
tained independently of the geographical and cultural position of and other varieties 
known by the speakers,
• the maintenance and improvement of the standard takes place in a relatively dynamic 
network system, but partly also by an institutional (academic) network for codification,
• the standard variety is part of the elite culture, spoken by those who have the standard as 
their vernacular, also by many highly educated people and by most of the middle classes, 
• the standard is usually not a specific variety of any geographical region, though its use 
is a significant feature of the communication in larger cities and cultural centres, the 
capitals,
• the communities and individuals speaking the standard have a high degree of aware-
ness of this variety, as well as being self-aware, i.e. they define themselves and their 
linguistic and cultural environment deliberately.
A third basic speech community type evolved gradually in Central Europe. This development 
started in the 1960s, when teenagers and people in their twenties formed a generation that grew 
up after the wwII. These generations did not automatically believe in the communist ideal and 
ideology, saw the false directions in social life, and realized that language in public communi-
cation is badly manipulated. Since all direct reactions of this perception were impossible, in-
direct methods were employed, with vivid fantasy and innovative force. Among these methods 
were the extended use of irony, grotesque, slang and urban popular lexicon, vulgarity, not only 
in spontaneous conversation among teenagers, but in literature, films and the theatre, too. The 
official reaction was completely and rigorously refusing, albeit the process could not be stopped. 
At the historical moment of the regime change, and in the decades that followed it, new 
generations developed a communication culture that accepted these relatively fresh ways of 
talk step by step. Around 1990 this process seemed to explode as this urban popular way of 
talk invaded the media, followed by commercial communication, interactions between 
strangers, and discourses on grave, even tragic topics, too.
The third prototypical group of communities and individuals is the one where people 
speak popular, i.e. urban folk varieties. This type has the following features:
• the cumulative culture of these communities is based on the radical transformation of 
traditions, i.e. it is innovative, non-replicative as much as possible; this means, among 
other things, that the linguistic markers of speakers are the new expressions, meaning 
structures, and ways of construal,
• the sources of linguistic creativity come from all kinds of varieties, including foreign 
languages, to construe adequate linguistic expressions for a given state of affairs at the 
moment of the interaction, and individual creativity and fantasy have a great role,
• the individual belongs basically to several social groups, also to speech communities, 
this is the individual’s personal social and communication network, the self-identity is 
given by the system of the vernacular and the other learned and created varieties,
• the innovative varieties are created and used in situations with momentary, local validity,
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• language contacts, i.e. contacts with others who use language in the same innovative 
way, is based on personal mobility, migration, travel and electronic communication, 
irrespective of the interlocutor’s cultural and linguistic knowledge,
• these communities have become relatively independent of real spatial and temporal 
conditions through the use of the internet,
• the individual belonging to these communities usually has an awareness of the wider 
relations, with a reflexive and self-reflexive look at the universal factors of current 
language use.
5.4. Although the societies were transformed from above artificially after 1945 in the Central 
European region, and another non-organic but basically expected and approved change took 
place in and after 1990, the system of language varieties was modified in a slower way. The 
status of the standard variety and its relation to the other varieties has been a central issue 
for the societies and language communities in the region. 
Generally speaking, the standard variety was adopted and adapted by the communist 
leaders. Most of them were of lower middle class or upper working class origin, speaking an 
urban dialect. In the countryside, in villages the local communist party secretary had the 
local dialect as his/her vernacular. 
The standard, regarded as the perfect and comprehensible variant of the language for every-
one, was used to mediate all information and propaganda. It was left out of the direct class war, 
the social and ideological, also cultural transformation of the society, concerning language’s 
formal (phonological, morphological and syntactic) norms. Nevertheless, the use of stigmatized 
non-standard forms by the new political elite showed a lack of education for most standard 
users, while these middle class groups were forced to hide their standard usage in many cases. 
On the other hand, the codified variety could be used as a tool for social homogenization, 
at least indirectly. Interestingly and ironically enough, this trend met the intention of tradi-
tional academic linguistics, which declared the historical unification of language. In reality 
the unification of the language community was thought to end in one variety, the standard, 
as a teleological development on the long run. Although Marrism in the Soviet Union de-
clared at the end of the 1940s that all social classes have their variety, this idea was soon 
dismissed by the party. 
However, the standard variety was deprived of its social and cultural origins. In the cul-
tural policy of the central political powers of the region, it was not any more the linguistic 
and cultural medium and result of the development of the middle classes and the nation, but 
the medium and mark of the rise of the working class. At the same time, middle class people 
and those aware of the cultural and historical role of the standard in the development of the 
language community and the nation, and also as the ideal, perfect completion of the nation-
al language, considered language, national language in particular, to be one of the domains 
where traditional universal and national values can be rescued from the destructive forces of 
the communist rule.
Nevertheless, the picture is yet more complex. The historical process is one of suppres-
sion, stigmatization and counteractions. 
Traditional linguistics predicted the death of local dialects for inner, linguistic reasons, 
from the 1940s for three or four decades. As mentioned, those committed to the linguistic 
theoretical framework based on neo-grammatical and structural ideas were convinced that 
the general direction of historical language development will result in the unification of 
varieties within one language, for structural and cultural reasons. This idea caused, among 
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other things, the stigmatization of traditional local, i.e. rural dialects, along with the later 
developments of urban popular varieties. These varieties were declared unsuitable for the 
complex communication forms and conceptualization ways (i.e. ways of grammatically and 
stylistically adequate expression). This view of language showed parallels with the dominant 
political ideology and underpinned, though unintentionally, the political stigmatization of 
the peasantry and the middle classes. Also, forced social transformation from above as a 
method was supported indirectly through it. 
Certainly, there were differences between the national traditions of linguistics in relation 
to the standard variety in the Central European region. while Hungarian linguistics was 
committed to the view of a secondary role of dialects, Czech linguists, the Prague School in 
particular, demonstrated the multifunctional nature of language mapped in varieties. And 
this prevalent view had nothing to do with contemporary ideas of formal theories, sociolin-
guistic and pragmatic investigations in international linguistics from the 1950s.
After 1990, the social status of the varieties changed strongly. The absolute value and role 
of the standard became undermined, even stigmatized in some cases, while others were re-
habilitated, in the course of democratization and pluralization. for many speakers and lin-
guists, the standard variety is treated as a source of linguistic suppression and stigmatization 
(linguicism), as a variant that is imposed artificially on the language community and society 
to maintain the power of the elite.
The functions of the traditional rural dialects and the recent urban dialects increased and 
their prestige rose. Also, a number of these varieties became a definite and overt factor in the 
formation and demonstration of the identity and identification of individuals and groups. 
Thus, the hierarchic system of language varieties with the standard in the centre and the 
dialects on the periphery turned into a heterarchic network system whereby the varieties are 
interpreted by their complex functions for the adequacy of their construal performance, their 
originality and identity power (see e.g. Kontra ed. 2003).
5.5. Every society, language community and state develops and maintains a kind of social 
semantics. This social semantics comprises the ways of seeing and construing things in 
language, the conventionalized meanings of linguistic expressions. Meaning construction is 
a crucial factor for community members to join in comprehending the world and the part of 
it they belong to. 
Before 1990, social semantics was controlled and directed by the centre of the communist 
parties, and in the general questions, by the Soviet communist party. Meaning was taken as 
a rule about how to use a word or an expression, and this rule was given to the population as 
an a priori law, i.e. something that is beyond the user’s will and control, beyond discussion 
and critique. This kind of social semantics collapsed by the late 1980s.
After 1990, the social nature of meaning has changed. The realization that meaning as 
the semantic content of a linguistic expression is partially conventional but is always object 
to joint meaning construction, prevailed. In other words, interlocutors join in the compre-
hension of what the speaker said, they agree on the meaning of the discourse in dialogic 
processes in discussions.
As a consequence, dictionaries began to give meaning definitions in accordance with the 
everyday use, i.e. joint meaning construction. In contrast with the censored dictionary (see 
page 57–58), the 2003 new edition of the Hungarian academic dictionary gives realistic se-
mantic accounts of certain concepts and their linguistic expressions of public administration 
(see Pusztai ed. 2003).
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6. The present paper has given an overview of the linguistic situation in Central Europe, how 
the historical developments have influenced language, language use, community formation 
and individual action, and also, in the opposite direction, how language, communication and 
language communities have affected politics and ideology, after world war II, and more 
specifically after 1990 in Central Europe. The investigation focused on the features of lan-
guage, in particular on the social, cultural and political power factors of the languages used 
in the region, and the relations between them.
The colonial and postcolonial situation in Central Europe resembles the situation in Af-
rican and Asian (post)colonies, but also differs from it. During the years of the Soviet colo-
nial rule, the states of Central Europe did not form a part of the Soviet Union in the legal 
sense, there was no Soviet (i.e. mainly Russian) elite settled in the region. Still, the cultural 
effect on communication and language was strong enough. A centralized hierarchic com-
munication system was introduced with strict censorship, with control on social semantics, 
and meaning was defined in the ideological centre. Linguistic homogenization was a relevant 
goal; it resulted in the levelling of linguistic performance and creativity, with innovation 
fading, and free identification and reflection, self-reflection on language use and joint action 
being severely constrained.
In 1990 the situation turned into its opposite in most cases. A heterarchical, decentralized 
communication system was built, with freedom of speech and human rights in general in 
focus. The region has been subject to diverse cultural effects on communication and lan-
guage, mainly from the western world. These effects are manifested in various ways accord-
ing to cultural and ideological differences. A decentralized heterarchical network commu-
nication system has been developed with general democratic control, whose basic features 
include dialogue, discussion about social semantics, and meaning (i.e. the content of utter-
ances, primarily in public communication) not defined in one ideological centre. Linguistic 
heterogenization is the current practice with reflections: the radical change has resulted in 
the acknowledgment of and reflections on variability in language, its functions for adequate 
conceptual construal, linguistic expression, individual and group identity and the like. In 
this process the view of language as a simple tool to be used for control has been replaced 
by the interpretation of language as the human capacity for joint acts and comprehension, 
with creativity and innovation challenging conventions, whereby creativity and innovation 
are appreciated, free identification and reflection, self-reflection on language use and joint 
action are supported, certainly in varieties and with critical opposing views, too.
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apoStropHic Fiction and Joint attEntion in LyricS 
a SociaL cognitivE approacH
szilárd tátrai
Abstract
This paper offers a functional, more specifically social cognitive interpretation of apostro-
phe. Under the proposal, this figure of speech involves the special functioning of joint atten-
tion as a feature of linguistic activities (cf. Tomasello 2002, Sinha 2005, see also Tátrai 2011). 
At the same time, it is also a characteristic, even defining property of lyrical poetry (see 
Tátrai 2012). The proposal will be backed up by the study of lyrics produced by the Hungar-
ian alternative rock band Quimby.
The interpretation to be offered here departs from the received view that is dominant in 
the rhetorical tradition; for example, it rejects the need for situating apostrophe in the system 
of figures of speech. Instead, it makes an attempt at the cognitive linguistic adaptation of 
certain insights of literary theory (cf. Frye 1998, Culler 1981) about the relationship between 
apostrophe and lyrical poetry. My departure from the rhetorical tradition is motivated pri-
marily by its basic incompatibility with the view of meaning characteristic of functional 
cognitive linguistics. From the adopted perspective, meaning is not seen as a mental object 
existing prior to linguistic activity, but rather as an intersubjective act (within a scene of 
joint attention) which allows its participants to construe and share their experiences of the 
world (cf. Sinha 1999, Croft 2009, Verschueren 1999). Once the social character of linguistic 
cognition is taken as a point of departure, it is worth devoting special attention to apostro-
phe, given the inherently discursive basis of this figure of speech.
Keywords: apostrophe, lyrics, joint attention, intersubjectivity, fictional discourse, spa-
tio-temporal relations, social relations, mental states 
1. Theoretical background
Recent decades have seen the publication of several theoretical works which place more 
emphasis on the social (interactional, discursive) grounding of linguistic cognition, along 
with its implications (see. e.g. Tomasello 1999, 2003, 2011, Sinha 1999, 2001, Croft 2009).
It is a general feature of functional cognitive linguistic models that (whether explicitly or 
implicitly) they conceptualize the evolution and functioning of language as an epigenetic in-
teraction between the human brain/mind and the physical/social environment. On the one hand, 
the concept of epigenesis highlights the fact that linguistic cognition crucially depends on 
genetically based, innate cognitive abilities (processes and structures). On the other, it also 
ascribes special significance to the constructive role of the physical/social environment in the 
elaboration of those abilities (cf. Karmiloff-Smith 1996). Under this explanation, environmental 
stimuli do not simply trigger a fully developed genetic program. Rather, relevant experiences of 
the environment assume a decisive role in the elaboration and emergent refinement of the initial, 
genetically determined perceptual and behavioural repertoire (cf. Sinha 2005).
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In this context, elaboration refers to the fact that simpler or more general constructs de-
velop into more complex or more specific ones. Emergence, for its part, highlights the ten-
dency that the above development gives rise to new properties and levels of the human 
cognitive system that cannot be simply deduced from the processes and structures serving 
as their basis.
It follows from the above that the potential scope of human cognitive development is 
crucially determined by the simple interactions occurring between the human body (with its 
characteristic, species-specific biological features) and the physical environment. This em-
bodied grounding (Sinha 1999) of human cognition makes an essential contribution to our 
ability to conceptualize and linguistically construe our experiences of the world. Embodied 
experiences are mapped onto concepts which are in turn mapped onto linguistic symbols, 
thus the symbols also (indirectly) map embodied experiences (cf. Lakoff–Johnson 1999, 
Rohrer 2007). However, recognizing the essential dependence of linguistic cognition on 
embodied experience does not amount to a claim that the former can be reduced to the latter. 
Our personal “coming into possession” of the world only partially explains the unique emer-
gent nature of linguistic cognition. for a comprehensive explanation, one also needs to be 
mindful that humans do not simply take the world into their possession but rather also share 
it in the context of social interactions. Put differently, our embodied experience of the world 
only “becomes” language by being embedded into the socio-cultural praxis which is formed 
by our joint social activities (cf. zlatev 1997). It is in this framework that people can make 
their experiences of the world accessible to others. In view of all this, the discursive  ground-
ing of linguistic cognition (Sinha 1999) must also be regarded as crucial.
The process of dynamic meaning generation is framed by discourses interpretable as joint 
attentional scenes (Tomasello 1999, Sinha 2005). Joint attentional scenes are characterized 
by the fact that their participants, the speaker(s) and the recipient(s) initiate interactions with 
each other through the medium of some natural language or languages, and by directing and 
following each other’s attention, constructively contribute to the production and comprehen-
sion of a referential scene (or scenes) with the aim of satisfying their communicative needs 
(cf. Verschueren 1999: 61–65). 
Thus, one precondition of the employment of linguistic symbols is for humans to regard 
each other as mental agents similar to themselves, possessing the ability to direct and follow 
their discourse partners’ attention (cf. Tomasello 1999, Sinha 2005). This allows them to 
bring their own mental states (intentions, desires, beliefs and emotions) to symbolic expres-
sion, and at the same time also influence the mental states of others (see also Croft 1994, 
Searle 1998). The ability to identify with others is presumably an exceptional biological 
endowment which is put to use and elaborated in social interactions (cf. Sinha 2005, 2009; 
Tomasello 1999). Hence, a crucial feature of linguistic cognition is its intersubjectivity: we 
learn to comprehend the world through language by comprehending others with respect to 
ourselves, and ourselves with respect to others (cf. Tomasello 2003, 2011).
An additional feature of the use of linguistic symbols (by no means independently of our 
ability to interpret others as well as ourselves as mental agents) is referentiality. Intersub-
jective linguistic cognition is characterized by a triadic system of relationships, also known 
as a referential triangle: somebody [1] directs the attention of somebody else [2] onto some-
thing [3] (cf. Sinha 2005). As a result, linguistic reference can be interpreted as an intersub-
jective act whereby we as speakers use linguistic symbols to direct the recipients’ attention 
to some distinct entity of the world around us (and including us), or better, a referential scene 
which involves that entity (see also Brisard 2002: xii).
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Joint attentional scenes establish the intersubjective context in which the referential in-
terpretation of linguistic symbols (their grounding in the discourse world) becomes possible 
(cf. Tomasello 1999). Looked at in this way, context does not have a reality prior to, and in-
dependently of, utterances. Rather, it is a dynamic system of relationships which includes the 
discourse participants along with their physical, social and mental worlds (cf. Verschueren 
1999: 75–114, Tátrai 2011: 51–67, see also Croft 2009). The physical world comprises the 
system of spatio-temporal relations as perceived by the discourse participants. The social 
world consists of socio-cultural relationships as processed by interlocutors. finally, the men-
tal world includes the mental states (intentions, desires, beliefs and emotions) that the par-
ticipants are attributing to themselves and each other. Thus, the intersubjective context 
emerges in a dynamic process: the participants make lesser or greater efforts in order to reach 
referential interpretations which satisfy their communicative demands, by relying on their 
knowledge pertaining to the physical, social and mental worlds of the discourse.
2. method and data
The corpus of my study is supplied by the lyrics of 40 Hungarian songs written by the alter-
native rock band Quimby. In 38 cases, Tibor Kiss is credited as the songwriter, and in two 
cases Líviusz Varga. Of the 40 texts, 13 come from the album Diligram (1997), 15 from 
Kilégzés (2005), and 12 from Lármagyűjtögető (2009).
The selection of these lyrics was motivated by the fact that texts belonging to this genre 
can be regarded as examples of “occasional poetry” which are aimed at the satisfaction of a 
widespread everyday demand for lyricism. Lyrics by Quimby are also peculiar, however: as 
lyrics of “alternative music”, they constitute a transition between popular hits and poems 
belonging to the literary canon. This makes it easier to employ the interpretive model under 
elaboration, and to potentially extend its application in both directions. The aim of this study 
is to lay the qualitative foundations for an extended quantitative study, supplying specific 
hypotheses that can be tested in the future.
3. Apostrophic fiction in the lyrics
3.1. Under an initial interpretation, apostrophe is a figure of speech which allows the speaker 
to exploit the opportunities resulting from the discursive nature of linguistic activities by turn-
ing away from the real addressee of her utterance, addressing some other entity instead (which 
may be present or absent, real or imaginary, human or non-human, with the latter category 
including living creatures, objects and abstract concepts) (Tátrai 2008: 52, 2011: 58). In contrast 
with embedded discourses such as quotations (cf. Tátrai–Csontos 2009), discourses created by 
apostrophe run in parallel and simultaneously with the matrix discourse.
It is important to add, moreover, that apostrophic discourse may involve either a factual 
or a fictional turning away from the addressee. In the case of factual apostrophe, the speak-
er turns to another person (subject) who is physically present in the speech situation. To put 
it in a simpler way: in the course of a conversation, we are dropping a word to somebody and 
then resume our temporarily interrupted discourse.
(1) Átmegyünk a felejtőbe
 Ráülünk az énlejtőre
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 Csúszunk egész lazáig
 Iszunk egy csésze akármit
 Taxi!
 ’Oblivion is where we go,
 sliding on the slope of our egos
 we’re getting loose with gravity    
 and drink a cup of anythin’
 Taxi!
 (Taxi [1997])
In the fictional discourse of (1), whose participants are marked by first person plural forms 
with inclusive reference (including both the speaker and the addressee), the exclamation Taxi! 
can be considered as an instance of factual apostrophe. It can easily receive a metonymical 
interpretation, according to which the speaker is addressing a physically present other person 
(a taxi driver).
However, as the initial interpretation offered above also makes it clear, apostrophe often 
(and in lyrical texts characteristically) fails to be directed at an addressee who is indeed 
available for being addressed. In cases of fictional apostrophe, the speaker is creating an 
apostrophic discourse by ignoring the physiological and discursive grounding of linguistic 
cognition (cf. Tátrai 2011: 26–35). She initiates linguistic interactions with entities with 
which this is not strictly speaking possible (unless the limitations of linguistic cognition are 
ignored), either because they are not physically present, or because they are not human be-
ings.
(2)  Szeretni, Istenem, milyen nehéz!
 ’To love, my God, how hard it is!’
 (Don Quijote ébredése ’Don Quijote’s awakening’ [2005])
In (2), the form of address Istenem ’my God’, highly conventional as it is, exemplifies fiction-
al apostrophe: here, the speaker is initiating human communication with a non-human being. 
3.2. In view of the above, apostrophic fiction can be said to produce a joint attentional scene 
prototypically characterized by direct interaction. In its context, the speaker is directing the 
attention of the apostrophic discourse’s addressee (with the employment of linguistic sym-
bols) to a referential scene (a linguistically represented event or state) which can be directly 
observed by both of them. In (3a), this is made explicit by the proximal space deictic pronoun 
ez ‘this’, while in (3b), by the first person singular form of the verb of perception lát ‘see’.
(3a) Tükröm, tükröm, tükröm, mondd meg nékem:
 Jól áll-e ez nekem?
 ’My mirror, my mirror, my mirror, do tell me:
    Does this suit me well?’
 (Don Quijote ébredése ’Don Quijote’s awakening’ [2005])
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(3b) Ismerlek, Mari,
 és kacsintanék,
 mondanám, hogy menjünk, de látom,
 hogy nálad még be van ragadva a kézifék.
 
 ’I know you Mary
 and I’d just wink
 and say »Let’s go«, but I [can] see 
 that by your side the hand brake is still stuck’
 (Mari ’Mary’ [2005])
During all this, the addressee of the actual discourse (the lyrics’ recipient) fulfils the role of 
eavesdropper with respect to the apostrophic discourse, listening in to what the interlocutors 
are saying whilst the latter are unaware of her presence (cf. frye 1957). In addition, apo-
strophic fiction offers further opportunities as well (for the concept of fictionality, see Iser 
1993, Anderegg 1998). The apostrophic fiction’s addressee can pose as if she were present as 
an onlooker, with a chance  to observe the referential scene, this time with the interlocutors’ 
consent. what is more, she can also act as if she were a marginal participant that could be 
talked to, and even play with the idea as if she were also talking as a kind of “vocalist” (on 
participant roles, see Verschueren 1999: 77–87).
In terms of the organization of spatial and temporal relations, it has important implica-
tions that in cases of apostrophic fiction, the space and time of the joint attentional scene 
coincide with those of the referential scene. In other words, the events being construed lin-
guistically unfold at the same time and place as the joint attentional scene, and typically 
feature the same participants as well. This can be contrasted with narrative fiction (charac-
teristic of epic texts and dramas), in which there is spatial as well as temporal distance be-
tween the referential scene (the story) and the joint attentional scene (the storytelling) (for 
details, see Tátrai 2008: 50–54, 2015: 12–16).
(4) most olyan könnyű minden,
 szinte csak a semmi tart.
 […]
 Alattunk a tenger,
 szemben a nap zuhan.
 […]
 G dúrban zúgják a fákon a kabócák,
 hogy láss csodát, láss ezer csodát,
 láss ezer csodát.
 ’now everything is so light,
 it’s as though only nothing is holding us.
 […]
 The sea is beneath us
 and the sun is falling opposite.
 […]
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 Cicadas are buzzing in G major on the trees:
 see miracles, see a thousand miracles,
 see a thousand miracles.’
 (Autó egy szerpentinen ’Car on a serpentine road’ [2005]) 
In (4), the first person plural word form alattunk ’beneath us’ makes is evident that the par-
ticipants of the joint attentional scene are at the same time also participants of the referential 
scene. More specifically, they are participants of a referential scene which unfolds simulta-
neously with the joint attentional scene (cf. the use of most ’now’, tart ’is holding [us]’, zúgják 
’they are buzzing’, láss ’see’), and the deictic centre for spatial orientation also lies with the 
position of the discourse participants (vö. alattunk ’beneath us’, szemben ’opposite [us]’). All 
this has two major implications. firstly, as illustrated by (5), any linguistic construal of the 
addressee may result in apostrophic discourse. Here, for example, second person singular is 
construed in a fictional discourse enacting a face-to-face interaction. 
(5) Hárman egy ladikban, 
 evezünk felfelé, 
 Hátul egy rablóhal, 
 S elöl te meg én.
 ’There’s three of us in the boat,
 we’re rowing upstream,
 behind us, a predatory fish,
 and in front, you and me.’
 Rablóhal ’Predatory fish’ [1997])
Secondly, in close correlation with the strategy to ignore limitations of human communica-
tion, the spatial and temporal relations of apostrophic fiction become accessible and inter-
pretable as constituting not so much a physical but much rather a metaphysical world.
It also follows from the above that apostrophic fiction results in the special organization 
not only of spatial and temporal but also of interpersonal relations. It can be said about 
linguistic cognition in general that any experiencing of the world is framed by an intersub-
jective system of relationships. However, apostrophic fiction goes further than this: here, 
experiencing the world is itself represented as an intersubjective relation (cf. Culler 1981: 
135–154). 
(6a) Sikítani akarok egyet Baby
 Lesz-e szex ma a szabadban?
 ’I wanna make a scream Baby
 Shall we have sex today in the open? 
 (Country Joe McDonald [2005])
(6b) Átkozott harangok, tücskök, madarak! 
 Hagyjatok! 
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 ’You damned bells, grasshoppers, birds!
 Leave me alone!’
 (Álmatlan dal ’Song of insomnia’ [2009])
(6c) Mint telihold az éjszakával
 Együtt nőttünk fel a fákkal
 Te idő sosem vicceltél
 ’Like the full moon with the night,
 we grew up together with the trees
 Time, you were never joking.’
 (Aranykor [1997])
(6d) sehol se talállak téged életem
 ’I can find you nowhere, my life.’
 (Sehol se talállak ’I can find you nowhere’ [2005]) 
fictional apostrophe makes it possible to take entities which are normally available as objects 
to linguistic cognition, and construe them as subjects participating in a system of social rela-
tionships. In (6a), a desire for the loved one (Baby) who is absent; in (6b), certain objects and 
animals (harangok, tücskök, madarak ‘bells, grasshoppers, birds’); and in (6c–d), issues asso-
ciated with abstract concepts (idő ’time’, élet ’life’) get construed in a discursive way. Example 
(6d), in which élet ‘life’ appears not as a metaphorical form of address directed to the loved one 
but rather in its own right, also aptly illustrates the paradox of apostrophic fiction: while I do 
not even know where you are, getting in touch (entering a discourse with you) poses no prob-
lem. The main lesson to be drawn from this is that in interpreting the “as if” of apostrophic 
fiction, it is difficult and even unreasonable to ignore the social character of linguistic cognition.
In addition to processing spatial, temporal and interpersonal relations, comprehending 
the mental states of the participants (their beliefs, desires, intentions and emotions) is also 
an integral part of the processing of apostrophic fiction. Such “embarrassing” manifestations 
of the human mind as apostrophe ought not to be exclusively explained by reference to emo-
tions (Culler 1981). Rather, it is worth highlighting that even in this case, intersubjective 
linguistic cognition involves the three dimensions of knowledge, action and emotions (cf. 
Croft 1994). In the context of the intersubjective directing of attention, the speaker of an 
apostrophic discourse not only brings her emotions to expression but rather also her beliefs, 
and she does so in order to influence the beliefs held by the apostrophe’s addressee and (with 
a fictional transfer) by the addressee of the actual discourse. The aim is either to get her to 
recognize something she has been familiar of, or to share with her some new knowledge 
about the world surrounding (and including) the interlocutors. Additionally, the power of 
apostrophe is manifested not only in the sharing of particular experiences but also in attempts 
at getting someone to act (cf. Culler 1981: 137–143, Tátrai 2008: 54). This is what we find in 
cases when the addressee (and by a fictional transfer also the recipient of the lyrics) is en-
couraged to bring about some change in the world surrounding her: do something she has 
not previously done or stop doing what she has been doing up to this point. 
(7a) Pofozzatok fel, bajszos angyalok
 Mutassátok, hol van a szerelem
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 ’Give me a punch, you angels with a moustache,
 show me where love is.’
 (Homo Defectus [2005])
 
(7b)  Menj már a pokolba,
 Vagy menj felőlem a mennybe akár,
 sodorj egy cigit, kannibál!
 ’Go to hell, come on,
 or go to heaven, I don’t care,
 roll me a cigarette, cannibal!’
 (Kannibálkarnevál [1997])
 
(7c) Küldj át a szőrös szívbe markolót
 S nyúzzuk le az égboltról a rákfogót
 ’Send me over as I’m grabbing a hairy heart,
 and let’s strip the lobster trap off the sky’
 (Dal Lászlónak ’Song for László’ [1997])
 
(7d) Gyűlnek a gerlék, várni kár
 Leteperhetnél végre már
 ’The doves are gathering, it’s a shame to wait,
 You should overpower me at last.’
 (Haverom a J. J. Cale ’J. J. Cale is my pal’ [2009]) 
 
In (7a–c), the highlighted imperative verb forms (pofozzatok fel ’give me a punch’, mutassátok 
’show me’, menj ’go’, sodorj ’roll’, küldj át ’send [me] over’, nyúzzuk le ’lets strip off’) make it 
explicit that an apostrophic address is often also an apostrophic command (with 26 out of 40 
songs including imperative forms). Moreover, it is not to be overlooked that getting others to 
act also has indirect forms of expression, as exemplified by leteperhetnél ‘you should/could 
overpower me’ in (7d). Thus, apostrophe cannot be interpreted exclusively as an outburst of 
passion, of emotions. It provides a special opportunity for the expression of beliefs, desires 
and intentions, and for influencing the corresponding mental states of others.
3.3. when the above considerations are brought to bear on the relationship between apostro-
phe and lyric, then it is worth regarding apostrophic fiction as a characteristic property of 
lyric as a general literary form and of (song) lyrics as a specific lyrical genre. It should be 
noted at the outset that from a functional cognitive perspective, the concepts of literary form 
and genre are open, prototype-based categories organized as complex systems of properties 
and expectations (cf. Tolcsvai Nagy 2001: 331–338, 2008, see also Genette 1988). lyric as a 
general literary form is not a basic level category, rather it is at a higher level of abstraction 
(cf. Tátrai 2008: 49–50). By contrast, songs can be treated as representing a basic level cat-
egory and at the same time a prototypical lyrical genre (besides the genre of odes, cf. Culler 
1981: 135–145). Songs rarely include epic or dramatic elements, the employment of fictional 
apostrophe is, however, one of their essential properties. 
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The theoretical insight implied by the previous section, namely that the lyrical speech 
situation is basically created and evoked by apostrophic fiction (cf. Culler 1981: 135–154), is 
also confirmed by the corpus of lyrics under study. Of the 40 songs, 38 include fictional 
apostrophe in some form, i.e. explicit marking of the speaker’s turning away from the actu-
al addressee of the song. This exceptionally high proportion overwhelmingly supports the 
hypothesis that apostrophe belongs to the central properties underlying lyric as proto-
type-based category. 
Having said this, it is worth taking a closer look at the two songs which do not employ 
the figure of speech of apostrophe.
 
(8a) kettesben élünk, én és a bank, az első közös kis lakásban.
 meztelen testünk összefeszül a hitelből vett nászágyban.
 ő kölcsönadott nekem egy lehelletet és én cserébe gazdagon  jutalmazom
 beengedtem és most már marad, hosszú évekig baszhatom.
’we are living here just the two of us, me and the bank, in the first small flat 
we own. 
our naked bodies stretch out in the matrimonial bed bought by credit.
she lent me a breath of air and in return I’m rewarding her generously
I have let her in and now she’s staying, I can screw her [or: ‘I’m screwed’ 
[figurative meaning] for years and years.’
 (én és a bank ’Me and the bank’ [2009]) 
 
(8b) Üdvözlöm érintem nem mutatom
 Nem emlékeztetem nem kutatom
 Nem zavarom zavarom csak figyelem
 Belefeledkezem vele utazom
 
 ’I’m greeting,1 I’m touching, I’m not showing,
 I’m not reminding, nor searching,
 I’m not disturbing, I’m only watching,
 I’m getting immersed [in it/her], I’m travelling along.’
 (Magam adom ’I’m giving myself’ [2005]) 
with regard to (8a), presenting the full text of the song in question, it may be suspected that 
we are faced with a non-prototypical song, given the shortness of the text and the punch line 
relying on the polysemy of the final word (with baszhatom meaning either ‘I can screw her’ 
or ‘I’m screwed’ in a figurative sense). The same point about non-prototypicality may also 
apply to (8b), which is based on the figure of speech of isocolon. However, we need not be 
satisfied with this overly trivial argument. Rather, it should be noted, for example, that the 
“real-time unfolding” character of lyrical texts is found in both songs, as suggested by the 
use of tenses, and creates a sense that the joint attentional scene and the referential scene are 
1 Due to the special property of Hungarian that definite objects can be morphologically marked by the verb, 
but with an inherent ambiguity regarding gender, the transitive verbs in this song can be interpreted as 
having either azt ’it’ or őt ’her’/’him’ as their syntactically unelaborated complement.
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simultaneous. In addition, the notion of apostrophic fiction need not be completely discarded 
either, despite the fact that the speaker’s turning away is not made linguistically explicit. It 
may be presumed that the speaker is turning here not to a person outside of the speech situ-
ation but rather to himself; he is acting as if he were talking to himself (cf. frye 2007). The 
actual addressee of the discourse is eavesdropping on him, as it were; alternatively, she can 
also pretend that she is the one who is talking (as suggested before).
The study also investigated the question as to what typical patterns of apostrophic fiction 
could be detected in the 38 songs which included explicit markers of the speaker’s turning away. 
Of the 38 lyrics, 15 consist entirely of apostrophic utterances, thus these examples can be in-
terpreted as texts in which the speaker is talking to the same apostrophic addressee from the 
beginning to the end. However, seven songs have also been found in which the apostrophic 
addressee is only addressed for part of the text’s length. 
(9) Most mondanám, de nem bírom.
 Megtehetném, mégsem szidom.
 Liliom volt az éjben, kósza sugár.
 Látod Nyina, múlik már.
 ’Now I would say it but I can’t.
 I could do that but I’m not scolding her.
 She was a lily in the night, a ray gone astray.
 Can you see nina, it’s going away.’ 
 (Nyina ’Nina’ [2005])
In the first three lines of (9), Nina is marked by third person forms; in the fourth line, how-
ever, she appears as an addressee marked by second person singular. The corpus includes 
nine additional texts in which multiple apostrophic discourses are initiated by the speaker.
(10) Sikoly a sorsa, 
 ha magába száll.
 Szponzora: téboly,
 bilincs és halál.
 Ez az útvesztőhely, mari,
 nem túl előkelő.
 Őrlángon égő, üregi szenvedély,
 most jöjj elő!
 
 ’Her fate is a scream
 when she’s lost in herself.
 Her sponsors are madness,
 handcuffs and death.
 This maze is the scaffold, mary,
 it’s not the most elegant.
 Passion burning in a cave on pilot-flame, 
 it’s time to come forward!
 (Mari ’Mary’ [2005])
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Example (10) begins in a way very similar to (9), with Mary first described in third person 
singular before the speaker is addressing her. However, the speaker then moves on to open 
up a new apostrophic discourse, using the address őrlángon égő, üregi szenvedély ’passion 
burning in a cave on pilot-flame’. The remaining seven lyrics feature apostrophic discourses 
in which both participants get to talk.
(11a) Mondd,
 Hol van az a furcsa fény
 Ami az éjt szúrja át?
 Hol lenne... ugyan már
 Jó éjszakát!
   
 ’Tell me
 where is that strange light
 that pierces through the night?
 Where would it be… forget it,
 good night!’
  (Hol volt hol nem volt ’Once upon a time’ [1997]) 
(11b) Valami nem hagy békén, valami jár a parton...
 Lefogadom, hogy a szerelem, na, ezt a fogadást tartom.
 […]
 felel a szellő értőn, felelek én is. 
 Kérdőn eljött értem az ágyad,
 Üzen a vágyad és most bennem árad szét.
 ’Something doesn’t leave me alone, something is walking on the shore.
 I bet it is love, hey, that’s a bet I’ll take.
 […]
 The breeze is answering in a savvy way, I will answer too.
 Your bed has come to ask for me,
 your desire is sending out a message and now it’s spreading in me.’
 (Cuba Lunatica [2009])
In examples like (11a–b), fictional apostrophic is so successful that the speaker even receives 
a verbal response. This discursive relationship even becomes the subject matter of reflection 
in (11b) (cf. Felel a szellő értőn, felelek én is ’The breeze is answering in a savvy way, I will 
answer too.’). 
4. Conclusions
The goal of this paper has been the elaboration of an interpretive model which accounts for 
the role of apostrophe in lyrical texts from a functional cognitive perspective. Although the 
theoretical and empirical grounding of the model requires further investigations, some gen-
eral remarks are already warranted.
Apostrophe, understood as the speaker’s turning away from the actual addressee, often 
(and in lyrical texts characteristically) initiates discourses with entities that cannot be (strict-
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ly speaking) addressed, unless the physiological and discursive limitations of linguistic cog-
nition are temporarily ignored. Crucial features of apostrophe include the following:
• fictional apostrophe construes a joint attentional scene prototypically characterized by 
direct interaction, in which the fictional speaker is directing the fictional addressee’s 
attention to a referential scene which both of them are able to observe directly.
• Apostrophic fiction makes it possible to take entities which are normally available as 
objects to linguistic cognition, and construe them (in the referential scene) as subjects 
participating in a system of social relationships.
• Apostrophe cannot be interpreted exclusively as an expression of the speaker’s emo-
tions in the context of her intersubjective directing of attention. Rather, it provides a 
special opportunity for the expression of beliefs, desires and intentions as well, and for 
influencing the corresponding mental states of others.
Thus, apostrophic fiction is a characteristic property of lyrical discourses in that it creates 
the lyrical speech situation (cf. Culler 1981: 135–154). However, it cannot be equated with 
lyricism. In particular, it must not be overlooked that the construal of referential scenes in 
apostrophic fiction also affords an important role to rhythm (cf. Simon 2014) as well as met-
aphorization (cf. Tolcsvai Nagy 2003). In addition, it needs to be emphasized that apostrophic 
fiction only creates an opportunity for aesthetic experience, in other words for transcending 
meaning generation (cf. Andreregg 1998), but does not guarantee its attainment. It does not 
suffice to ignore the embodied and discursive grounding of linguistic cognition; for an aes-
thetic experience that dual grounding needs to be transcended as well.
Source of the lyrics
http://www.zeneszoveg.hu/egyuttes/264/quimby-dalszovegei.html 
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